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Introduction
The Cyber Analogies Project was launched in 2012 to assist U.S. Cyber Command in identifying and developing relevant histori-
cal, economic, and other useful metaphors that could be used to enrich the discourse about cyber strategy, doctrine, and policy. 
The intent of the project is to provide useful insights, both for those with little technical background in or direct connection to 
cyberwar and cyber security and for those whose job it is to think about the spectrum of cyber-related issues every day. The project 
was conceived and carried out to help very senior, busy, responsible people understand topics and issues that are fast-moving and 
dynamic, and have potentially great consequences for society, security, and world affairs. 
The President has identified the cyber security threat as one of 
the most serious we face as a nation. Events in cyberspace con-
tinue to accelerate, as both nation-states and non-state actors 
seek to exploit asymmetrical advantages in this virtual domain. 
The risks and costs of failing to act skillfully and effectively are 
likely to be widespread, cascading, and almost surely highly 
disruptive. Many small-scale attacks can be—and are being—
prevented; but a major, mass-disruptive attack is a growing 
possibility against which current defenses are inadequate. 
There are several reasons for saying this. First, the nation’s 
cyber architecture relies on a multitude of asset types, configu-
rations of those assets, and multiple organizations pursuing 
strategies and policies—not always in concert. Second, there 
is no shared situational awareness across all networks, the 
absence of which minimizes chances of detecting adversarial 
activities. Third, the authorities, policies, rules of engagement, 
and division of effort to act in defense of cyberspace are not 
fully articulated, implemented, or even properly delegated. 
Fourth, there are insufficient trained and ready forces to act. 
Fifth, the information systems architecture has been built for 
availability, functionality, and ease of use, with considerations 
of security all too often an afterthought. Sixth, commercial 
firms in the private sector are reluctant to divulge penetra-
tions, as this would acknowledge vulnerability and possibly 
cause a loss of customer and shareholder confidence. Finally, 
and most closely related to the military sphere, cyberwar has 
not yet been fully integrated into more traditional concepts 
of operations. These gaps increase vulnerability to malicious 
activity—perhaps even to mass disruption of critical systems 
in the physical world—coming from cyberspace. 
The cyber threat continues to evolve swiftly. Things we 
value—personal wealth, national economic prosperity, in-
tellectual property, national security secrets—are all targets. 
More and more, these treasures reside in or depend upon 
cyberspace—the new battleground or, in Pentagon parlance, 
the “warfighting domain where adversaries are already operat-
ing.” Ability to keep pace with the cyber evolutionary curve, 
or perhaps to stay a step ahead of those who wish to do harm, 
depends on the ability to visualize how to fight in this new 
domain, just as strategists from earlier eras had to imagine 
how operating in the air, or with nuclear weapons, changed 
military affairs. Analogies drawn from earlier eras and differ-
ent disciplines have the potential to help with visualization, 
allowing us to think through new or difficult subjects. They 
offer us an inductive approach to developing an understand-
ing of high-level conceptual and operational issues related to 
cyber security and cyber warfare. Scrutiny of historical cases, 
which makes up much of this anthology, can at the very least 
lead to identification of similar problems and ways to address 
them—that either “worked” or did not. No historical example 
provides a perfect fit for current challenges, so any analogy 
must be carefully developed and not used in isolation. Still, 
historical analogizing is essential to the learning process. As 
H.G. Wells put it, “History is a race between education and 
catastrophe.” 
SURPRISE ATTACK
The primarily history-based analogies contained herein begin 
with a re-examination of Pearl Harbor. Teasing out implica-
tions of this case can help illuminate how to deal with the 




seminal, as the goal of the Japanese attack was not only to 
destroy key naval forces, but also to disrupt the ability of U.S. 
forces to respond to other strikes being launched simultane-
ously, across thousands of miles. The three chapters that begin 
this anthology (by James Wirtz, Michael Goodman, and Emily 
Goldman et al.) are cognizant of this operational-to-strategic 
linkage, and all derive key insights applicable to the process of 
shoring up cyber defenses against surprise attack. One of the 
most interesting observations is that Pearl Harbor was not a 
“bolt from the blue,” but rather came at the darkest, lowest 
point in U.S./Japan relations. Warnings were issued, but the 
actions taken in response to these warnings made the Pacific 
Fleet more vulnerable to an air attack. 
This analogy also suggests that we should not view cyber 
as separate from conventional military actions. A thinking 
adversary will probably want to link cyber with physical at-
tacks. Further, opponents are likely to grow more interested 
in employing cyber surprise when they see it as a way to dis-
able physical military capabilities. Historically, weaker parties 
turn to surprise to overwhelm stronger adversaries and prevent 
them from responding. Cyberwar techniques provide an op-
portunity to do exactly this, because modern militaries have 
grown so dependent on their information infrastructures. 
Indeed, the cyber domain holds the key to enabling—and 
disabling—logistics, as well as overall command and control. 
The Pearl Harbor case—along with others examined in this 
anthology—suggests that the solution to developing an effec-
tive response in real-time is not entirely a technological one. 
There is also a strategic response, guided by answers to the 
question “What kind of national strategy would deter the op-
ponent from launching an attack in the first place?” The best 
way may be to convince the adversary that a cyber Pearl Har-
bor will not achieve the desired effects; that the vulnerabilities 
they perceive as great are really much less so. The key is to 
reduce the attacker’s confidence that conventional capabilities 
can be crippled by strikes on cyber targets. And if there is a 
reluctance to escalate, i.e., to retaliate for a cyber attack with a 
“kinetic” response, then mitigation of the effects of the former 
becomes a key to deterrence, convincing the adversary that he 
is not winning. Currently, if we have a deterrence/mitigation 
strategy, it is based on preserving uncertainty in the adversary’s 
mind. If we can be more overt about mitigation, then we can 
add to the realm of uncertainty the factor of risk, so that the 
opponent is forced to ask the uncomfortable question: Which 
do we prefer: uncertainty or risk?
NUCLEAR PRE-DELEGATION
Given that avoiding another Pearl Harbor—i.e., a crippling 
“bolt from the blue” attack—was a prime driver of strategic 
thought in the nuclear era, the cyber analogies team thought 
it important to revisit this period, mining it for insights. 
Peter Feaver and Kenneth Geers have done just this, focus-
ing on the issue of pre-delegated authority to act, given the 
swift tempo of operations likely to unfold. This was a very 
significant problem when it came to dealing with the massive 
destruction that would accompany nuclear attacks delivered 
by inter-continental missiles that could reach anywhere across 
the world in about half an hour. In cyberspace, where the ef-
fects are likely to be simply disruptive—at least for now—the 
attacking timeline, and thus the need to respond, can be re-
duced to seconds. Pre-delegated authority is clearly going to 
be an important issue area into which strategists and policy 
makers will have to wade deeply. The analogy from the nuclear 
era is no doubt going to add value to their discourse. 
Pre-delegation raises the possibility that certain threat sce-
narios may oblige the national command authorities to do 
something that they would actually prefer not to—i.e., craft a 
set of allowed automatic military responses prior to any con-
flict. Pre-delegation was an inexpensive response to the Cold 
War nuclear “tri-lemma” (nukes must always be available for 
use; must never be used under conditions political leadership 
does not intend; and must remain under civilian control). Al-
though a cheap solution, pre-delegation raised—and contin-
ues to raise—tricky questions about implementation: How 
far down the chain of command should pre-delegation go? 
How public can pre-delegation protocols be? Can they be 
reversed? Under what circumstances and to which systems 
does pre-delegation apply? What is the role of pre-delegation 
in terms of signaling to and establishing credibility with po-
tential attackers? What does pre-delegation mean for private 
sector actors, given that, unlike nuclear weapons, there is no 




There are many skeptics—and many with much credibility—
who believe that cyber attacks are not now serious enough 
to merit pre-delegation. This skepticism must be addressed 
before any decisions about pre-delegation can be made. Even-
tually, a situation may emerge wherein pre-delegation is seen 
as so obvious and necessary—because of clearly demonstrated 
advances in cyber disruptive capabilities—that operating 
without it becomes unimaginable. Thus the nuclear age pro-
vides an important example to guide thinking on this topic. 
Early on, military custody of nuclear weapons was hugely con-
troversial. The initial idea was that civilians would physically 
hold the nukes to ensure civilian control. Pre-delegation was 
almost unthinkable. At some point, though, the decision was 
made that the military needed to retain physical custody. Op-
erational issues surrounding pre-delegation did not go away, 
but the controversy did. What was considered unthinkable 
in 1946 had become obvious by 1966. But we are still “in 
1946,” politically and psychologically, on the issue of cyber 
pre-delegation.
AIRPOWER AND AIR DEFENSE
Perhaps the historical analogy that comes closest to explain-
ing cyberwar is offered by the rise of airpower a century ago. 
From very early on, strategic thought about attack from the 
air diverged along two paths: one emphasized striking di-
rectly at an enemy homeland, without first having to defeat 
opposing land and naval forces; the other focused on the use 
of attack aircraft in close support of ground forces, or fleets 
at sea. Gregory Rattray’s contribution to this anthology keeps 
the dual nature of airpower clearly in mind, and provides an 
opportunity to consider whether strategic thinking about cy-
berwar reflects an awareness that this duality applies to the 
virtual domain as well. The history of air campaigns over the 
past century suggests that strategic attacks have, for the most 
part, failed to achieve the material or psychological effects 
desired. But airpower used in close support of military and 
naval forces completely transformed the face of battle in the 
20th century. If the air analogy holds, then the possibility is 
that strategic cyberwar—so greatly feared today—may have 
less impact on strategic affairs than cyber attacks mounted in 
conjunction with other military operations. 
With this in mind, Rattray hypothesizes that, as was the case 
with airpower, the attacker might have an advantage; but the 
swift pace of technological change might reverse this in favor 
of the defender. His discussion of the defeat of the Luftwaffe 
in the Battle of Britain—so soon after its run of blitzkrieg 
victories—is particularly illuminating. Another key topic that 
Rattray considers closely is the matter of human capital. In 
the realm of airpower this has always been a crucially impor-
tant factor; in the cyber domain the need for highly skilled, 
outstanding personnel is just as critical, if not more so. The 
implications for cyber education and training are profound, 
especially given the interest of U.S. Cyber Command in 
increasing its numbers by nearly five-fold, from the current 
thousand or so, over the coming years. 
Dorothy Denning and Bradley Strawser also work with the 
airpower analogy; but in their case they focus specifically on 
the matter of the ethical appropriateness of various defensive 
actions. Their typology of defensive options—a spectrum 
of measures ranging from active to passive, and internal to 
external—is both comprehensive and illuminating, and the 
parallels between air and cyber defense are many. Interest-
ingly, there is one major difference: active-external air defense 
measures run the ethical risk of causing destructive collateral 
damage, whereas similar cyberspace-based defensive actions 
are likely only to disrupt in unintended ways, not destroy. 
Thus, from their point of view, there may be more freedom to 
act—perhaps even to pre-delegate—in the cyber realm than 
in the domain of traditional air defense. But disruption may 
prove extremely costly, especially in an increasingly intercon-
nected world. This is a telling point made by the contribution 
that explores the economic warfare metaphor. 
ECONOMIC DISRUPTION AND 
COLLAPSE 
British attraction to and use of economic warfare during the 
opening months of World War I a century ago—what we 
might call a Britskrieg—raises the intriguing parallel notion 
of state actions in cyberspace destabilizing the global economy 
today. The British put their plan into effect swiftly, but abort-
ed the operation within weeks—probably the only strategic 




collateral damage was immense. The Great Crash of 1929 was 
terrible and costly, but the British effort in 1914, if not swiftly 
curtailed, threatened to have global effects that would have in-
flicted far greater damage than that suffered fifteen years later. 
Nicholas Lambert tells the tale of how strategic economic at-
tack on an early version of a global economy had immediate 
material impacts on banking and trade, and also on human 
psychology. Thus the great power, Britain, whose naval mas-
tery ensured control of trade routes, and whose roles in global 
finance and communications were central, found itself in a 
position wherein massive disruption wrought unacceptable 
levels of collateral damage on friend and foe alike—and on 
British interests perhaps most of all.  
The similarity with strategic cyber warfare today is eerie. One 
cannot target with precision because of the complexity of 
the world economic system.  Costly, unintended impacts on 
neutrals may affect a state’s decision to launch a cyberwar at 
economic targets in the first place. Further, one’s own com-
mercial sector might prove highly resistant to being party to 
such a campaign. At the outset of World War I, it seemed 
that there was no such thing as a blindly patriotic business-
man, and the cooperation of the multinational companies 
of the day was hardly a given. British financiers refused to 
cooperate with their government in 1914 because they had 
little confidence that the latter understood or could deal with 
the costly economic disruption and dislocation that would 
ensue. In the cyber realm today, where the government does 
not control everything—perhaps not even very much—what 
level of confidence can there be that private companies will 
cooperate as civil and military leaders would like them to dur-
ing a cyberwar? The short, unhappy life of the Britskrieg offers 
a profoundly cautionary tale, one that suggests the value of 
analogies may in some cases lie in learning to avoid rather than 
to imitate them. 
A CULTURE OF INNOVATION
Cyber aspects of the Information Revolution portend a full, 
combined-systems transformation—one that hearkens back 
to similarly profound shifts, such as those that accompanied 
carrier aviation and amphibious warfare over seventy years 
ago, and AirLand Battle doctrine and battle management sys-
tems in more recent decades. Many involved in the business 
of strategic thought know that transformation is afoot once 
again, and that there are many factors that will influence the 
course of events—a course that is never predetermined, linear, 
or without setbacks. In past instances, organizational inno-
vation was led by senior officers with traditional credentials 
who reacted not only to intelligence about specific potential 
enemies, but also to structural changes in the overall external 
threat environment. They were often, but not always, willing 
to experiment with fresh ideas, develop innovative doctrines, 
and create new promotion pathways for junior officers who 
showed promise as practitioners of the emerging modes of 
war. But today military innovations can hardly be the sole 
province of the armed services.  
As John Kao points out in his study of the innovation phe-
nomenon, a much more holistic approach is now necessary. 
Today there are over fifty countries that have broad, ambitious 
innovation and stewardship programs. And many of these 
technological innovations are already leading, or soon will 
lead, to new capabilities for waging war. If there is one part 
of the world that is about innovation and trying to avoid doc-
trinal lock-in as much as possible, Kao observes, it is Silicon 
Valley. A key factor in Silicon Valley’s success is its permis-
sive environment for linking academic research and business. 
For example, successful commercial spin-offs from research 
originating at Stanford University abound.  Other important 
factors include the wide acceptance of social norms of trust, 
as well as openness to experimentation and risk-taking. Ulti-
mately, innovation thrives when there is a galvanizing narra-
tive around which to create a call to action and a call to arms. 
A compelling story is likely to be a “great attractor” of talent. 
The task now, as Kao notes, is to craft a narrative for cyber 
security—e.g., perhaps tied to the notion that individual, 
commercial, and national security all depend upon it—that 
will mobilize a wide-ranging, societal-level response. 
THEORIES, TYPOLOGIES, AND 
ANALOGIES
The final two entries in this anthology serve, to some extent, as 
“conceptual bookends.” Keir Lieber skillfully dissects the classic 
international security theory of the offense-defense balance, long 
thought to hold the key to understanding whether the world 




stabilized through robust deterrence (when defense is dominant 
in military affairs). He provides fresh perspectives that challenge 
this formulation, but goes even deeper, disentangling tactical 
military considerations of offense and defense on the battlefield 
from the larger strategic decision-making process about whether 
to go to war—or not. His insights are particularly valuable for 
the current discourse on cyberwar, which today is characterized 
by a general consensus that it is much easier to mount cyber 
attacks than to defend against them. 
While this may be true, it is less clear that an offensive advan-
tage in cyberwar will make conflict any more likely than if 
defense were perceived to have the advantage. The culprit here 
is the problem of uncertainty about effects. There is a very 
significant degree of unpredictability any actor who would 
launch a cyber attack must face—e.g., even the very specifi-
cally targeted Stuxnet worm “escaped into the wild” from the 
Iranian nuclear facility in which it was supposed to remain 
until it deleted itself. Now a range of malefactors are almost 
certainly reverse engineering and weaponizing modified ver-
sions of Stuxnet. Unpredictability of this sort may seriously 
undermine the logic about how offensive advantage leads to 
more war—a point that echoes Lambert’s insights into the ini-
tial British enthusiasm for waging economic warfare and the 
swift onset of their regret at having employed this approach. 
The issue of predictability per se aside, an overarching issue 
here remains—indeed, the jury is still out—whether uncer-
tainty about effects will lead to stability or conflict in the cyber 
realm. Nonetheless, the governing fact for cyber security today 
is that defense is not only more difficult than offense; it also 
requires a lot more resources. Under what conditions are gov-
ernments going to be willing to make substantial, sustained 
investments in defense? 
Perhaps one of the ways to proceed is to explore alternative de-
fensive strategies that might prove less costly than the current 
firewall-and-antiviral paradigm that dominates the cyber secu-
rity field today. With this in mind, Robert Axelrod concludes 
the anthology with a dazzling tour d’horizon of analogies 
drawn from history, biology, trade relations—even market-
based commercial insurance underwriting standards. There is 
far more than Pearl Harbor in the historical “bag” of metaphors, 
Axelrod notes. He finds, for example, behavior-based notions of 
arms control—like the Chemical Weapons Convention—to be 
very much worth contemplating. From the life sciences he iden-
tifies analogies in the realms of biodiversity and herd immunity. 
And then he flips the (seemingly unusable) notion of economic 
warfare on its head, using the model of the insurance industry 
as a way of encouraging, in an actuarially-based fashion, some 
major improvements in cyber security. 
Not all of his analogies are about limiting cyberwar; many offer 
thoughts about ways of taking the offensive. We are particular-
ly drawn to his exploration of the potential for highly effective 
doctrinal innovations, such as were demonstrated by German 
airborne troops in the glider-borne assault on Eben Emael, 
and by the U-boats with their wolfpack “swarms.” Axelrod 
makes clear that unexpected new tactics can have profound 
effects. The Chinese analogy that he considers at some length 
is also quite interesting—as Beijing seems attuned to sending 
strong signals of intent in the middle of a crisis. Cyber might 
provide a perfect means for signaling an adversary—short of 
outright acts of war. Overall, Axelrod’s chapter concludes the 
anthology by offering up suggestions for the pursuit of several 
new arcs of research aimed at mining analogies and metaphors 
for fresh insights. 
THE CASE FOR ANALOGIES
All of us on the cyber analogies team hope that this anthol-
ogy will resonate with readers whose duties call for them to 
set strategies to protect the virtual domain and determine the 
policies that govern it. Our belief is that learning is most ef-
fective when the concepts under consideration can be aligned 
with already-existing understanding or knowledge. People use 
analogies, metaphors, and parables, both explicitly and implic-
itly, to link what is new to what is already known, as a bridge 
between the familiar and the new. Analogies at their best 
facilitate communication, particularly when carefully chosen 
to resonate with an identified audience. Since cyber security 
is a grand challenge that requires a whole-of-government ap-
proach, in close partnership with the private sector, analogies 
can be useful in communicating with diverse stakeholders in 
terms aligned with their present understanding, knowledge, 
and experiences. Analogies can also be a vehicle to engage ac-
tive operators in useful discussions with informed people who 







Cyber issues are inherently tough to explain in layman’s terms. 
The future is always open and undetermined, and the number 
of actors and the complexity of their relations are too great to 
give definitive guidance about future developments. Histori-
cal analogies, carefully developed and properly applied, can 
help indicate a direction for action by reducing complexity 
and making the future at least cognitively manageable. There 
is a rich trove of analogies from which to choose, as this an-
thology demonstrates. And this is a good thing, given U.S. 
Cyber Command’s serious interest in the systematic use of 
analogical reasoning as a means of gaining strategic insights 
and generating alternative options and courses of action. 
Above all, though, the chapters that follow should be viewed, 
and judged, in terms not only of their ability to stimulate 
the discourse on cyber security, but also by their contribu-
tion to winning H.G. Wells’s “race between education and 
catastrophe.”
Emily O. Goldman & John Arquilla
Fort Meade and Monterey
February 2014  
 
 
The Cyber Pearl Harbor
James J. Wirtz
The notion that the United States is vulnerable to a strategic surprise attack bent on incapacitating computational and communica-
tion capabilities, which is often characterized by senior officials, military commanders, scholars and the popular media as a “Cyber 
Pearl Harbor,” is a mainstay of the current strategic discourse.1 The notion is reinforced by recurring media reports of ongoing, 
sophisticated and apparently successful foreign and domestic efforts to penetrate and disrupt military, commercial and private data 
bases and networks with an idea of compromising information, gaining clandestine control of various commercial and military 
systems or limiting or destroying the ability to access the World-Wide-Web or classified computer networks. Applying the “Pearl 
Harbor” analogy to characterize a cyber attack conjures up compelling images of a “bolt-from-the-blue” surprise attack in Ameri-
can political and strategic culture. It suggests that policymakers and intelligence officials will fail to anticipate the scope, nature or 
target of a cyber attack and that the U.S. military or technological infrastructure will suffer catastrophic paralysis, rendering them 
unable to develop a militarily or politically effective response in wartime. The analogy is also a clarion call to action: appropriate 
steps must be undertaken immediately in order to avert a potential catastrophe. 
A more sophisticated and historically informed retelling of the 
events leading up to the December 7, 1941 attack on Oahu 
would suggest that the Pearl Harbor analogy is somewhat mis-
leading. The attack occurred following a prolonged and seri-
ous deterioration in the relations between the United States 
and Japan. Additionally, the possibility of a carrier strike on 
U.S. military facilities on Oahu was anticipated and assessed 
in war games undertaken by the U.S. Navy. Indeed, protests 
by senior admirals over the forward deployment of the bulk of 
the U.S. Pacific Fleet to Hawaii were delivered to the highest 
levels of the Franklin D. Roosevelt administration.2 Navy offi-
cers believed that the movement of the U.S. Pacific Fleet was a 
hollow gesture that would do little to bolster deterrence while 
leaving the force vulnerable to enemy action. In other words, 
the Japanese strike on Pearl Harbor can be characterized as 
something other than a bolt-from-the-blue attack. Neverthe-
less, using the Pearl Harbor analogy to characterize a potential 
cyber attack does provide insights into a specific political, 
strategic and operational setting that makes strategic surprise, 
deterrence failure and war more likely. The United States is 
vulnerable to a “Cyber Pearl Harbor” and it is possible to an-
ticipate why and how it will occur. 
To explain this assessment, this paper first describes the stra-
tegic setting that makes the United States a potential target 
of a surprise attack by describing how this strategic context 
shapes the incentives and perceptions of the parties in a 
potential conflict. It then provides a brief description of the 
operational setting that makes cyber attack an attractive ele-
ment of a strategic surprise on the United States. The paper 
also discusses the serious challenges facing intelligence analysts 
as they contemplate the prospect of a Cyber Pearl Harbor, and 
how the analogy offers some important insights into analyti-
cal challenges involved in offering specific event prediction of 
cyber attack. The paper concludes with a suggestion of one 
possible way to reduce the likelihood of a cyber-based surprise 
attack on the United States.
THE STRATEGIC SETTING
Although operational or tactical surprise in war is universally 
endorsed as a force multiplier, relying on surprise as a “war 
winning” initiative at the outset of hostilities is an extraor-
dinarily risky gamble. It is attractive to the weaker party in a 
potential conflict because of its military inferiority vis-à-vis 
the stronger party. One of the most common misconceptions 
surrounding surprise attack is that it occurs because the 
weaker party launching the attack overestimates its military 
prowess; in fact, both the weaker and the stronger party, for 
that matter, generally possess an accurate picture of the mili-
tary balance. Because the weaker party recognizes its military 
inferiority, it seeks to develop various stratagems to circum-
vent a stronger opponent’s military might in order to achieve 
some fait accompli or to alter the incentives of the stronger 
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party to reduce the likelihood that it will act on its deterrent 
threats.3 A strategic surprise attack is one of those stratagems 
because it suspends temporarily the dialectic of war by remov-
ing an active opponent from the battlefield. Strategic surprise 
attack allows the weaker opponent to achieve objectives that 
it realistically could not expect to secure if it faced a militarily 
superior and fully engaged opponent. 
If the weaker party is attracted to strategic surprise, the stronger 
party finds it difficult to detect and respond to indications of 
what is about to unfold. It too has an accurate assessment of 
the military balance, which suggests that deterrent threats are 
strong, credible and can be readily executed against a weaker 
opponent to good effect. Evidence of impending attack is of-
ten dismissed as incredible ex ante by analysts, commanders 
and officials because in their minds such initia-
tives are doomed to failure at the hands of their 
vastly superior military capabilities. The stronger 
party’s decision-makers assess the potential ac-
tions of their weaker opponents with an “attri-
tional mindset”: they view a potential conflict 
as a “force-on-force” affair that the weaker party 
cannot realistically hope to win. Ironically, the 
weaker party also shares this perception, which leads it to 
seek ways—e.g., strategic surprise—to achieve its objectives 
by circumventing or paralyzing the military might of a vastly 
stronger opponent.4 
The strategic setting thus shapes the perceptions of the 
stronger and the weaker party in ways that make a strategic 
surprise likely to occur. The weaker party becomes extremely 
risk acceptant because it sees an opportunity to obtain objec-
tives that have been deemed to be impossible to achieve in 
the face of a vastly superior military opponent. The stronger 
party will find it hard to respond effectively to indications 
of what is about to unfold because they will be appear too 
farfetched or “hare-brained” to be taken seriously. Even more 
to the point is that recognition that an attack would force 
decision-makers within the stronger party to accept that their 
military might and deterrence strategies, developed at great 
cost and effort, are about to fail to prevent war. Large bu-
reaucracies are unlikely to respond effectively to such estimates 
because they appear to be prima facie irrational and threaten 
the personal, professional, institutional and political interests 
of those charged with responding to warning. 
Given the current strategic setting, it is fairly safe to assume 
that the United States is more likely to be the victim, not the 
initiator, of a Cyber Pearl Harbor. As the militarily dominant 
state in the world today, it faces several potential opponents 
that are militarily inferior and who cannot realistically expect 
to achieve their objectives in the face of concerted and coordi-
nated military opposition on the part of the United States 
and its allies. The extremely risky gambit of strategic surprise 
will appear attractive to these opponents as a means to sidestep 
superior military capabilities to present the United States with 
a fait accompli or to alter the strategic setting to circumvent 
existing deterrence strategies and to alter the incentives faced 
by U.S. decision-makers to engage in attritional 
combat to return to the status quo. The use of 
the Pearl Harbor analogy to explain the strate-
gic origins of a cyber surprise attack captures 
the strategic and psychological dimensions of a 
brewing conflict that could lead the Unites States 
to fall victim to a strategic surprise attack.
THE OPERATIONAL DIMENSION
For decades, the U.S. military has led its competitors in 
exploiting the ongoing Information Revolution as a force 
enabler and has incorporated it as a key component of virtu-
ally every facet of its operations, infrastructure and doctrine. 
Military interest in the Information Revolution emerged as 
a solution to a long-forgotten strategic problem confronting 
the United States and its allies in the 1970s. It was feared that 
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) would lose a 
mobilization race against the Warsaw Pact in a conflict along 
the inter-German border: NATO could match the mobilization 
pace of Warsaw Pact first and second echelon units, but would 
eventually be overwhelmed by third echelon units that could 
reach the battlefield faster than allied reserves. To stop this 
third echelon from reaching the forward battle area, the Unit-
ed States and NATO undertook several initiatives—“Emerging 
Technologies,” “Follow-on-Forces Attack,” and AirLand 
Battle Doctrine—to engage logistical bases and staging areas 
deep behind Warsaw Pact lines. These initiatives incorpo-









capabilities, information management technologies and long-
range, precision-strike capabilities to penetrate Warsaw Pact 
defenses to disrupt the ability of the Soviets and their allies to 
maintain the tempo of forward operations and to prevent re-
serves from reaching the battlefield. By the 1980s, these initia-
tives sparked a lively debate about the nature and existence of 
a so-called “Revolution in Military Affairs” (RMA) and about 
whether the Information Revolution would fundamentally 
transform conventional warfare.5 
Today, debate continues regarding the impact of the Informa-
tion Revolution on war; but it is also clear that the United 
States still leads the world in the exploitation of computer 
and communication technologies as the basis of virtually all 
facets of its military operations.6 
The general impact on force struc-
ture, operations, and logistics of 
the Information Revolution also 
is relatively clear. The information 
revolution, combined with superior 
space and aerial surveillance capa-
bilities, provides commanders with 
an exquisite ability to survey entire 
theaters of war in real time, identify-
ing troop concentrations, command 
centers and critical communication 
networks for destruction by long-
range, precision-strike capabilities, 
which deny an opponent the op-
portunity to engage in operational or 
even tactical maneuvers or the ability 
to undertake combined-arms operations. Once paralyzed, the 
opponent is intended to be rapidly overtaken by combined 
arms operations launched by highly professional and well-
equipped, if numerically inferior, U.S. forces. Operational 
forces are also supported by a minimal logistical infrastructure 
as “just-in-time” supply chains deliver materials to forward 
units quickly and efficiently. In terms of air and conventional 
ground actions, this philosophy, technology, and doctrine 
has given the U.S. unmatched military capabilities in air and 
conventional ground operations, although the effects of this 
“system-of systems” approach have yet to manifest convincingly 
in small-unit or unconventional operations (e.g., counter-insur-
gency) and remain relatively unknown in war at sea.
No one disputes the fact that the U.S. military relies heav-
ily on the Information Revolution as a basis of its military 
superiority; yet, there is limited acknowledgement of the fact 
that this reliance provides potential asymmetric advantages 
to opponents that cannot hope to defeat a fully engaged and 
information enabled U.S. military. Opponents have few 
viable alternatives to engage the United States effectively— 
superior numbers, firepower or a technically superior weapon 
(e.g., an advanced battle tank) can be rendered ineffective if 
they cannot be incorporated into operational and tactical ma-
neuvers or combined arms operations. Nuclear attacks remain 
as a viable alternative to U.S. conventional superiority, but 
such attacks risk altering the political and strategic setting in an 
adverse manner for the attacker, which could lead to quick cata-
strophic defeat if the United States 
chooses to forgo conventional op-
erations by relying on its own nuclear 
capabilities to achieve its objectives.
When compared to the drastic po-
litical and strategic consequences of 
even a limited nuclear attack on U.S. 
or allied forces, cyber attacks hold 
out greater promise of success. Cy-
ber attacks can strike at the linchpin 
of U.S. forces, by rendering them at 
least temporarily unable to execute 
their preferred doctrine and op-
erations, leaving them outgunned 
and outnumbered on some battle-
field. The effects of cyber attack might be localized, and their 
impact relatively fleeting, but they do hold out the promise of 
at least temporarily removing the United States as an active 
opponent in some theater of operations. Moreover, because 
they hold out the possibility of removing the United States 
as an active opponent while inflicting minimal casualties or 
damage to U.S. forces, they can alter the political and strategic 
context of a confrontation by presenting U.S. policy-makers 
with a fait accompli at minimal cost to both parties. The bur-
den of escalation would then shift to U.S. policymakers, who 
would have to choose war over political compromise. In other 
words, the degradation of U.S. military capabilities caused by 
a cyber attack will eventually be overcome, but the political 
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and strategic consequences of a failure of deterrence will linger 
long after U.S. forces recover their full capabilities. The his-
tory of strategic surprise attacks suggests that opponents often 
bank on these altered political and strategic circumstances to 
guarantee the eventual success of their risky gambit. They un-
derstand that even a wonderfully successful strategic surprise 
attack will not disable a vastly superior opponent forever; but 
they do hope to cause the opponent to come to believe that 
the game is not worth the candle. Needless to say, basing an 
operation on the expectation that a stronger opponent will 
choose not to respond to an attack is not in the best traditions 
of diplomacy or the military profession, which is an observa-
tion that further makes such scenarios unlikely to be taken 
seriously by the stronger party to a potential conflict.
In an operational sense, a cyber-based surprise attack on the 
United States would be attractive to a weaker opponent be-
cause it would offer a potential way to temporarily remove the 
United States as an active opponent on the battlefield. Further-
more, by allowing the opponent to achieve objectives quickly 
and with virtually no opposition, it creates the possibility of 
confronting the United States with a fait accompli achieved 
with minimal death and destruction. This would make this 
operational solution to U.S. military superiority politically 
and strategically attractive because it shifts the onus of esca-
lation onto U.S. policymakers. Confronted by a deterrence 
failure, U.S. policymakers would be forced either to reassess 
their objectives or to engage in an inevitably more costly war 
to reverse initial losses. Unlike a nuclear surprise attack, which 
entails enormous destruction and political costs at the outset, 
a cyber-enabled surprise attack might just make living with a 
fait accompli a less costly alternative to war in the minds of the 
victims of a Cyber Pearl Harbor. A cyber attack, combined 
with conventional operations to achieve a fait accompli on the 
ground, provides the weaker party with a politically attractive 
and a potentially operationally effective means to temporarily 
prevent the information-empowered U.S. military from mak-
ing its presence felt on some distant battlefield.
THE INTELLIGENCE CONTEXT
The Cyber Pearl Harbor poses several challenges to the intel-
ligence community and to the officers and policymakers who 
have to take effective action in response to indications and 
warning of an impending attack. The first issue concerns the 
need to gain a general acceptance of U.S. military vulner-
ability to a cyber surprise attack. Acceptance of a potential 
vulnerability is based on a net assessment produced by the 
Intelligence Community or those charged with cyber opera-
tions that flies in the face of service cultures and the percep-
tion among “war fighters” that combat capability is primarily 
derived from traditional operations and weapons systems. By 
contrast, warnings about a Cyber Pearl Harbor highlight the 
importance of a part of the U.S. military infrastructure that 
war fighters generally prefer not to think about at all—sup-
port elements and personnel that by definition will never be 
engaged in direct combat. In other words, there is a tendency 
to avoid the fact that the U.S. military relies on the syner-
gies enabled by the Information Revolution to produce its 
superior combat power and to treat those who manage the 
“information elements” of the combined arms team as sec-
ond-class citizens who are less important than the “war fight-
ers.” Recognition of the cyber threat would thus upset overall 
defense hierarchies and preferences, which would threaten 
everything from promotion patterns to budgetary decisions 
to bureaucratic pecking orders. Things were never quite the 
same for battleship admirals after Pearl Harbor, but it prob-
ably is impossible to undertake quickly effective bureaucratic 
reform or cultural change in the absence of the motivation gen-
erated by catastrophe. Intelligence assessments based on long-
term projections of emerging cyber trends and risks pose an 
immediate threat to personal, professional, bureaucratic and 
cultural preferences and will not be welcome news to their 
most critical audience—senior officers who benefit from exist-
ing hierarchies and budgetary priorities. Recognition of the 
cyber threat means that strategic choices will have to pay less 
homage to organizational preferences. 
In terms of operational or tactical warning of a cyber at-
tack, the challenge is truly daunting. Estimates vary, and the 
specifics remain highly classified, but it would appear that 
indications and warning of an impending cyber attack will 
probably be received, if at all, somewhere between a few days 
to a few seconds before some nefarious event. As a result, the 
time available for warning will not correspond to “political 





the threat and to match political preferences to operational or 
tactical choices. A response to a cyber attack will have to be 
based on pre-established procedures that are implemented not 
by humans, but by the hardware and software that constitutes 
the U.S. information infrastructure. Estimating the specific 
methods, targets, timing and impact of a discrete attack might 
also be beyond the realm of possibility, especially if indications 
of what is about to transpire precede an attack by only a few 
seconds. These time constraints would call for the adoption 
of an indications and warning methodology when it comes to 
responding to the threat of cyber attack, and the development 
of protocols and standard operating procedures to increase 
defenses in response to a heightened threat environment. To 
beat such stringent time constraints, intelligence analysts who 
focus on the cyber realm need to produce real-time threat as-
sessments in order to enable defensive measures that can deter 
and, if need be, mitigate and defeat an attack.
Events surrounding Pearl Harbor, or 
even the 9/11 attacks, however, provide 
ready examples of responses to warning 
that failed to meet imminent threats. At 
Pearl Harbor, warnings of impending 
hostilities prompted actions to prevent 
sabotage, which actually left U.S. facilities more vulnerable 
and less responsive to air attack. In the hours prior to the 9/11 
attacks, the would-be hijackers attracted suspicion, but the 
heightened security protocols they tripped proved ineffective 
when it came to disrupting their scheme. Intelligence analysts, 
and policymakers for that matter, have to ensure that the 
changes in security protocols and standard operating procedures 
that are enacted in response to warning actually are an effective 
response to imminent attack. This requires long-term analyses 
and net assessments to understand vulnerabilities and to devise 
responses that are likely to deal effectively with potential threats.
A third problem facing intelligence analysts is the possibility 
of technological surprise that can be produced by strategic 
interactions, narrow technical vulnerabilities or even “normal 
accidents.” Because a strategic surprise attack that incorpo-
rates a significant cyber dimension has never occurred, it is 
difficult to predict how extremely complex technical systems 
and human-machine interfaces will respond to novel events 
or unanticipated technical exploits.7 An interaction between 
competing offenses or offensive and defensive programs might 
yield heretofore unknown consequences among information 
systems and specific weapons, information systems and con-
ventional forces writ large, or information systems and critical 
support functions (e.g., logistics, electrical grids, etc.). Infor-
mation infrastructures might also fail quickly and catastrophi-
cally if heretofore small and seemingly unimportant technical 
vulnerabilities can be exploited across entire networks or are 
used to destroy key nodes in important communication archi-
tectures.8 Cascading failures also might occur because of op-
erator error or because standard operating procedures actually 
exacerbate unanticipated degradation of networks. Because 
the information infrastructure permeates all facets of military 
operations, technological surprise becomes an acute problem 
because the behavior of emerging information systems is not 
completely understood, especially in circumstances that are 
not specifically anticipated by designers and operators. When 
it comes to technological surprise, cyber 
attack also holds out the possibility of 
producing systemic effects, which stand 
in contrast to the general tendency of 
technological surprise to produce effects 
related to specific weapons and localities. 
It is probably too much to expect that intelligence analysts 
will be able to offer policymakers specific event predictions 
when it comes to a strategic surprise attack based on cyber 
operations. The information realm is not entirely understood, 
opportunities for technical exploitation by the opponent are 
not completely identified, and not enough time is available for 
policymakers or officers to mull over options to select appro-
priate efforts to deter or defend against an attack. Intelligence 
analysts might be able to issue general warnings of a height-
ened threat, but an appropriate response will still depend on 
sustained analysis that can generate appropriate responses to 
potential attack vectors. Confusion over responsibilities and 
unwarranted assumptions about the likely behavior of other 
services or commands and inappropriate defensive prepara-
tions lead the defenders at Pearl Harbor to take ineffective or 
lackadaisical responses to “war warnings,” last minute indica-
tions of an approaching enemy, and even reports of an engage-
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In terms of operational or 
tactical warning of a cyber 
attack, the challenge is truly 
daunting.
is easy to see how a cyber attack, coupled with conventional 
operations, could produce similar results.
THE WAY AHEAD
The specific details of the Cyber Pearl Harbor cannot be 
known in advance, but the general outline of the scenario can 
be described with some certainty by relying on the history 
of previous instances of strategic surprise attack. A militarily 
inferior opponent will utilize a cyber attack in conjunction 
with conventional military operations to present the United 
States with a fait accompli, probably at surprisingly minimal 
cost in death and destruction. This failure of deterrence will 
occur in an unanticipated manner, and might even be abetted 
by technological surprise—utilizing unrecognized technical 
vulnerabilities, undertaking heretofore unimagined types of 
operations, exploiting operating errors, triggering ineffective 
standard operating procedures, or causing catastrophic cascad-
ing effects. The cyber attack itself will be highly asymmetric 
in the sense that the attacks will be subtle 
and undertaken at relatively minimal cost, 
but they will incapacitate extraordinarily 
powerful forces developed and deployed 
at enormous expense. The effects of the 
Cyber Pearl Harbor will be temporally and 
geographically limited, but it will have a lasting political and 
strategic impact on U.S. interests. The Cyber Pearl Harbor 
will confront the United States with a decision to fight or to 
accept a significant political or military setback given deter-
rence failure and an altered strategic setting. The opponent 
will expect that the United States will not bring the full force 
of its superior military capability to bear to return to the status 
quo antebellum. The architects of the Japanese attack on Pearl 
Harbor, for example, informed their political leaders that they 
could give them free reign in the Pacific for six months, suggest-
ing that a rapid diplomatic settlement was in their interests. Al-
though that estimate turned out to be a bit optimistic, it might 
still serve as the operational time horizon for a future opponent 
that risks its fate on a Cyber Pearl Harbor. 
Policymakers and officers have demonstrated an increasing 
recognition of this scenario; their repeated references to a 
potential Cyber Pearl Harbor reflect a growing appreciation 
of the threat faced by the United States. What is missing is 
a ready solution to mitigate the threat. Technical solutions 
to the problem seem unavailable—as soon as technical vul-
nerabilities are identified and mitigated new vulnerabilities 
are discovered or are even created by “patches” that address 
known problems. Operational or tactical solutions to cyber 
vulnerabilities are difficult to devise and implement because of 
the inability to bridge professional, cultural and bureaucratic 
divisions within a complex defense establishment that privi-
leges the interests of “warfighters” over other elements of an 
information-enabled military. The asymmetric threat posed by 
cyber attack is noted, but solutions to the problem are largely 
confined to technical matters that must be executed in a way 
that preserves bureaucratic and professional preferences. Intel-
ligence is unlikely to produce specific event predictions in 
sufficient time for policymakers or officers to identify and 
select appropriate technical, tactical, or operational responses. 
It thus might be suggested that the best way to deal with the 
possibility of a Cyber Pearl Harbor is to 
prevent it from happening in the first place. 
In other words, a strategic solution to the 
problem of bolstering deterrence might be 
the best way to prevent this scenario from 
unfolding. The exact deterrent strategy to 
be adopted, however, requires clarification. Deterrent strate-
gies based on punishment (i.e., inflicting prompt damage 
out of proportion to the gains achieved through aggression) 
or retaliation (i.e., inflicting death and destruction until the 
opponent abandons their ill-gotten gains or alters unwanted 
behavior) will not be effective because those contemplating 
a strategic surprise attack have deliberately developed their 
plans with an eye towards nullifying these types of strategies. 
The attacker hopes to alter the political and strategic calculus 
of the victim of surprise in a way that reduces their incentives 
to act on previously stated deterrent threats based on punish-
ment and retaliation. The attacker generally recognizes that 
the victim of surprise will retain the ability to act on deterrent 
threats; instead, they hope that acting on deterrent threats will 
appear politically and strategically unattractive once deter-
rence fails. This turn of events might appear incredible to the 
potential victim of surprise ex ante—a perception that sets the 
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grasped as a theory of victory by those who gamble everything 
on surprise. Thus, restating or reinforcing deterrent threats 
based on retaliation or punishment will do little to prevent 
The Cyber Pearl Harbor. Ironically, the Roosevelt administra-
tion moved the Pacific Fleet to Pearl Harbor to bolster deter-
rence, but in so doing actually weakened deterrence by placing 
its retaliatory force within range of a pre-emptive strike. The 
party that initiates surprise attack already recognizes that it 
will be lambasted if the stronger party brings its full military 
capability to bear. Messages that restate the military superi-
ority of the stronger party in a potential conflict make little 
impression on a weaker party that has already embraced the 
gambit of strategic surprise. 
Instead of deterrence by retaliation 
or punishment, deterrence by de-
nial offers the more promising path 
to prevent the occurrence of The 
Cyber Pearl Harbor. Denial implies 
a recognition of the threat of cyber 
surprise attack and the adoption 
of pro-active program to decrease 
an opponent’s confidence that a 
cyber attack will actually succeed. 
Clearly, a technological response to 
the threat of cyber attack is in order, 
but tactical, operational, and strate-
gic programs to mitigate the loss of 
information-enabled systems might 
decrease at least the appearance 
that cyber attacks can have a sys-
temic impact across the entire U.S. 
defense establishment. Several general ways to bolster deter-
rence by denial can be suggested. Information-based systems, 
for instance, might be more closely integrated in an organic 
fashion in operational units, decreasing their reliance on a 
single operating network. Wargames and experiments might 
be conducted to test and operate systems or combat units in 
a situation where information systems are degraded in an ef-
fort to design wartime protocols or work-arounds. Wartime 
systems might be developed so that they can be constituted 
in times of national emergency to replace systems and net-
works that have been compromised by cyber attack. Most 
importantly, information systems need to evolve continu-
ously to prevent them from becoming a static target that can 
be exploited by long-term efforts by potential opponents. By 
creating an ever-changing operational picture, potential op-
ponents might never have confidence that they have managed 
to penetrate information systems in a way that may produce 
strategic damage against U.S. warfighting capabilities. Static 
technology, doctrine and operations give opponents the time 
to discover technological or operational weaknesses that might 
form the basis of the conclusion that it just might be possible 
to paralyze U.S. forces long enough to create a fait accompli. 
Creation of a dynamic deterrence-by-denial capability is no 
small matter. It would be expensive and redundant. It also 
lacks clear-cut metrics related to suf-
ficiency, other than a clear indication 
of when insufficient effort has been 
expended and deterrence has failed. 
A dynamic deterrence-by-denial 
program also flies in the face of eco-
nomic logic and the philosophy that 
animates the Information Revolu-
tion. Instead of a single, highly-con-
nected system, a robust denial capa-
bility might require high redundancy 
or systems that can retain important 
functionality without networking. 
Information systems work best when 
everyone is free to communicate with 
everyone else, but such systems could 
be vulnerable to cascading failure if 
damage to some seemingly unimport-
ant parts of the systems propagates across the entire information 
infrastructure. It would also be prudent to search for vulner-
abilities across the interface between information infrastructure 
and operating units. In other words, can single-point logistical, 
communication or command failures threaten entire theaters 
of operation? Have key systems and combat forces become 
static and vulnerable to penetration and potential disruption? 
Are otherwise robust operational capabilities overly reliant on 
vulnerable information-based networks for supply or command 
and control functions, creating critical weaknesses that will re-
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act swiftly, or do they possess the luxury of time to seek out 
weaknesses and devise exquisite operational means to exploit 
their opponent’s obvious military superiority? 
A dynamic deterrence-by-denial effort cannot eliminate all of 
the vulnerabilities that are inherent to an information-based 
military, but it can reduce an opponent’s 
confidence that a solution to their military 
inferiority can be found in an asymmetric 
attack. The key is to deny the opponent the 
confidence that some ingenious, albeit ex-
traordinarily risky, plan might actually suc-
ceed in gaining an immediate fait accompli. 
For the stronger party, this effort must occur 
in peacetime. In war, the opening move is 
granted to the side launching a strategic surprise attack.
CONCLUSION
If warfighters are reluctant to credit the synergies created by an 
information-enabled military as the linchpin of their combat 
power, then technicians charged with maintaining informa-
tion capabilities are probably equally reluctant to embrace a 
strategic-based solution to the problem of cyber surprise at-
tack. For them, technical solutions will beckon as the most ef-
fective and appropriate response to cyber attack. Nevertheless, 
if technical solutions are not informed by an awareness of the 
political, strategic, intelligence and operational context of sur-
prise attack, they are unlikely to address the incentives faced 
by a weaker party as they consider ways to circumvent the 
warfighting capabilities and deterrent strategies of a stronger 
opponent. Deterrence by denial requires that the opponent 
perceives that there is little opportunity to 
achieve asymmetric effects by employing 
cyber attacks. The best way to deal with the 
threat of a Cyber Pearl Harbor is to alter 
the incentives and perceptions of the op-
ponent so that they fail to gain confidence 
in a stratagem to achieve their objectives by 
sidestepping the superior military power of 
their opponent. 
This paper also highlights the fact that, to be significant, a 
cyber surprise attack should not occur in a political vacuum. 
In the scenario outlined here, cyber attacks are coupled with 
conventional operations to achieve specific political or stra-
tegic objectives. To date, this sort of cyber event has not oc-
curred in world politics, which suggests that official warnings 
about a Cyber Pearl Harbor do not describe ongoing cyber 
activities, but are rather a warning about the possible shape of 
things to come. i
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Applying the Historical Lessons of Surprise Attack to the Cyber Domain
Applying the Historical Lessons of Surprise Attack to the  
Cyber Domain: The Example of the United Kingdom
Dr Michael S. Goodman1
Surprise is an integral component of all confrontations, political as well as military. As the mode of conflict has evolved, so too have 
the methods and tactics needed to mount surprise attacks; yet the essential variables—time, place, ground, direction, numbers and 
capabilities—have remained relatively constant. There is a large literature on ‘surprise attack’, and the lessons are overwhelmingly 
drawn from examples of the Twentieth Century. These generally involve instances of state conflict and traditional conceptions of 
‘war’. The Cold War arms race introduced some revisions, including the issue of ‘technological surprise’, but fundamentally the 
issues remained the same. At the center of the discussion has been an examination of ‘intentions’ and ‘capabilities’. As the nature 
of warfare has changed, these two constituent elements have remained intact; indeed, although there are subtleties to them, they 
remain perfectly valid for a consideration of a terrorist attack or any other sort of asymmetric warfare, including cyber attack. Yet, 
cyber attack has its own unique characteristics that require a recasting of how ‘surprise’ is understood. This chapter considers some of 
the lessons that can be drawn from historical studies of surprise and focuses on their applicability to the cyber domain. In concluding 
that there is no guarantee to preventing surprise, it then considers how the United Kingdom approaches the problem of cyber attack.2
DEFINITIONS
There is no question that in warfare, surprise is a powerful 
tactic. It has been described as a ‘force multiplier’ and, perhaps 
as a result, is frequently employed as an asymmetric ploy. In 
one of the earliest but most frequently cited studies, Richard 
Betts argued that ‘surprise is almost superfluous if the attacker 
dwarfs the opponent … vital if opposing forces are evenly 
matched … shock is the only hope at all if the victim is stron-
ger than the attacker’.3 Invariably, it is the device of the weaker 
side against the stronger but generally does not result in the 
attacker (and weaker side) ultimately emerging victorious.4 
This should not confuse the aims of the initial surprise attack 
though; it might not have been intended to cause overall vic-
tory, being simply an attempt to ameliorate the present posi-
tion. Reflecting its utility in conventional warfare, ‘surprise’ 
occurs because of a failure to provide or respond to relevant 
intelligence in three principal ways:
Strategic warning—This is a long-term warning, often 
weeks or months in advance, usually following evidence 
of large-scale troop deployment. What is important here 
is that ‘strategic’ warning denotes evidence of capabili-
ties; true intentions are potentially concealed.
Operational warning—This is imminent warning, of-
ten received only days before a potential attack. It might 
reveal the starting movements of the actual attack.
Tactical warning—This is the immediate stage in the 
hours before an attack or some fait accompli. The decision 
to go has been taken, initial efforts have taken place and 
the attack begins. Almost certainly by the time warning 
has been received, it is difficult to pre-empt or forestall 
an attack.5
‘Warning’, in these cases, has frequently been replaced with 
words like ‘failure’, ‘intelligence’, or ‘surprise’ in the literature on 
surprise attack.
The means needed to effect strategic surprise might well be dif-
ferent from those needed for operational or tactical surprise. 
The actual time involved in these definitions has also become 
compressed with advances in technology. Thus, for instance, 
tactical warning in a conventional sense might still encompass 
a matter of weeks; whereas, in the missile era it might be just a 
few hours. The importance here is what the context reveals for 
the response time. To allow for counter-measures, but also to 





warning might be more important than tactical warning in the 
information age.
These ideas can also be considered in terms of the impact of 
surprise. The connection between warning and consequence is 
clear. Betts identifies a subtlety where the surprise is not actu-
ally in the attack itself, but in the consequences that result: ‘the 
victim may not be surprised that war breaks out, but he is still 
surprised in military effect’.6 Betts also writes that ‘effective sur-
prise changes the ratio of forces, making the peacetime balance 
almost instantaneously obsolete’.7 While this might be true, 
at least in the immediate aftermath of the attack, history has 
shown that the victim (usually the militarily stronger party) 
often will regain the initiative in the 
conflict after the shock of surprise 
begins to fade.
In the context of the cyber domain, 
another important consideration 
is ‘technological surprise’. Patrick 
Morgan has written how ‘most stra-
tegic surprises do not result from 
a crucial new weapon used on an 
unsuspecting opponent with dev-
astating effect, i.e., the atom bomb. 
What we do find in many cases is 
the use of existing weapons and 
forces ‘in new and different ways’.8 
‘Technological’ surprise changes the 
analysts’ calculations somewhat—
here the issue is as much about de-
veloping an accurate estimate of the 
opponents’ capabilities as it is estimating their intentions. A 
distinction might be drawn in this context between war and 
peace: it might be assumed that in times of war a weapon will 
be deployed once it is ready; during peacetime just because 
a weapon is operational it might not (as in the case of nuclear 
weapons) be readily employed.
In contrast to Morgan’s statement, the ‘Defense Warning Of-
fice’ of the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) has identi-
fied four types of technological surprise:
Type 1: A major technological breakthrough in science 
or engineering.
Type 2: A revelation of secret progress by a second par-
ty which may have an unanticipated impact.
Type 3: Temporal surprise, when a party makes more 
rapid development or advancement in a particular tech-
nology than anticipated … this type of surprise is often 
facilitated by technology transfer that accelerates prog-
ress beyond a traditional linear development cycle.
Type 4: Innovative technology applications, such as us-
ing an airplane as a weapon on September 11 2001 … 
such innovations do not necessar-
ily require technical expertise, but 
rather the creativity to use avail-
able resources in a new way.9
What this classification of techno-
logical surprise suggests is the cen-
trality of intelligence and a careful 
understanding of what is meant by 
‘intent’ and ‘capability’ when think-
ing about the future actions of some 
opponent. Estimating intentions is a 
far less tangible and more speculative 
process than estimating capabili-
ties.10 It is important to distinguish 
between different types of inten-
tion: it is possible to talk in terms 
of a strategic intention—the desire to 
acquire a particular weapons capability in the first place—and 
a tactical or operational intention—the desire to actually use 
the weapon once acquired.11 While these may be related, the 
former does not necessarily imply the latter. Capabilities, on 
the other hand, are generally more visible than intentions. 
They are physical manifestations which, depending on the 
technology, are difficult to conceal, especially because they are 
accompanied by a significant industrial or operational infra-
structure if they are to be used on a large scale. ‘Capability’ 
can also be further defined because a theoretical or latent ca-
pability is a very different prospect than a practical capability, 
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relationship between ‘intent’ and ‘capability’ and the blurring 
of their use can, and has, led to poor quality intelligence es-
timates. In other words, when an intention is assumed it can 
contaminate estimates of capabilities, or vice versa.12
From an intelligence perspective, there are four scenarios that 
highlight the complexities involved in producing accurate 
estimates. These cases demonstrate the difficulties in assess-
ing technological advances and, in doing so, conflate issues 
of intent and capability. These are particularly instructive 
for the cyber domain, given the prevalence of technological 
innovation:
Case 1) We develop a cyber capability—They devel-
op a cyber capability
This is the most frequent scenario and, as the title sug-
gests, occurs when both sides develop comparable tech-
nologies. Although both parties may seek similar ca-
pabilities, they may take completely different routes 
to achieve them. It may thus become difficult to esti-
mate which side in fact has superiority in terms of cyber 
capabilities.
Case 2) We develop a cyber capability—They don’t 
develop a cyber capability
The challenge here is to verify that a potential oppo-
nent actually lacks strategic or operational capability to 
undertake cyber activity. An opponent might decide to 
hide the existence of a capability so that it can be used 
to maximum effect in a significant attack.
Case 3) We don’t develop a cyber capability—They 
develop a cyber capability
In a sense, this is the most troublesome case. It can 
emerge from a political or strategic decision not to de-
velop certain military capabilities, or because of a failure 
to enjoy or understand important, theoretical, techno-
logical or operational innovations in the cyber realm.
Case 4) We don’t develop a cyber capability—they 
don’t develop a cyber capability
This has similarities to the other cases, but is still 
unique. Once more the problem of proving a negative 
is evident—that a capability is not being built—as is the 
difficulty of assessing information about which no di-
rect experience exists.13 
In all of the situations described above, the word ‘capability’ 
can denote both defensive and offensive means. An examina-
tion of the preceding factors suggests different ways of calcu-
lating what constitutes a ‘threat’:
HIGH THREAT = high likelihood + high impact  
LIMITED THREAT = low likelihood + high impact  
LIMITED THREAT = high likelihood + low impact 
LOW THREAT = low likelihood + low impact 
This formula is instructive, though it is by no means infal-
lible. Betts offers a useful statement that encompasses these 
issues: ‘the most militarily telling innovations are those in 
which the development of a new possibility is coupled quickly 
with an appropriate strategic and tactical concept, and is ap-
plied promptly in battle before the enemy becomes aware of, 
absorbs, and adapts to it.’14
How can ‘cyber attack’ be characterised? It can be interpreted 
in many ways: by the originator (state-based, criminal, ter-
rorist, individual etc.); by the method (hacking, denial of 
service etc.); by the aspiration (espionage, criminal etc.); and 
the effect (disabling a network, spreading propaganda, stealing 
information etc.). In short, like the term ‘cyber warfare’, it is a 
somewhat ambiguous phrase that has become a catchall term 
for almost any sort of electronic strike. 
CAVEATING LESSONS FROM HISTORY
There are many books on intelligence failure and surprise at-
tack. Although not the first, the field was defined by Roberta 
Wohlstetter’s 1962 study on the attack on Pearl Harbor.15 The 
majority of the detailed studies of surprise attack have focussed 
on conventional warfare. Even when discussion has extended 
to include terrorist attacks, the common links to orthodox 
military operations have been emphasised.16 A few caveats 
need to be recognised before examining the lessons from his-
tory. The first is that the overwhelming majority of accounts 
focus on the reasons why the defending nation was surprised, 





this paper that distinction does not pose a problem, but it 
is important to highlight that imbalance in the treatment of 
surprise and how the perspective can skew understanding. The 
second caveat is that many of the lessons are drawn from the 
same case-studies: Pearl Harbor, Barbarossa, the Korean War, 
the Cuban Missile Crisis and the Yom Kippur War are the 
most frequently cited and examined cases. As new evidence 
is declassified or becomes available, these cases have been 
subjected to ongoing reassessment. Very rarely is treatment of 
the cases based on complete access to all information. A third 
factor is related to this second caveat and raises the question of 
selectivity: surprise attacks are obvious but what about those 
instances where surprise was forestalled? By their nature they 
are harder to spot, but in fact it is just as important to learn the 
lessons from surprise prevention as it is surprise attack. Yet the 
literature is firmly tipped towards examples of failure.
Studies of surprise attack have tended to focus on different 
aspects of the phenomenon, often encompassing the elements 
of the intelligence cycle.17 It has been thought 
that collection has been at fault, sometime 
analysis, and often policy reluctance or an in-
ability to act. These are very simple conclusions 
though, and most of the work on the topic has 
attempted to delve much deeper. One of the 
most well-trodden paths is analysis, particu-
larly the view that in every case there was some sort of warning 
which might not have been obvious at the time but which, 
nonetheless, was present. The conclusion that is frequently 
drawn is that if only it were known what to look for, then 
surprise could have been prevented. This logic has led to some 
very detailed analyses, often focusing on the sorts of psycho-
logical traps or barriers that can affect progress. In fact these 
are not limited to surprise but are everyday issues of concern 
to analysts; but the effect is magnified when the ramifications 
of various analytical pathologies are much more serious.
How might the system work in a perfect environment? Ideally 
the intelligence community will receive information that is re-
liable, verifiable, and time-sensitive. Policymakers will receive 
the intelligence assessments, will find them credible and will 
act. Crisis averted. But things are never this simple or straight-
forward; in the cyber domain, issues of timeliness make this 
particularly tricky. It is commonly assumed that cyber attacks 
happen at lightning speed—many certainly do—but the most 
destructive and effective ones are far more complex, involv-
ing significant lead-time and a long lifespan. What, then, is 
meant by ‘warning’? David Omand devises a useful typology, 
distinguishing between:
Strategic notice: An estimate of what may happen in 
the future
Situational awareness: What is going on in terms of 
who, what, where, when etc.
Explanation: What is going on in terms of why, what for?
Prediction: Where next? What next? When next?18
In the cyber context, there is an important distinction to be 
drawn between early warning of an attack possibly coming 
and early detection of the attack itself. 
These imply that it is far too simple to 
draw lessons from the historical stud-
ies by concentrating on the individual 
elements of the intelligence cycle. The 
greatest lessons, therefore, emerge from 
more generic points:
1. What the various studies seem to accept is that intel-
ligence is absolutely integral to trying to prevent sur-
prise. Historical surveys suggest that there is invariably 
a decent amount of intelligence, but often the specific 
questions needed to avoid surprise (what, where, when 
etc.) are absent.
2. It is important to remember that to label an attack as 
a ‘surprise’ is too simplistic. Frequently the decision to 
attack is not a surprise, but elements of the attack itself 
are. This suggests that it is possible to achieve tactical 
surprise without being surprised strategically.
3. Perhaps as a reflection of the analytic imbalance, it is 
usually found that surprise is a result of the defender’s 
inabilities rather than the attacker’s abilities: it is a 
question of one side’s failure, not the other’s success.
4. The asymmetric nature of surprise attack is often its 
most ignored feature: an examination of the strategic 
the most effective cyber 
attacks are complex, 
involving significant lead-
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balance will usually be enough to convince the de-
fender that their capabilities are sufficient to withstand 
an attack, which makes them reluctant to take drastic 
action to forestall or pre-empt what appears to be ex 
ante as a risky and improbable event.
The problem with historical analyses, as Klaus Knorr identi-
fies, is that ‘the utility of extracting lessons for statecraft from 
historical analysis rests on the assumption that past experience 
is relevant to the future.’19 There are clear similarities that can 
be observed in case of conventional surprise attack, but how 
valid are these for the Twenty-First Century cyber domain?
IS THE CYBER DOMAIN SO VERY 
DIFFERENT?
By what measure is it possible to compare conventional war-
fare and the cyber domain? There are a host of variables to 
consider and none are as simple as might ap-
pear at first glance:
Purpose of attack
It is possible to conceive of various types of 
‘attack’, loosely defined: for instance, espio-
nage, sabotage, crime, or destruction. These 
forms are common to different tactics, whether conventional, 
irregular or cyber. The differences between them lay in the way 
that they are conducted and their intended effect. The litera-
ture on surprise attack is focused on military strikes but there 
are other sorts of examples to choose from, including diplo-
matic surprise (for instance the Nazi-Soviet Pact); operational 
surprise (such as the penetration of an organization by a spy); 
or longer-term failures (the failure to anticipate the end of the 
Cold War is a good example). The role of intelligence will vary 
depending on the initiative undertaken by the attacker.
Identity of attacker
Who is the behind the attack? This is not simply a question of who 
pressed the button, but who possesses the technical expertise to 
enable it? Is the ‘attacker’ the authorizer of the attack, the facili-
tator, the source of the technical operation, the location of the 
server, etc. These may not be the same, and determining who 
is behind an attack is particularly difficult for non-state actors. 
In conventional warfare these questions are far simpler to ascer-
tain: there have been no instances of significant surprise attack 
where it is not immediately clear who the perpetrator was. The 
identity is less clear in the context of terrorist attacks but, by 
and large, even if evidence is not forthcoming, a group will 
often claim responsibility. 
Nature of attack
The evolution of warfare has changed the nature, scale, and 
operability of attacks. Central to these variables is technology. 
Missiles greatly increased the speed (and devastating effect) by 
which war could be launched, just as aircraft had a generation 
earlier. Asymmetric tactics and conventional attacks are often 
devastating and the method will, almost certainly, involve the 
physical destruction of something. Attacks in the cyber do-
main are different for two crucial reasons: the victim might 
not realize that they have actually been attacked, possibly even 
after the attack is finished; and the attack is not 
kinetic, though the consequences of cyber at-
tack might cause a kinetic effect.20 This latter 
point can also be perceived in terms of tactical 
vs. strategic strikes. It is perfectly conceivable 
that a military attack might threaten the strate-
gic future of a country, but can the same be said 
for a cyberattack?
Identity of victim
For conventional warfare and terrorist attacks the victim was 
invariably the state (in terms of its people or inhabitants). Al-
though the goal might have varied, usually it had something 
to do with weakening or undermining the position of the 
state. In the cyber domain this is not necessarily the case. It 
is much more difficult to target a specific group of people in 
the same way that a terrorist attack might, depending on what 
the criteria are (race, religion, nationality etc.). That said, it is 
easier to target specific institutions through their electronic 
footprints—there are myriad examples of individual corpora-
tions being selected for attack.
Option to respond
The option to respond has to be based on evidence that an 
attack has taken place, something that might not always be 
the victim might 
not realize that they 
have been attacked, 
possibly even after 





obvious. Unlike military attacks it will not always be evident 
who the attacker is. Furthermore, there are the questions of 
scale and proportionality: what sort of cyber-attack, for in-
stance, will necessitate a military response and, if so, what 
form should it take? At what stage might pre-emption be con-
sidered? During the Cold War various systems were developed 
to cope with such eventualities. The North Atlantic Treaty Or-
ganization (NATO), for instance, had its own Counter-Surprise 
system based on a series of alerts. Once triggered these would 
suggest that an attack was under way and would set in mo-
tion pre-planned responses. The system enabled the supreme 
military allied commander, SACEUR, to counter immediately 
even when time did not allow political consultation.21
SURPRISE ATTACK IN THE CYBER ERA
Given the historical examples of surprise attack and the differ-
ences between the cyber domain and other forms of warfare, 
what lessons emerge?
Detection and Attribution of a Surprise 
Cyber-Attack
Knowing that an attack is imminent or has taken place is, of 
course, crucial. Detection and attribution are therefore para-
mount—the ‘digital blood trail’, as one member of Interpol 
has described it.22 Clark and Landau argue that ‘solutions to 
the “attribution problem” lie outside the technical realm’, that 
instead political, diplomatic and legal measures should resolve 
any doubts. It is an interesting view but difficult to substan-
tiate.23 More importantly they suggest that ‘attribution’ is 
important for four reasons and, in doing so, conflate it with 
‘prediction’:
Before the Fact—Prevention or Degradation
During the Fact—Mitigation
After the Fact—Retribution
Ongoing: Attribution as a Part of Normal Activity
The advent of international law ensured that formal declara-
tions ought to have been issued to confirm that two nations 
were at war. Today’s cyber context is markedly different and 
this distinction is crucial. There have been many debates as to 
what, precisely, should be the ‘red line’—the point at which a 
cyber-attack is deemed sufficient to warrant a response, mili-
tary or otherwise. Given that most attacks will be conducted 
without prior notice, in the cyber domain it is extremely un-
likely there will ever be a repeat of the beautifully worded and 
terribly polite way in which the United Kingdom declared war 
on Japan in 1941:
FOREIGN OFFICE, DECEMBER 8 (1941) 
SIR,
ON THE EVENING OF 7TH DECEMBER HIS MAJ-
ESTY’S GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED KINGDOM 
LEARNED THAT JAPANESE FORCES, WITHOUT 
PREVIOUS WARNING IN THE FORM OF A DECLARA-
TION OF WAR OR OF AN ULTIMATUM WITH A CONDI-
TIONAL DECLARATION OF WAR, HAD ATTEMPTED A 
LANDING ON THE COAST OF MALAYA AND BOMBED 
SINGAPORE AND HONG KONG.
IN VIEW OF THESE WANTON ACTS OF UNPRO-
VOKED AGGRESSION COMMITTED IN FLAGRANT 
VIOLATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND PAR-
TICULARLY OF ARTICLE I OF THE THIRD HAGUE 
CONVENTION RELATIVE TO THE OPENING OF 
HOSTILITIES, TO WHICH BOTH JAPAN AND THE 
UNITED KINGDOM ARE PARTIES, HIS MAJESTY’S AM-
BASSADOR TO TOKYO HAS BEEN INSTRUCTED TO 
INFORM THE IMPERIAL JAPANESE GOVERNMENT 
THAT A STATE OF WAR EXISTS BETWEEN OUR TWO 
COUNTRIES.




The point here is not the formal response by which war is de-
clared, but the manner in which hostilities break out initially—
a surprise attack. Matters are further complicated because the 
question of attribution is neither simple nor straightforward.25 
In addition, how should a response be judged: If the perpetra-
tor is a non-state actor, can a state be held accountable? What 
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it make a difference where the attacker is physically based, 
particularly if nationality and allegiance are different? For all 
of these reasons and more, an attack in the cyber domain is 
different from conventional military operations.
Defending a Surprise Cyber Attack
The clear lesson from historical studies of surprise attack is that 
there is no way to ensure against surprise. In the aftermath of 
the failed assassination attempt by the IRA on Prime Minister 
Margaret Thatcher at a Brighton Hotel, a statement was issued 
that said ‘Today we were unlucky, but remember we only have 
to be lucky once. You will have to be lucky always.’26 Clearly 
the definition of ‘failure’ will differ depending on whether the 
attacker or defender’s perspective is taken.
The most productive way of think-
ing about defending against a sur-
prise cyber attack is to conceive it in 
either a strategic or tactical context. 
The lesson from the performance of 
Britain’s most senior analytical body, 
the Joint Intelligence Committee 
(JIC), during the Cold War is that, 
while strategic warning was almost 
always given, tactical knowledge was 
often lacking. There are several issues 
that are raised by this observation. 
The first is to ask, reasonably, what 
should policymakers expect from 
their intelligence community and 
the JIC in particular? Is the provision 
of timely, strategic warning enough, 
especially when provided days or weeks beforehand? Having 
tactical intelligence on the ‘decision to go’ would, of course, be 
ideal, but regardless of whether this is possible, does it really 
make much of a difference, given that the response time might 
be reduced to minutes? This has clear implications for the cy-
ber era, when time sensitivities are arguably far more crucial.
David and Sakurai write that ‘at the tactical level of specific 
attacks, it is almost impossible to design systemic strategies for 
identifying the immediate threat details of exactly where, when 
and how an attack will occur. However, at the operational level, 
how cyber terrorists [or state actors for that matter] plan to use 
information technology, automated tools and identifiable tar-
gets may be observable and to some extent, predictable.’27 This 
conclusion is borne out by history: Bletchley Park’s wartime 
experiences and the JIC’s Cold War performance demonstrate 
the importance of regularly monitoring and updating the 
progress of events, even if no predictive element is utilized; in 
other words, one of the JIC’s key outputs was to describe the 
evolution and meaning of events, as much as it was to predict 
what might happen next.
What does this mean for the cyber field? At a strategic level, 
it signifies the importance of monitoring both the offensive 
capabilities of other nations and groups, but also in develop-
ing an objective assessment of defensive mechanisms.28 One of 
the frequently cited reasons for be-
ing surprised is a misunderstood and 
incorrect view of how a country’s de-
fences stack up against an aggressor’s 
power. The importance of strategic 
analyses is that they provide time for 
action to be taken; the difficulty, as 
one former CIA member has written, 
is that ‘analysts must issue a strategic 
warning far enough in advance of 
the feared event for officials to have 
an opportunity to take preventive 
action, yet with credibility to moti-
vate them to do so’.29 The problem, 
certainly if the lessons of history 
are anything to go by, is that it is 
often very difficult to predict when 
a troop exercise on a border actually 
becomes the first move of an invasion. In the cyber context, 
for instance, is it possible to know whether attacks that try 
to expose vulnerabilities at different margins of a network 
are simply attempts to obtain access to information, probes 
to seek out vulnerabilities that could be exploited to create 
strategic effects, or smokescreens to divert attention from what 
is really planned?
The critical element of the tactical and operational levels is the 
ability and speed of response. Just as in the Cold War, simula-





what might happen. This is particularly the case given that the 
decision to ‘go’ might be taken by one or two people (in which 
case advance intelligence warning is all but impossible) and 
that, once taken, operational effectiveness in the cyber age will 
be potentially instantaneous. A notion shared by conventional 
and cyber examples, is that ‘if we accept the fact that warning 
is bound to be ambiguous then we must be capable of reacting 
repeatedly to false alarms without commitment to war’.30 The 
intelligence producer-consumer relationship is critical here, 
not only for the manner in which warning is communicated 
to the policy realm, but also in the way in which it is received 
and responded to.31 Betts has argued that the Cold War envi-
ronment did not lend itself to this sort of fluidity: ‘the only 
way to hedge is to have a military bureaucracy and strategic 
community capable of sensitivity, creativity, and quickly adap-
tive innovation. This is almost a contradiction in terms’.32
An ability to integrate both strategic and tactical intelligence 
is vital: thus, the government should be ‘interested not only 
in explicit warnings but in general information about attacker 
intentions and capabilities’.33 Does this mean 
that a JTAC-style outfit is the answer—an entity 
that includes seconded individuals from every 
relevant arm of the government working on cy-
ber matters, designed to provide both strategic 
and tactical assessments? What it does suggest 
is that a strategy is extremely important, not only in discover-
ing the attack and ensuring that all relevant bits of the state 
(including non-state responsibilities) work together, but also 
in terms of co-ordinating the response. This is something that 
former Director of National Intelligence (DNI) and Director 
of the National Security Agency (NSA), Mike McConnell, has 
argued the United States desperately needs.34
The overarching lesson from examples of technological sur-
prise is to avoid underestimating the opposing side’s advances, 
particularly that novel ways might be sought to overcome 
obstacles. As the Germans discovered with their Enigma ma-
chine, just because you cannot defeat it, it does not follow 
that no one else will be able to either. The pace of technologi-
cal change in the cyber domain has been frightening. Perhaps 
here, more than any other instance in history, an examination 
of internal vulnerabilities and defenses is critical. To ensure 
the best possible defense the lesson is that intelligence sharing 
is vital. In the cyber context this takes on a further dimension 
given the greater involvement of non-state actors to whom the 
state owes its allegiance. In this way not only is it important 
for the different strata of the government to work in unison, 
but it is equally as imperative to enable and provide a forum 
to share potentially classified information with those that are 
to be defended, be they banks, transportation services, critical 
infrastructure, etc. 
The underlying theme, then, is that to be effective, intelligence 
in the cyber era has to be both defensively and offensively 
aligned. This last point is particularly valid in that the ability 
to respond is just as important in the cyber era as in conven-
tional military examples. On the assumption that deterrence 
has failed and an attack has taken place, the manner and time-
liness of the response will be critical. In the cyber field this 
might be a defensive reaction—stopping further penetration 
or attempting to discover the identity of the perpetrator—or it 
might be offensive, anything from a counter-cyber-attack to a 
military rejoinder. One lesson from conven-
tional warfare is that it is particularly difficult 
to ‘keep in constant readiness defenses strong 
enough to deter and, if need be, defeat a sud-
den attack’.35 Presumably ‘readiness’ is less of 
a problem in the cyber era but is exacerbated 
by the proliferation of threats, possible attack routes and array 
of necessary responses.
THE CENTRALITY OF ATTACK 
MITIGATION: THE EXAMPLE OF THE 
UNITED KINGDOM
Unlike other forms of warfare, in the cyber domain the at-
tacker has an overwhelming advantage: put simply, they can 
choose when, where and how to attack; the chances of being 
detected in advance are slim; and the speed with which an 
attack can take place suggests that they are unlikely to be in-
terrupted. Furthermore, traditional notions of deterrence—in 
which the perceived response to an attack is enough to prevent 
it—are almost certainly inapplicable.36 The central issue comes 
back to the original conception of a ‘threat’. Williams, Shim-
meall and Dunlevy argue that ‘threats are inextricably linked 
intelligence in the 
cyber era has to be 
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to vulnerabilities … in the realm of cyber-space, vulnerabili-
ties are inescapable’.37 Given the strategic advantage then, and 
the fact that pre-emptive intelligence of an attack is extremely 
difficult to obtain, it follows that the most important contri-
bution is to be made once an assault is underway in the form 
of attack mitigation.
Klaus Knorr wrote that ‘insurance takes three forms … the 
first is to provide for adequate military deterrence and defence; 
the second, to pursue foreign policies that do not unnecessar-
ily incite the aggressiveness and despair of other states … the 
third form of insurance accepts the possibility of being taken 
by strategic surprise and is intended to reduce its impact’.38 
The British government’s 2010 National Security Strategy in-
stalled cyber matters as one of four top priority concerns for 
the United Kingdom.39 The Strategic Defence and Security 
Review (SDSR) subsequently provided £650 million of fund-
ing to tackle cyber issues, and the 2011 Cyber Security Strat-
egy (CSS) focused on how this money should be spent.
At the heart of the CSS is an unstated but implicit recognition 
that cyber-attacks are impossible to avoid completely. Indeed, 
GCHQ has estimated that 80% of successful attacks in the 
United Kingdom could be prevented by ‘simple computer and 
network “hygiene”.’ Thus, it is the remaining 20% to which 
GCHQ devotes its attention.40 The implications are enshrined 
in one of the CSS’s four objectives: ‘making the UK more re-
silient to cyber attack and better able to protect our interests 
in cyberspace’. Although there is mention of the necessity to 
‘improve our detection and analysis of sophisticated cyber 
threats’, the impression conveyed is that the cornerstone of 
the CSS is ‘resilience’ or mitigation—the ability to cope with, 
absorb, and continue in the aftermath of an attack (a variant 
of “graceful degradation”).41
The means to achieve this are contained within the CSS’s three 
other objectives, which center on the necessity to present a unit-
ed front, not only within the governmental machinery, but also 
between the government and the private sector. In the short pe-
riod since the CSS was formulated, there have been a plethora of 
new organizations created to foster collaboration, ranging from 
the tri-Service ‘Joint Cyber Unit’, hosted by GCHQ; the Centre 
for the Protection of National Infrastructure (CPNI), which is 
accountable to the Security Service; the National Cyber Crime 
Unit, soon to be based within the new National Crime Agency; 
through to the UK National Computer Emergency Response 
Team (CERT); the Cyber Incident Response scheme; and the 
Cyber-Security Information Sharing Partnership (CISP).42 Most 
recently, in July 2013, the ‘Defence Cyber Protection Partner-
ship’ was announced. A collaborative effort between the gov-
ernment and leading defense companies to improve ‘collective 
defenses’.43 
Crucial to the British response, and symptomatic of the need 
to pool information, are two bodies: (i) the Office of Cyber 
Security and Information Assurance (OCSIA), which resides 
in the Cabinet Office and liaises with other departments to 
provide strategic direction and coordination. (ii) The Cyber 
Security Operations Centre (CSOC), which is located in GCHQ 
but not technically a part of it (in a similar vein to JTAC and 
the Security Service). It draws its membership from second-
ments from other government departments and is intended 
to monitor cyberspace, coordinate incident responses, and 
understand the nature of any attack conducted. 
Central to protecting the UK—or, by implication, any na-
tion—is intelligence. The majority of the £650m allotted to 
cybersecurity has been distributed to the intelligence commu-
nity, with GCHQ receiving the greatest share. In addition to 
providing tactical intelligence on evolving threats and means 
to cope, the community also provides strategic assessments of 
different states’ cyber capabilities, particularly Russia and Chi-
na. Yet, the role of the intelligence agencies is not restricted to 
protecting networks and thwarting plots. As the Intelligence 
and Security Committee wrote in mid-2012, ‘while attacks 
in cyberspace represent a significant threat to the UK, and 
defending against them must be a priority, we believe that 
there are also significant opportunities for our intelligence and 
security Agencies and military which should be exploited in 
the interests of UK national security’, including: active de-
fense; exploitation; disruption; information operations; and 
military effects.44
For the United Kingdom then, the CSS provides a template 
from which structures have emerged, designed to foster collabo-





been without its critics, and one accusation has been the way in 
which it has lofty aspirations but little in the way of detail for 
how they should be achieved. Central to the strategy is the role 
of intelligence, and this is ‘intelligence’ in its widest meaning, 
encompassing everything from pre-emption, information assur-
ance, and capacity building, to attribution and offensive action.
The overarching lesson from the history of surprise attacks 
is that surprise should not be unexpected. Admittedly con-
tradictory, what this means is that omniscient intelligence is 
impossible and so surprise will always be conceivable. In the 
cyber era this conclusion is magnified: almost by definition 
every successful cyber attack is the result of surprise of one sort 
or another. The key, then, is in resilience and attack mitiga-
tion. Cyber attacks are a feature of modern life and, provided 
that all arms of the state (government and otherwise) are in 
communication, then surprise can be managed and expecta-
tions of the unexpected will become the norm. i
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The Cyber Pearl Harbor Analogy: An Attacker’s Perspective
Emily O. Goldman, John Surdu, & Michael Warner
Emerging technologies have had sweeping socioeconomic effects on states and societies. In recent decades, the comparatively 
low cost and availability of new information technologies have changed how people create, share, protect, and store data—and 
ultimately wealth. The effects often have been disruptive, initiating new lines of operation for businesses and exposing new weak-
nesses for competitors and adversaries to exploit. A “cyber” domain has emerged, an easily accessed, semi-ungoverned space that 
has become the newest front for military and economic confrontation. 
WHY PEARL HARBOR? 
On 11 October 2012, then-Secretary of Defense Leon Pa-
netta publicly warned that the United States is vulnerable 
to a “Cyber Pearl Harbor.” To many this conjures up grainy 
newsreel footage of burning battleships and the nation’s entry 
into World War II. The Pearl Harbor analogy, from the U.S. 
perspective, evokes a devastating bolt from the blue that leaves 
an indelible imprint on the popular psyche. “Remember Pearl 
Harbor!” in this context is a call to mobilize support for in-
creased cyber preparedness. 
Our analysis of the Pearl Harbor analogy flips the perspective 
and proceeds from the viewpoint of the attacker. Some might 
argue that the warning klaxon of impending cyber attacks 
against the United States (not just on its military, but to its 
critical infrastructure) is alarmist and overblown. We are not 
so confident. Conditions exist on the world stage today that 
bear similarities to the East Asian crisis in the 1930s, which 
in turn led to the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941. 
Such conditions could entice an adversary to strike a similar, 
disabling blow against the United States in the hope of a quick 
victory that presents America with an undesirable strategic fait 
accompli. 
STRATEGIC CONTEXT FOR JAPAN’S 
ATTACK ON PEARL HARBOR
James Wirtz argues in his contribution to this anthology that 
Pearl Harbor was not in fact a “bolt from the blue,” but rather a 
logical outcome of Imperial Japan’s long-term strategy to solidi-
fy its hold on its Pacific empire. Japanese expansionism focused 
on establishing an exclusive sphere of influence—the Greater 
East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. By 1941, Japan’s aggression 
in China and its larger aims in the Southwest Pacific were 
hampered by President Franklin Roosevelt’s harsh sanctions, 
which Tokyo saw as tantamount to economic warfare. Japanese 
naval strategists thereafter sought to blunt Washington’s ability 
to frustrate Tokyo’s aims. Since America had moved aggres-
sively to frustrate Japan’s military aims in China and cripple its 
economy, the Japanese reasoned they had to hit back.
Japan’s top naval strategist, Admiral Yamamoto, understood 
the risks of unleashing America’s industrial might, which he 
had seen firsthand as a young officer posted to the United 
States. For Japan to win and retain the upper hand, he be-
lieved, it was necessary to strike an early, decisive blow—one 
that would preclude the possibility of the Americans going 
on the offensive while Japanese forces consolidated a defen-
sive perimeter in the Western Pacific. Japan would have to 
eliminate U.S. forces in the Philippine Islands (astride Japan’s 
desired supply routes) and crush the U.S. Pacific Fleet near 
Hawaii to prevent its advance toward Japanese home waters 
before Japan was ready for the great clash of battleships that, it 
was thought, would decide the struggle once and for all.
Yamamoto’s strategic objective was not to conquer the United 
States or even to seize (much) American territory, but rather 
to delay the inevitable American counteroffensive. He judged 
that destroying the Pacific Fleet’s offensive power, even tempo-
rarily, would allow Japanese forces to take control of oil supplies 
in the Dutch East Indies and erect a barrier chain of island bases, 
thereby enabling Japan to delay the Pacific Fleet in its westward 




Goldman, Surdu, & Warner
of strength. A model for the attack was Germany’s success-
ful blitzkrieg strategy in France: hit hard and demoralize the 
adversary so its people would reject a long and costly war. It 
would take years for the United States to recover, Yamamoto 
hoped, and by then it would face a fait accompli with Japan’s 
control extending from the Indian to the Pacific Oceans.
The Imperial Japanese Navy’s Striking Force easily reduced 
the Pacific Fleet’s old dreadnoughts on Battleship Row to 
smoking hulks, but missed the Fleet’s aircraft carriers and 
left its fuel depots and drydocks almost undamaged. Yama-
moto had taken a huge risk in mounting the Pearl Harbor 
operation—which could have been a tactical disaster for 
the Japanese fleet. American commanders across the Pacific 
expected war and already had their forces on alert. But local 
mistakes by commanders in Manila and Pearl Harbor ensured 
the Japanese had tactical surprise in both locations. The Japa-
nese succeeded in destroying most U.S. fighter planes on the 
ground at Pearl Harbor, but the carrier-based 
air armada that struck Hawaiian targets that 
morning still took 10% casualties—a pretty 
high rate by World War II standards. Similar 
attacks by the Japanese in the Philippines that 
same day garnered similarly mixed results. 
Indeed, American bombers kept flying from 
the Philippines for weeks afterward attacking 
Japanese military targets. 
Yamamoto’s aircraft carriers by then had run amok, as he 
predicted, supporting the conquests of the East Indies, Ma-
laya, Singapore, Guam, and northern New Guinea, and raid-
ing targets as far afield as Australia and India. Yet even then 
the timetable was slipping. In the Philippines, the Japanese 
quickly took control of the air and sea but had troops tied 
down for months trying to defeat the American and Filipino 
defenders. Even before these forces surrendered, American 
carrier-launched bombers had mounted a militarily trivial, but 
psychologically stunning, raid on Tokyo itself. 
Pearl Harbor was a Pyrrhic victory for Tokyo, accomplishing 
some immediate goals but swiftly uniting the American people 
around calls for revenge. The surprise and scope of the defeat 
focused Washington’s war aims on ending Japanese militarism, 
and ensured that the nation’s determination would burn on 
for years. Yanked back to the grim imperative to sink the Pa-
cific Fleet’s aircraft carriers, Yamamoto and his staff began plan-
ning new operations to lure the Americans into a decisive battle, 
first in the Coral Sea and then near a remote atoll known to a 
handful of pilots and mariners as Midway Island. Together these 
battles certainly proved decisive, but not in the way Japanese 
planners wanted or expected. The Imperial Japanese Navy lost 
the cream of its pilots and two-thirds of its aircraft carriers with-
in a month and forfeited the strategic initiative permanently. 
The United States could replace its naval losses and more. After 
Midway, Tokyo could only hope the Americans might run out 
of patience before they defeated Japan.
CYBER AS A TOOL OF CHOICE 
Japan launched a war against the United States in 1941 be-
cause its leaders felt they were running out of time to respond 
decisively to President Roosevelt’s sanctions. 
Japanese planners had powerful forces at 
their disposal but also knew their plans had 
to compensate for serious resource deficien-
cies. Is there a lesson here for our time? Per-
haps it is that adversaries who feel their backs 
are against the proverbial wall might lash out 
in new and unexpected ways. We know what 
that meant in 1941, but what does it mean today?
Powers with ambitions and a high tolerance for risk—espe-
cially those that perceive the United States to be thwarting 
their ambitions—could seek ways to constrain our power to 
act. This includes impeding our ability to operate militarily, 
while also delivering a psychological blow to the American 
psyche. This logic applies in cyberspace as well. A cyber attack 
could have the virtue (from an adversary’s perspective) of be-
ing more damaging to the United States’ capacity to respond 
in the physical domain, and yet also be less “mobilizing” than, 
for example, a terrorist attack with mass casualties in an Amer-
ican city. A cyber attack might thus reduce America’s ability to 
respond, while dampening (if not eliminating) political pres-
sures to respond. This is the type of effect that a cyber-savvy 
adversary with outsized goals could find attractive.
adversaries who feel 
their backs are against 
the proverbial wall 
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Cyber activities can fit conveniently into an adversary’s 
strategy to counter U.S. conventional military capabilities, 
making cyber weapons a tool of choice for potential U.S. 
adversaries. This is so for several reasons. First, cyber opera-
tions require skill and technical acumen indeed, but not the 
level of resources, manpower, and training required to lever-
age industrial-era technologies into sustained, conventional 
military forces. Second, the U.S. as an open society is easier 
to attack—and more vulnerable—in the cyber domain than it 
is in the land, maritime, and air domains. Third, cyber tools 
empower and enable even relatively unsophisticated actors to 
project power and operate deep within America’s physical ter-
ritory, to say nothing of its “virtual 
landscape.” Fourth, and finally, cy-
ber capabilities can be employed to 
achieve impacts like those of earlier 
“breakthrough” technologies that, 
in the past, undermined the existing 
advantages of even leading military 
systems. Potential adversaries can 
now avoid challenging us in areas 
of traditional military dominance 
and instead exploit our real and 
perceived vulnerabilities with cyber 
attacks launched against our critical 
infrastructure.
If an adversary’s objective is to con-
vince Washington to leave it alone, 
or to allow it to pursue its aims 
against its neighbors, then Admiral Yamamoto’s intellectual 
heirs in such a situation could be tempted to mount a quick 
strike—against our mobilization and logistical network—that 
would keep the United States at bay. Potential adversar-
ies have invested in anti-access and area-denial capabilities, 
as well as in other asymmetric means to counter traditional 
U.S. strengths and to prevent America from projecting power 
abroad. They could prepare the future cyber battlefield now 
by stealing intellectual property, conducting industrial espio-
nage, and exploiting government networks and those of our 
defense, financial, and communication industries. Through 
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance against U.S. and 
allied networks, they could gain penetration and establish per-
sistent access. We are witnessing such activities today, as can 
be verified from perusing the continuous and alarming public 
statements uttered by a host of independent computer and 
software security experts.
ADVERSARY PERCEPTIONS AND 
CALCULATIONS 
What would such an attack actually gain, and what might 
make it seem worth the attendant risks? To recall our Pearl 
Harbor example, Japanese military planners had no illusion 
they could fight and win a war of conquest against the United 
States. They preferred not to fight the Americans at all, but 
felt the proverbial dice had already 
been tossed by President Roosevelt’s 
economic sanctions. With conflict 
seemingly inevitable, Tokyo sought 
to keep Washington’s only offensive 
force—the U.S. Pacific Fleet—as far 
away as possible from the regions 
that Japan desired to control. In 
short, in an aggressor’s calculus, if 
the United States might be induced 
to stay out of a regional conflict, then 
the aggressor keeps his gains. Once 
he has gained what he wanted, an 
aggressor might even have the ironic 
temerity to call on the international 
community to intervene to stop U.S. 
“pressure and intervention.” 
A fait accompli is a half-way step toward a larger war. It prom-
ises a greater chance of political victory than quiet diplomacy, 
but it also raises the risk of violence. The acting side moves 
without warning, presenting the other side with an accom-
plished fact. Retreat means losing face, while standing firm 
most assuredly means collision.1
Do people actually think this way? Saddam Hussein of Iraq cer-
tainly did in 1990. He mounted a surprise mobilization of his 
best divisions and then invaded neighboring Kuwait as soon as 
his forces were ready. Kuwait fell to Iraqi troops in mere hours, 
giving Saddam an oil-rich “19th province” with a fine harbor 
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position with respect to Iran, its enemy in a grim eight-year war 
that had just ended. But Saddam’s gambit failed, and his forces 
were driven from Kuwait.
Can a new aggressor hope to achieve surprise in our modern 
age? Would not its moves be telegraphed in advance during 
a period of rising tensions? The likelihood is not high—it is 
virtually certain. Every surprise attack over the last century 
had to overcome the peril of discovery. Indeed, there is no 
example of a significant surprise attack in living memory 
in which the victim had no warning of what could happen. 
Surprise works not because the victim has no inkling of peril 
but because he believes the peril is not imminent. It is not 
comforting to reflect that surprise probably plays a larger role 
in cyberspace than in any other domain. The digital battlefield 
provides unprecedented opportunities for surveillance, decep-
tion and surprise. Devastating attacks on critical infrastructure 
can be launched with little or no tactical warning 
(although presumably few actors can do this yet).
We believe low-grade cyber conflict has been 
increasing for years, that cyber interference with 
U.S. interests (including our economy and future 
economic competitiveness) are occurring daily, 
and that we are late-comers to the cyber warfare game. Our 
opinions, however, are less important than others’ perceptions 
of the United States. Viewing Pearl Harbor from the attacker’s 
perspective compels U.S. policymakers who are grappling 
with the tactical, operational, and strategic implications of 
conflict to include a cyber dimension to their calculations, 
and to reflect on how our actions could influence adversary 
considerations and planning.
Take, for example, the creation of U.S. Cyber Command in 
2010. This was meant to address a national, strategic vulner-
ability to cyber attacks. In the 1930s, the U.S. feared the rise 
of Japanese militarism and quietly began preparing for war. 
But could the establishment of U.S. Cyber Command have a 
similarly unintended consequence? Could its creation pose a 
threat to our adversaries? Some have worried that the creation 
of U.S. Cyber Command could have the undesired, long-term 
side effect of furthering a world-wide rise in cyber militarism. 
An adversary might believe that U.S. Cyber Command is a 
primarily offensive organization training weapons on them. 
Such an adversary might see the need to strike against the U.S. 
economy sooner, rather than later, before the Cyber Com-
mand is able to strengthen America’s defenses against cyber 
attacks. We should consider how the creation of U.S. Cyber 
Command could be shaping the offensive calculations of our 
adversaries, and whether, like Japan in the 1930s, they might 
consider a “bolt from the blue” in order to temporarily blunt 
U.S. capabilities. 
WARNING AND RESPONSE
The Obama administration signaled its attitude toward cyber 
attacks when the White House released its vision for the fu-
ture of cyberspace. “When warranted, the U.S. will respond 
to hostile acts in cyberspace as we would to any other threat 
to our country,” it said, adding that such responses included 
“all necessary means,” including military ones. 
Complicating the matter of responding to cyber 
attacks, however, is the debate over what consti-
tutes an act of war in cyberspace. At the current 
time, observers inside and outside the govern-
ment disagree about what the Department of 
Defense (DoD) can and should do in response 
to malicious activity in the cyber domain. There is no consen-
sus on what acts, including threats against the United States or 
responses to those threats, would constitute a hostile act. The 
same disagreement manifests itself at the international level, 
where debates continue over what the threshold is for declaring 
a cyber attack an act of war. 
With these geostrategic and policy considerations as a back-
drop, what lessons can the U.S. draw if we decide that the 
Pearl Harbor analogy is a useful one to ponder from the at-
tacker’s perspective? What should we build in order to apply 
these lessons?
Defensible Architecture
Defenses make a difference; even bad ones can slow an attack’s 
momentum, and strong defenses can prevent defeat. The U.S. 
Navy said as much over a year before Pearl Harbor. Navy brass 
had opposed President Roosevelt’s decision to move the Fleet 
from San Diego to Hawaii in 1940 (Roosevelt wanted to send 
low-grade cyber 
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Japan a warning), so one lesson is to reduce one’s defensive 
footprint (or the “attack surface”) for an adversary to target. 
We must assume our networks have been penetrated already. 
We need layered defenses to secure them and prevent strategic 
surprise. This begins with overall network hygiene. It requires 
sensors within and at the boundaries of our networks to act 
as scouts, screening for adversary attack methods and detect-
ing and eliminating adversary activity within our networks. 
Scouts can also conduct counter-reconnaissance to deny the 
adversary the ability to map our command and control nodes 
or to gather information about our defenses. We must be able 
to see in order to defend. Yet with 15,000 network enclaves 
in DoD alone, this is extremely difficult. DoD is working to 
reduce its own attack surface by limiting the number of its 
connections to the Internet backbone. Even if we could see all 
our networks, however, most cyber operators today are busy 
applying patches and configuring devices. We must automate 
updates to our systems to free up humans to hunt for adver-
sary malware inside DoD networks. Still, the nation, and not 
just the Department of Defense, is under incessant cyber at-
tack. As a nation, we must reduce our vulnerability to them. 
DoD can assist through information sharing; provision of as-
sistance teams to operate under the control of the supported 
organization; and deployment of defensive capabilities in or at 
the boundaries of others’ networks.
Situational Awareness 
The strong defenses at Pearl Harbor lacked situational aware-
ness and tactical control. Early detection of Japanese aerial and 
submarine scouting of the harbor on 7 December should have 
prompted the base to go to battle stations. As it was, how-
ever, the Army and Navy failed to coordinate their scouting 
and watches, and clear indicators went unheeded. A common 
operational picture might have prevented this. Had the radar 
system sent to guard Pearl Harbor been fully operational, for 
example, the Japanese attack could have been blunted.2
In cyberspace as well as air operations, a common operational 
picture (COP) is crucial. Such a COP is difficult to gain in cy-
berspace, because there are so many dynamic data points. Still, 
the data points likely exist somewhere, and political, cultural, 
and legal considerations could allow for an early warning 
system for cyber attacks. Cyber intelligence must involve both 
cyber and non-cyber sources in order to build a comprehen-
sive operational picture. As with nuclear weapons, this early 
warning system must involve close integration with our allies.
Active Defense
What would have been the U.S. response if the right dots 
had been connected in early December 1941? International 
law permits nations to conduct preemptive strikes. Seeing 
six Japanese aircraft carriers north of Hawaii and headed for 
Oahu at top-speed on December 6, for example, U.S. Army 
bombers might well have been ordered, with clear legal justi-
fication, to launch attacks against that fleet. There are no clear 
norms, however, for preemptive strikes to blunt or prevent 
cyber attacks against our national infrastructure. Nonetheless, 
after thwarting an adversary attack, we must have the capabil-
ity and authority to maneuver within our own networks, in 
neutral networks and, if directed, into adversary networks, to 
conduct operations that neutralize and disrupt the adversary’s 
ability to conduct follow-on cyber operations. 
Intelligence 
Japanese operational deception worked before Pearl Harbor. 
U.S. Army analysts had ample diplomatic signals intelligence 
from reading Japan’s foreign ministry ciphers. But U.S. Navy 
analysts misread the SIGINT clues they possessed (and failed to 
realize how many indicators they lacked), partly because the 
Japanese fleet practiced simple but effective deception and 
denial methods. Better management of intelligence analysts 
in Washington and Hawaii might well have revealed addi-
tional clues to Tokyo’s intentions, and spotted the Japanese 
deception efforts—providing another vital indicator of im-
pending hostilities. 
Intelligence is a process akin to assembling a mosaic. Then 
and now the process must be comprehensive, active, and well-
managed—and protective of the civil liberties and privacy of 
the American people. Today we operate in a telecommunica-
tions environment that is perhaps the most complex artifact 
ever devised. We cannot stop the advance of technology, but 
we must make every effort to use technology to improve our 
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Resilience
The purpose of Japan’s Pearl Harbor attack was to delay an 
American response, not to achieve ultimate victory. How long 
might it take us to recover from a massive attack on our critical 
infrastructure today? Would that buy an adversary time to op-
erate without fear of U.S. retaliation? Is there a contemporary 
analogue to a decisive blow against Battleship Row—or are we 
more secure by having a distributed infrastructure? Building 
resilience and redundancy into our critical infrastructures is 
essential. In cyberspace our “Battleship Row” might consist 
of numerous national systems and institutions critical to our 
economy, such as, but not limited to: undersea cables, Wall 
Street, power grids, water supplies, classified networks, elec-
tronic voting systems, banking systems and electronic funds 
transfer (those that enable Internet commerce, for instance), 
and a very heavy reliance on a single operating system (i.e., 
Windows). We have seen recent examples of large conse-
quences brought about by inadvertent interruptions in these 
systems. We can only imagine what would be 
the effects of intentional disruptions.
Attribution 
Attribution was not an issue at Pearl Harbor 
and this represents a key difference between cy-
ber attacks and traditional attacks. Attribution 
is commonly cited as a reason that cyber warfare 
favors the attacker; it can be difficult to determine the attacker 
unambiguously due to deception, pre-deployment of attack 
tools, and attack through convoluted paths. It is also easier 
in cyber warfare to hide the buildup of “cyber ships, tanks, 
and aircraft.” Cyber tools can be developed within isolated 
networks, denying us intelligence about enemy capabilities. 
These characteristics may make cyber attacks a good risk for 
an attacker to take precisely because they create complications 
for response. 
Cyber and Combined Arms 
On the other hand, cyber attacks could invite a stronger, ki-
netic response that the attacker may well regret. Anyone who 
chooses to employ cyber attacks against the United States 
must take into account the possibility of a response that might 
not necessarily be executed in cyberspace. Today, a kinetic 
response to a damaging or crippling cyber attack might be 
seen as overreaction; however, as norms of behavior at the 
nation-state level in cyberspace are formed, such responses 
may become more acceptable.
At the national level, we need to synchronize cyber operations 
with traditional military activities and other initiatives. Na-
tional leaders need to understand the comparative advantages 
and disadvantages of achieving an effect by cyber means versus 
conventional means, the risks of escalation, and how to gen-
erate mass and coordinate movements across the cyber and 
physical domains. We understand conventional combined 
arms operations like AirLand Battle and AirSea Battle—now 
we may need to develop “Cyber-Kinetic-Diplomatic-Law En-
forcement Battle.”
Trained and Ready Forces
We had little up-to-date experience in maneuvering large 
sea, air, and ground forces at the outset of World War II. The 
forces at Pearl Harbor had never been bombed 
by modern aircraft, and did not know how to 
prepare for air raids. Proper dispersal of aircraft 
and warning (possible even without radar) 
would have reduced the accuracy of the raids 
and downed more attackers. Our infrastructure 
remains woefully unprepared for cyber attacks. 
Yet we have an advantage in that the incessant 
activities against our networks are helping us prepare. The 
constant cyber skirmishing that characterizes the daily struggle 
on our national infrastructure helps build experienced cyber 
warriors and more defensible systems. 
CONCLUSION
Cyber warfare has already begun, at least at the level of spying, 
skirmishes, and patrols. One can argue our options, but we 
would be unwise to ignore the possibility of sudden major 
cyber attacks. We currently fall short in critical respects that 
could have repercussions for both the defense of the nation 
and the ability of Combatant Commanders to execute their 
operational plans. Our nation’s capabilities in cyberspace are 
strong but limited. Small comfort lies in the realization that 
other countries probably lag behind us in adapting military 
operations for the cyber domain—as they were in the air and 
sea domains a century ago. We are racing potential adversaries 
debates continue 
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to learn how to fight in, through, and alongside cyberspace, 
and new contenders will continue to enter the race.
The ease of applying mass and achieving surprise in the new 
cyber domain means that we now have some peer or near-
peer competitors in this space. Threats to U.S. national and 
economic security in cyberspace are increasing in complexity 
and destructiveness, and given the lack of traditional warn-
ing and the lack of immediately visible consequences of cy-
ber exploitation and disruption, resources must be directed 
to address critical shortfalls to protect the nation. We must 
maintain our momentum, improve our defenses, and close the 
gaps outlined above that threaten our well being and strate-
gic security. Actions are needed to manage the current cyber 
risk and allow for long-term development and sustainment of 
cyber defenses. Global circumstances require agile and tech-
nologically advanced cyber capabilities empowered to respond 
to threats to the United States beyond the borders of U.S. 
military information systems. We must gain greater global 
cyber situational awareness, exercise authorities to defend the 
nation, adequately command our cyber workforce, build a 
defensive cyber architecture, and train cyber teams to defend 
against growing cyber threats. 
The Japanese gamble almost worked at Pearl Harbor. The 
surprise attack could have disabled the U.S. Pacific Fleet for 
a year or more, giving Japanese forces time to dig in for a 
lengthy conflict. But Japan’s knockout blow didn’t knock us 
out, and it ensured the United States would fight to the end of 
Japanese militarism. Pyrrhic victories can be very expensive to 
those who win them but ultimately lose the conflict. They can 
cost just as much to those defeated at the outset who nonethe-
less ultimately triumph in the end. For these and other reasons 
such conflicts are best not fought at all. That means, however, 
they must be deterred—even if doing so costs considerable 
resources and seems to risk “militarizing” those assets and in-
terests that one feels beholden to defend. i
NOTES
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ABSTRACT
The speed with which a devastating cyber attack could strike the U.S. means there may be insufficient time for the traditional political-
military decision-making process to work. During the Cold War, the U.S. faced a similar challenge in the nuclear domain. To meet 
this challenge, the nuclear command and control system granted a small number of senior military commanders a “predelegation” of 
authority to use nuclear weapons in the event of a sudden, catastrophic national security crisis. We review the lessons learned from 
nuclear predelegation and apply them to the cyber domain. We conclude that the cyber command and control system may need 
to consider similar predelegation measures in order to defend against some forms of hostile cyber attack. However, there are inher-
ent risks in this policy that are also analogous to the ones confronted in the nuclear era. Counterintuitively, defending the nation 
against cyber attacks may demand patience rather than predelegation.
1. Introduction
In a formerly TOP SECRET document, entitled “Instructions 
for the Expenditure of Nuclear Weapons in Accordance with 
the Presidential Authorization Dated May 22, 1957,” the U.S. 
military was notified that “When the urgency of time and 
circumstances clearly does not permit a specific decision by 
the President, or other person empowered to act in his stead, 
the Armed Forces of the United States are authorized by the 
President to expend nuclear weapons in the following circum-
stances in conformity with these instructions…”.1
The importance and significance of this directive was under-
lined by the fact that President Eisenhower personally in-
formed then-Secretary of Defense Thomas Gates that the Pres-
ident himself had written parts of it. Furthermore, Eisenhower 
informed Gates that “I cannot overemphasize the need for the 
utmost discretion and understanding in exercising the author-
ity set forth in these documents. Accordingly, I would like 
you to find some way to brief the various Authorizing Com-
manders on this subject to ensure that all are of one mind as 
to the letter and the spirit of these instructions.” Eisenhower’s 
memo shows the U.S. national command authority wrestling 
with the thorniest of national security concerns: how to pre-
serve political control when evolving technology and threats 
are pushing for faster and faster response. Today the national 
command authority is facing similar issues and perhaps poli-
cymakers and cyber commanders can learn from the efforts of 
earlier generations to adapt to the nuclear age. Although cyber 
conflict does not constitute the same kind of civilization-
ending threat that global thermonuclear war poses, it may 
well demand changes to the way U.S. leaders manage national 
security affairs that will rival the changes wrought by the ad-
vent of nuclear weapons seventy years ago. In particular, just 
as nuclear weapons imposed unusually dramatic constraints 
on traditional command and control arrangements, it is likely 
that cyber conflict will strain existing command and control 
systems in new ways.
In this paper, we examine one specific parallel: predelegation 
policy, which granted lower-level commanders the author-
ity to use special weapons under carefully prescribed condi-
tions. Three features of nuclear war drove policymakers to 
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to predelegation: 1) the speed with which a nuclear attack 
could occur, 2) the level of surprise that could be achieved, 
and 3) the specialized nature of the technology (which meant 
that only certain cadres could receive sufficient training to be 
battle-competent).
For each of these features, there is an obvious cyber analogue. In 
both nuclear and cyber defense, 1) defenders are under a great 
deal of pressure to act quickly, 2) they may be faced with con-
flict scenarios no one could have imagined, and 3) the nature of 
the fight requires a high level of training and technical expertise. 
As a result, and in both the nuclear and cyberwar cases, defend-
ers may require some level of predelegated authority in order to 
act quickly and capably in defense of the nation.
Thus, the “letter and spirit” of Eisenhower’s memorandum is 
also the topic of this paper: namely, the possibility that certain 
threat scenarios may oblige the National 
Command Authority to do something it 
would much prefer not to do: to authorize 
military action in advance, without know-
ing exactly when and how it will be used.
2. Nuclear Predelegation
Early in the nuclear age, policymakers recognized a trilemma 
inherent in the nuclear revolution (Feaver, 1992).2 The first 
two horns were the “always-never dilemma”—political au-
thorities demanded that nuclear weapons always be available 
for use even under the most extreme conditions (even after 
suffering a surprise attack), while at the same time demanding 
that they would never be used accidentally or without proper 
authorization. Many measures designed to assure the “always” 
side of the dilemma posed risks for the “never” side, and 
vice-versa. The third horn of the trilemma was the desire that 
nuclear weapons enjoy the highest level of civilian control, far 
in excess of what was required for conventional military weap-
ons and operations. Here, some measures designed to ensure 
strict civilian control tended to exacerbate the always-never 
dilemma. What happened in practice? In fact, the evolution of 
the U.S. nuclear command and control system was an ongo-
ing set of compromises which balanced myriad risks against 
these three desiderata. 
As the Soviet nuclear arsenal grew in size and lethality, the 
challenges of this trilemma became more acute. What if a 
sudden illness, a natural disaster, or a surprise military attack 
killed or incapacitated the President, and perhaps other senior 
leadership figures, before they could even begin to manage 
a war? What if tactical commanders received warning of an 
attack—or actually came under attack—and political authori-
ties delayed in responding? Relative to certain weapons, this 
could create a “use them or lose them” scenario. What did 
we want U.S. nuclear commanders to do in these and other 
dire scenarios, and how could we ensure that they would not 
violate the principles of always, never, and civilian control?
One controversial measure designed to address these con-
cerns was predelegation of use authority (hereafter, predelega-
tion), in which the President spelled out carefully delineated 
procedures in advance that would authorize when and how 
nuclear weapons could be used by tactical 
commanders. Of course, some form of 
predelegation is as old as warfare itself. As 
Martin Van Creveld observed, even Stone 
Age chieftains wrestled with the challeng-
es of command in war and part of their 
solution likely involved explaining to the other warriors what 
they should do under certain anticipatable circumstances (Van 
Creveld, 1985, pp. 5–9). For centuries, and before technologi-
cal advances solved the problem of communicating at great 
distances, ground and especially naval commanders departed 
on their missions with orders that spelled out in greater or 
lesser detail what political authorities expected the command-
ers to do while out of communication range. Indeed, some 
form of predelegation is inherent in the President’s function 
as chief executive officer; unless the President can delegate 
certain of his powers and duties, little in the country would 
ever get done.3 Faced with the trilemma of always, never, and 
civilian control, U.S. national command authorities updated 
this familiar tool to the unfamiliar constraints of the nuclear 
age. It has long been known that, between the Eisenhower 
and Ford administrations, up to seven unified and specified 
commanders, at the three- and four-star levels, possessed 
the authority to launch nuclear weapons (Bracken,1983, pp. 
198–199; Sagan, 1989, p. 142; Blair, 1985, p. 113). In 1950, 
CINC Strategic Air Command (CINCSAC) General Curtis 
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LeMay argued that senior officers must be able to act in the 
event Washington were destroyed by a surprise Soviet attack, 
and later believed that he had gained “de facto” authority 
(Feaver, 1992). In 1957, LeMay informed a presidential com-
mission: “If I see that the Russians are amassing their planes 
for an attack, I’m going to knock the shit out of them before 
they take off the ground” (Kaplan, 1983, p. 134). His suc-
cessor, CINCSAC General Thomas Power, informed Congress 
that he possessed “conditional authority” to use nuclear weap-
ons. During the 1962 Cuban missile crisis, Supreme Allied 
Commander Europe (SACEUR) General Lauris Norstad was 
given prior authority to use nuclear weapons if Russia attacked 
Western Europe (Feaver, 1992).
The nature and scope of nuclear 
predelegation has been some of the 
most highly classified information in 
the U.S. nuclear establishment, so 
the public record is murky and filled 
with holes. Nevertheless, in the last 
15 years, a number of documents 
have been declassified, filling in 
some of the gaps.4 The most dramat-
ic revelation was the declassification 
of information on “Project Further-
ance,” a plan that provided for “a full 
nuclear response against both the 
Soviet Union and China… .” under 
certain circumstances, particularly 
“in the event the President has been 
killed or cannot be found.”5 In the 
memo dated October 14, 1968, 
President Johnson’s advisors recommended changes to the 
existing authorities, specifically allowing for the response 
to be tailored either to the Soviet Union or China, limit-
ing the response to a conventional attack at the non-nuclear 
level, and outlining these instructions in two rather than one 
document. The most recent revelations indicate that predel-
egation extended well beyond the use of nuclear weapons in 
a defensive role. 
In 1976, the U.S. reportedly planned to revoke some if not all 
of the provisions for nuclear predelegation that it had estab-
lished in the 1950s (Feaver, 1992). Currently, it is not publicly 
known whether any predelegation of authority to launch nu-
clear weapons continues to exist and, if so, under what con-
straints. However, based on recently declassified documents, it 
was clear into the 1980s that the threat of decapitation and the 
difficulty of maintaining connectivity with national command 
authorities during a nuclear war was still very much a problem 
that U.S. war planners were addressing—and that predelega-
tion was at least one of the options under debate.6
2. 1 The Pros: Why Nuclear Predelegation
The primary benefit of predelegation is that it is a reliable work-
around to the threat that the enemy might interdict commu-
nications between national command authorities and nuclear 
operators, which could decapitate the 
nuclear arsenal and render it impo-
tent. Moreover, predelegation fixes 
this problem while simultaneously 
reinforcing the legal chain of com-
mand. The predelegated instructions 
take the place of the orders that the 
national command authority pre-
sumably would have given in the 
scenario if able to, thus making the 
actions legal.
Predelegation is preferable to presi-
dential succession, which transfers all 
presidential authority to subordinate 
officials. The Constitution and the 
Presidential Succession Act of 1947 
prescribe a cumbersome process of 
succession from the President, to the 
Vice-President, to the Speaker of the House, to the President 
pro tempore of the Senate, to the Cabinet officers in order of 
when each Department was established. But a nuclear war 
could kill many if not all of these civilians suddenly, or at 
least render them incommunicado. And given the secrecy and 
complexity of nuclear war planning, it is doubtful that more 
than a handful of these officials would be ready to manage a 
war, especially a nuclear war. In short, national security plan-
ners have good reason to fear that the constitutional line of 
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A crisis-oriented alternative to succession is the “devolution” 
of military command, in which the President as CINC is re-
placed by the Secretary of Defense, immediately followed by 
the next highest-ranking military officer, and so on. However, 
it is highly likely that any practicable system of de facto devo-
lution of command would quickly diverge from the de jure 
line of succession. Furthermore, devolution as a national plan 
may rest on shaky political and legal ground. It is doubtful 
that U.S. civilian leadership would ever agree to cede so much 
power to the U.S. military automatically, and the Supreme 
Court might not uphold it as constitutional. Finally, devolu-
tion of command creates the problem of “multiple presidents” 
if communication links with one or more of the individuals in 
the chain of command are reconstituted and then lost again as 
the crisis evolves.
Predelegation is on much stronger legal ground and is thus 
preferable to devolution of command. Predelegation gives 
conditional, de facto authority to certain trusted commanders 
while keeping de jure authority with elected civilian leader-
ship. Moreover, predelegation allows for fine-tuned 
civilian control, since the predelegated authority 
can be as restrictive or permissive as desired. Thus, 
predelegation appears to reinforce civilian control 
of nuclear weapons. Last but not least, predelega-
tion allows the president to reassert command and 
control if communications are restored.
It is not enough to have policies and doctrine aimed at ad-
dressing the trilemma. The political authorities must also 
understand the doctrine and support those policies on an on-
going basis. Military doctrine without political buy-in cannot 
be sustained indefinitely. Over time, gaps are likely to emerge 
between what political leaders think is military doctrine and 
what military officers understand to be their doctrine. During 
a crisis, this lack of mutual understanding could lead to re-
sponse failures or other breakdowns in command and control, 
proving disastrous for the nation.
In sum, compared with the alternatives and provided political 
authorities fully comprehend what they are doing, predel-
egation is simple and easy to implement. Building hardened 
command, control, and communication (C3) networks that 
would withstand every worst-case scenario imaginable would 
be prohibitively expensive, even if it were technologically fea-
sible in the first place. Predelegation offers a ready stop-gap for 
unforeseen circumstances that could defeat U.S. C3 networks 
and is, by comparison, essentially free.
2.2 The Cons: Why Not Nuclear Predelegation
The predelegation of nuclear authority has an age-old Achilles 
heel: human nature. In order for the system to work in the 
extreme scenarios when it would be needed, it couldn’t be sty-
mied by technical measures that physically block use (such as 
Permissive Action Links or other coded systems that separate 
possession from ability to use).7 Predelegation was intended 
as the solution for when all communication with political 
authority was broken. Therefore, a military commander pos-
sessing predelegation authority must also possess everything 
that he or she would require to give a legitimate launch order. 
Logically, a commander with predelegated authority must be 
able to make an unauthorized use look authorized to anyone 
downstream in the chain of command. Thus, pre-
delegation favors the “always” side of the trilemma 
at the expense of the “never” and the “civilian con-
trol” sides. These risks are tolerable provided that 
the commanders honor the terms of their predel-
egated authority—that is, if they can be counted 
on to operate with complete integrity. Of course, 
the nuclear establishment invests extensive resources to ensure 
such integrity, but this risk is not inconsequential.
Predelegation seems to imply that de jure political control 
would give way very quickly to de facto military control, and 
that there would be some level of automaticity to nuclear 
retaliation akin to the interlocking mobilizations of World 
War I or to the Soviet Union’s “Dead Hand” system (Lieber, 
2007; Hoffman, 2010).8 In short, predelegation poses a strain 
on civil-military relations. As personified by General Curtis 
LeMay and parodied in Dr. Strangelove, in war as in peace-
time, civilian and military leaders may have different tenden-
cies. Military officers, to protect assets, forces, or territory, may 
desire to employ nuclear weapons in preemptive or retaliatory 
action, even if the bombs explode over domestic or allied ter-
ritory. They may feel a certain pressure to “use them or lose 
them.” On the other hand, civilians might prefer to absorb 
predelegation 







tactical military losses in the hope of achieving strategic gains, 
such as preventing an escalation of the conflict.
As a concept, predelegation is simple, but in practice it must 
be a highly complex mechanism. For example, how far down 
the chain of command should nuclear authority go? How 
wide should the latitude be, and how specific the instructions? 
It is hard to anticipate in advance what would be the pre-
ferred course of action under scenarios that can be only dimly 
imagined. In practice, for predelegation to be effective, pre-
scribed conditionality would have to be balanced with implied 
flexibility. Yet it is undesirable to have too much interpretive 
latitude with nuclear weapons. And how public should pre-
delegation policy be? Revealing some information helps deter-
rence, but revealing too much information gives the enemy 
opportunities to figure out how to defeat the system (Rosen-
baum, 2009).9 It is worth noting that presidential delegations 
of authority should be published in the Federal Register, but 
this never happened with nuclear authorities 
(Feaver, 1992). Finally, how should nuclear au-
thority revert to civilian control? In theory, this 
should happen as soon as reliable communication 
with the President or his successor is restored, but 
in practice this would be difficult to accomplish 
during a rapidly unfolding crisis. 
In theory, predelegation could apply both to offensive and de-
fensive weapons. However, the case for nuclear predelegation 
is much stronger for defensive weapons, such as air defense 
missiles tipped with nuclear warheads. Defensive weapons 
have a very short operational window to be effective, and the 
consequences of an unauthorized defensive use may be less 
severe than for unauthorized offensive use. Defensive nuclear 
weapons would explode primarily over U.S. and Canadian air-
space. By contrast, offensive weapons would detonate on enemy 
territory, greatly increasing the pressure to escalate the crisis.
However, the fact that even defensive predelegation scenarios 
involved the territory of other states proved to be one of the 
most sensitive and difficult aspects of the policy. The declassi-
fied record shows that President Eisenhower reluctantly acqui-
esced to the predelegation policy, but he was personally most 
invested in dealing with the political challenge of pre-autho-
rizing nuclear activity that would so directly affect our closest 
allies. In the notes from a formerly TOP SECRET meeting on 
June 27, 1958, “The President stressed the weakness of coali-
tions as bearing on this matter [referring to the predelegation 
of authority to fire nuclear air defense weapons]. He recalled 
that this was largely the secret of Napoleon’s success, which 
was not seen until Clausewitz wrote about it. He recalled that 
Clausewitz had stressed that war is a political act—we must 
expect the civil authorities to seek control.”10 
3. Cyber Predelegation
The nuclear revolution began with an historic explosion in the 
New Mexico desert on July 16, 1945. By contrast, the cyber 
revolution slowly sneaked up on us. And while the Internet 
era has truly benefited the entire world, a looming downside 
is that the world may have grown too dependent on a tech-
nology that is highly vulnerable to attack. We are still at the 
beginning of the Internet era, but almost every kind of net-
work-connected critical infrastructure has been 
threatened by hackers: air traffic control (Gor-
man, 2009), financial sector (Wagner, 2010),11 
elections (Orr, 2007),12 water (Preimesberger, 
2006),13 and electricity (Meserve, 2007).14 Over 
time, this problem may only get worse, as former-
ly closed, custom IT systems are being replaced 
with less expensive commercial technologies that 
are both easier to use and easier to hack (Preimesberger, 2006). 
National security thinkers rightly worry that militaries, intelli-
gence agencies, terrorists, insiders, and even lone hackers may 
target such systems in the future.
Cyber weapons do not pose an immediate, apocalyptic threat 
on the scale of nuclear weapons; and for the foreseeable future, 
the always-never dilemma will not apply in the cyber domain 
exactly as it applied in the nuclear domain. Indeed, in the 
nuclear era, apart from the bombs dropped on Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki, the U.S. military only prepared for nuclear war—
but never fought one. By contrast, the U.S. national security 
establishment (and even the private sector) is almost always un-
der some form of cyber attack, even though many key players 
have scarcely begun to prepare for it. The U.S. may have a low 
tolerance for the kind of catastrophic cyberattack envisioned in 
worst-case scenarios, but we manifestly have a high tolerance 
for the low-level cyberattacks that occur every day.
predelegation 
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Still, as the infamous Morris worm of 1988 and the more 
recent Stuxnet computer worm illustrate, there are reasons 
to worry about the intended and unintended effects of au-
thorized or unauthorized use of cyber weapons (Broad & 
Sanger, 2011). Moreover, cyber has a novel dimension that 
dramatically intensifies the degree of concern about politi-
cal control: the line between military/national security and 
civilian/commercial domains is quite blurry and activities in 
one domain usually seep over into the other, raising sensitive 
privacy and civil liberty concerns. On the notional spectrum 
from bayonets to ballistic missiles, cyber weapons are often 
considered to be closer to the ballistic missile end, requiring 
extraordinary command and control arrangements—not un-
like nuclear weapons. However, all of these assessments are 
tentative, and still open to debate.
There are important analogs between nuclear attacks and 
cyber attacks: 1) malicious code 
travels across computer networks at 
lightning speed; 2) successful cyber 
attacks are often based on novel 
ideas; and 3) computer security is a 
complex, highly technical discipline. 
These three characteristics—speed, 
surprise, and specialization—may 
force national civilian leadership to 
give tactical military commanders 
a predelegated authority to operate 
in cyberspace, so that they are able 
to defend U.S. computer networks 
competently and successfully.
Yet the cyber challenge differs from 
the nuclear in two key ways—at-
tribution and impact. Together, 
these point to the need for caution in adopting the nuclear 
era “fix” of predelegation. In cyberspace, it is often difficult 
to know with certainty who is attacking you, at least until a 
full-scope investigation is complete. This poses a significant 
obstacle to quick retaliation. There are analogous concerns in 
the area of nuclear terrorism, but for most of the Cold War, 
the attribution concern from state-based attacks was a second-
ary consideration. Likewise, if cyber attacks do not pose an 
existential threat to American society, they also do not pose 
the always-never dilemma. Therefore, it is politically fraught 
to assume the risks inherent in predelegation, and the benefits 
and requirements are more open to debate. Predelegation was 
quite controversial during the nuclear era, when the command 
and control exigencies made it seem even more necessary.
Therefore, cyber commanders could have more difficulty than 
their nuclear predecessors in convincing political leaders of the 
wisdom of the predelegation option.
3.1 The Pros: Why Cyber Predelegation
First, it may take months or even years to plan a cyber attack, 
but once an attacker pulls the trigger, electrons move far more 
quickly than ballistic missiles—at close to the speed of light. 
In fact, even layered cyber attacks may unfold at such a high 
rate that predelegation alone is insufficient. For nuclear war, 
predelegation was deemed necessary 
to eliminate cumbersome interac-
tions between national command 
authorities and tactical command-
ers. However, under most scenarios, 
tactical commanders would likely 
have enough warning to make their 
own deliberative response. With cy-
berattacks, the damage is often done 
before tactical commanders have a 
chance to collect evidence, evaluate 
data, and prepare a response. The 
cyber analog therefore might not 
be predelegated authority to respond 
but automated authority to respond. 
One of the primary fears of nuclear 
predelegation was that there would 
be an automatic response. But with 
cyber attacks, the minuscule time 
windows involved could make some level of automation 
inevitable.
Second, nuclear predelegation hedged against surprise attacks 
and unforeseen scenarios. Cyber attacks are also characterized 
by a high level of surprise. Information technology and cy-
ber attacks are evolving at a blinding rate. It is impossible to 





companies routinely gather over 100,000 unique samples of 
malicious code in a day, and still many cyber attacks pass 
undetected.15 The most advanced attacks, called “zero-day” 
exploits, epitomize this challenge; such attacks are almost im-
possible to defend because they use a novel attack method for 
which there is no signature. Thus, security experts today are 
forced to defend against broad categories of cyber attacks in-
stead of focusing on individual threats, because it is hard to say 
exactly what the next cyber attack will look like.16 The wide 
variety of possible attack vectors means that a cyber command 
and control system that restricted use authority narrowly to 
the topmost national command authority would likely fail 
catastrophically; by the time policymakers figured out what 
was happening and how they wished to respond, the damage 
would be done and the attack might have morphed to new 
and unanticipated forms, leaving policymakers always sev-
eral steps behind. Of course, the near-inevitability of surprise 
could mean that policymakers will be hard 
pressed to develop the carefully prescribed 
predelegation conditions of the nuclear era. 
Therefore, predelegation in the cyber domain 
may need to be more permissive and flexible 
than that employed for nuclear command 
and control purposes.
Third, like nuclear war, cyberwar involves highly technical 
considerations that even dedicated policymakers are unlikely 
to master. The cyber sophistication of political leadership 
can improve with participation in cyber exercises and deeper 
familiarization with the cyber command and control system. 
But the rapid evolution of information technology makes it 
a challenge even for technical professionals to keep pace, so 
there will likely always be a gulf in understanding between 
the operators and policymakers. Whereas an inability to un-
derstand the finer points of aerodynamics may not limit the 
quality of political guidance regarding air strikes, confusion 
over the nature of computer hacking could materially degrade 
decision-making on cyber response. In a 2010 Black Hat con-
ference keynote address, former CIA Director Michael Hayden 
stated that conventional operations such as air strikes are 
discrete events that can be easier than cyber attacks for deci-
sionmakers to manage; the President, he argued, could choose 
to bomb a factory at any time, but sophisticated cyberattacks 
take months if not years of painstaking, multifaceted technical 
subversion. Cyber predelegation, which would allow policy-
makers to develop guidance focused on desired outcomes in a 
deliberate manner and well in advance of a crisis, may be the 
best way for political authorities to get the results they want.
3.2 The Cons: Why Not Cyber Predelegation
Cyber predelegation involves many of the same risks that 
policymakers wrestled with in the nuclear era. Predelegation 
would require trusting the cyber operators with decisions that 
political leaders might prefer to retain for themselves. With 
cyber, the level to which authority would need to be delegated 
would likely be even lower in the chain of command than was 
needed with nuclear predelegation. The complexity and un-
certainty of cyber means that predelegation procedures could 
be especially fraught—specifying in advance the conditions 
under which certain actions could or could 
not be taken might be very difficult. 
Moreover, the cyber-nuclear analogy breaks 
down in two ways that cut against the desir-
ability of predelegation. First, the attribution 
problem is much more acute in the cyber do-
main than in the Cold War nuclear domain. 
The most vexing challenge for cyber defense today is that of 
the anonymous hacker. Smart hackers hide within the interna-
tional, maze-like architecture of the Internet, leaving a tenu-
ous trail of evidence that often runs through countries with 
which a victim’s government has poor diplomatic relations or 
no law enforcement cooperation. Most cyber investigations 
end at a hacked, abandoned computer, after which the trail 
goes cold. Moonlight Maze, a multi-year investigation which 
sought to find a hacker group that had successfully stolen U.S. 
technical research, encryption techniques, and war-planning 
data, discovered “disturbingly few clues” about its true origin 
(Adams, 2001).
Vint Cerf, one of the Internet’s inventors, recently acknowl-
edged that security was not an important consideration in the 
Internet’s original design. If given the chance to start over, “I 
would have put a much stronger focus on authenticity or au-
thentication” (Menn, 2011). From a technical perspective, it 
is theoretically possible to solve the attribution problem. For 
Most cyber 
investigations end at 
a hacked, abandoned 
computer, after which 
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example, in the near future, the language of computer net-
works will be Internet Protocol version 6 (IPv6), which will 
raise the number of computer addresses from 4 billion to a 
practically infinite number. Everyone and everything—includ-
ing each person’s individual actions—could be tagged with a 
permanently associated number. IPv6 also supports (but does 
not require) Internet Protocol Security (IPSec), which can be 
used to authenticate Internet traffic. In 2006, Chinese Inter-
net Society chairwoman Hu Qiheng stated that “there is now 
anonymity for criminals on the Internet in China … with the 
China Next Generation Internet project, we will give everyone 
a unique identity on the Internet” (Crampton, 2006).
However, the future of cyber attri-
bution, even in a next-generation 
network environment, is far from 
certain. Technologies such as IPv6 
may be used to mitigate the threat 
of anonymous cyber attacks, but 
human rights groups fear that gov-
ernments will use this new capability 
to quash political dissent by reduc-
ing online privacy. In 2012, the 
South Korean Constitutional Court 
overturned a five-year-old law that 
required citizens to use their real 
names while surfing the Web, stat-
ing that the rule amounted to “prior 
censorship” that violated privacy, 
was technically difficult to enforce, 
and generally ineffective (Ramstad, 
2012). Although it is possible to redress some of the Internet’s 
current technical shortcomings, it is likely that connectivity 
will continue to outdistance security for many years to come. 
Progress in attribution will be incremental, involve a slow 
harmonization of national cyber crime laws, improved cyber 
defense methods, and a greater political will to share evidence 
and intelligence.
For the time being, however, the attribution problem will like-
ly limit cyber predelegation to a defensive role. In the absence 
of reliable intelligence regarding a hacker’s true identity, it is 
difficult to deter, prosecute, and/or retaliate against anyone. 
For example, in 2008, the U.S. military experienced its most 
serious cyberattack ever (Lynn, 2010) when malicious code 
was discovered on U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) un-
classified, classified, and command and control systems. The 
attack was presumed to be directed by a foreign intelligence 
agency—perhaps Russia—but the true culprit could not be 
determined with precision (Shachtman, 2010). However, the 
Pentagon was forced to undertake a large-scale response to the 
attack, codenamed Operation Buckshot Yankee. Because the 
initial attack vector had been the insertion of a removable USB 
flash drive into a U.S. military laptop in the Middle East, the 
Pentagon decided to issue a blanket prohibition on the use of 
flash drives throughout the world (Nakashima, 2010).
The second way in which the nuclear 
analogy breaks down concerns im-
pact. Cyber attacks, in the extreme, 
could reach catastrophic levels, but 
likely not levels contemplated at 
the middle-range, let alone the ex-
treme range, envisioned in global 
thermonuclear war. There have been 
some alarming real-world examples, 
but many credible national security 
thinkers are still skeptical of the risk 
posed by cyber warfare.17 Nuclear 
predelegation involved extreme 
scenarios that were unlikely—and, 
indeed, never came to pass—and 
yet whose consequences were so dire 
that political leaders saw predelega-
tion as an acceptable hedge. Cyber 
would involve scenarios that were comparatively more like-
ly—indeed, may already have happened—and yet whose con-
sequences were not (yet) seen as so daunting that we should 
run the risks of predelegation.
Moreover, some of the consequences of predelegation might 
be readily felt, or at least perceived, in the civilian and political 
worlds through a loss of privacy and the politically-sensitive 
blurring of civilian-military divides. Properly circumscribing 
any predelegated cyber authority would require common 
agreement on the likely threats, but cyber risk analysis and 
cyber damage assessments are notoriously difficult and time-





place that requires U.S. commercial enterprises to employ “best 
practices” in cyber defense. Many organizations today do not 
even have a good map of their own network infrastructure, let 
alone confidence in their network security. In stark contrast to 
a nuclear explosion, some major cyber attacks go absolutely un-
noticed by the public, with only the direct participants witting 
(Libicki, 2009). If and when a real cyberwar takes place, the 
attacker’s identity should be clear because there will be other, 
circumstantial evidence,18 but the often intangible nature of 
most cyber attacks is likely to make cyber predelegation difficult 
for national security decision-makers to approve.
In sum, if the odds of a catastrophic cyber attack 
are low, the consequences perceived to be man-
ageable, and the National Command Authority 
assumed to be available to manage any future 
cyber crisis, the political stars may not align quite 
so readily to pave the way for cyber predelegation.
4. The Cyber Predelegation Sweet 
Spot?
No analogy works in all respects, but nuclear predelegation 
holds at least one clear lesson for cyber conflict: if cyber com-
manders do receive predelegation authority, it will likely be 
for defensive rather than offensive operations. In fact, defensive 
predelegation may be all that is needed—and may even be 
more than is necessary to confront many cyber threats.
In stark contrast to a nuclear attack, most cyber attacks can 
be stopped—at least in a tactical sense—with purely defensive 
measures. There is no immediate need to know who the perpe-
trators are, where they are located, or their true intentions. The 
urgency stems from a need to locate, isolate, and neutralize 
malicious code as fast as possible. Furthermore, blocking mali-
cious data is far easier than shooting down a ballistic missile. 
In this light, cyber predelegation may not even be necessary, 
because system administrators already have the authority and 
capability to protect their networks from what has become an 
incessant barrage of malware.
Some cyber threats, such as botnets, pose more complicated 
challenges, and may require cyber defenders to go “outside 
the wire.” Botnet mitigation can even entail the shutdown or 
hostile takeover of the botnet command and control server(s). 
But this type of intricate cyber operation, which normally 
involves the collection of evidence and acquisition of court 
orders, is unlikely to occur in real-time. To some degree, this 
seems to obviate the need for cyber predelegation. For ex-
ample, the celebrated “Coreflood takedown” in 2011 required 
both Department of Justice (DOJ) user notification and FBI 
user authorization before the federal government could re-
move malware from any infected computer (Keizer, 2011).
Still, there may be scenarios in which 1) cyber command-
ers desire offensive or counterstrike options, and 2) there is 
simply no time to consult with a traditional 
chain-of-command. One could imagine that a 
fleeting window of opportunity would close dur-
ing which crucial cyber evidence and intelligence 
could be gained. Here, cyber predelegation might 
be useful, but its parameters must be governed 
by the existing laws of war. For example, U.S. 
forces in Afghanistan are authorized to return fire 
and pursue adversaries. Logically, cyber predelegation should 
reflect these same principles. One limitation could be that, in 
hot pursuit, the counterstrike (or perhaps even a preemptive 
attack) could not deny, disrupt, degrade, or destroy adversary 
data or computer resources except in the event that there is no 
other way to stop a grievous cyber attack on the United States.
Tactical cyber commanders are likely to have rules of engage-
ment that are much more liberal than those given to nuclear 
commanders, due to the fact that cyber attacks are simply not 
as dangerous as nuclear attacks. If malicious code is found al-
ready installed on a compromised U.S. government computer, 
defensive actions may be straightforward, as in Operation 
Buckshot Yankee. If a cyber attack emanates from the U.S. 
private sector,19 FBI and DHS could take the lead, with tech-
nical support from NSA and CYBERCOM if necessary. When 
a cyber attack on the United States emanates from a foreign 
network, it is preferable to contact the country in question’s 
national law enforcement and system administration person-
nel to help stop it. However, there will be occasions when 
foreign cooperation is not forthcoming or when there is no 
time for consultation before costly, irreparable harm would be 
done to the United States. In this case, predelegation might 
the political 
stars may not 
align to pave the 
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authorize preemption or a counterattack against the offending 
computer or computers.
Due to the attribution problem, this predelegation policy 
should recognize that U.S. computer networks must be pro-
tected even when the assailant is unknown. Positive cyber 
attribution should be required for significant retaliation, but 
simple, defensive blocking actions against an ongoing cyber 
attack will be OK. ICBMs have a return address, but we may 
never know the true source of some cyber attacks—or we may 
be successfully deceived by a “false flag” operation. However, 
even without knowing the true identity of an attacker, CY-
BERCOM may still be able to target the proximate source of 
the attack according to the laws of war—with discrimination, 
proportionality, etc. (Schmitt, 2013). For some forms of cyber 
attack, such as a denial-of-service,20 the easiest and most pas-
sive form of defense is to “blackhole,” or silently discard, the 
malicious traffic somewhere on the 
Internet, before it reaches its target.21 
But for the most serious forms of cy-
ber attack, such as a malicious manip-
ulation of U.S. critical infrastructure, 
CYBERCOM may be able to conduct 
a pinpoint cyber strike to terminate 
the malicious process(es) active on 
the attacking computer, while leaving 
the other processes intact (if they are 
presumed to be legitimate).
If neither of these options is pos-
sible, the attacking computer may 
be completely shut down via cyber 
attack or, in extreme cases, a kinetic 
attack. This is not ideal, because the 
attacking computer may have other 
legitimate processes or functions that could be associated with 
the national critical infrastructure of another country. Just as 
soldiers sometimes fire from within hospitals against the laws 
of war, cyber attackers can also launch attacks from Internet 
servers that are related to public health and safety. Here, CY-
BERCOM would have to calculate risk versus reward, but it will 
need to minimize collateral damage to the extent possible. Any 
predelegated cyber response should be conducted in legitimate 
self-defense and supported by as much public transparency as 
security and intelligence constraints allow. During the opera-
tion, CYBERCOM could notify the targeted computer’s system 
administrator and national law enforcement of its actions 
and their rationale. Today, there are even recommendations 
that cybersecurity should be included in international secu-
rity fora at the highest levels of government, with the aid of a 
mechanism such as the Moscow-Washington “hotline,” which 
is designed to help world leaders defuse international crises 
(Segal, 2012).
5. Conclusion
The history of nuclear predelegation offers helpful insights 
into whether and how we should grant predelegation in 
the cyber domain. Nuclear predelegation was an easy-to-
implement workaround that seemed to avoid the potential 
pitfalls of presidential succession 
and command devolution. In a simi-
lar fashion, cyber predelegation may 
help USCYBERCOM to defend U.S. 
critical infrastructure in the new and 
fast-evolving domain of cyberspace, 
which, like the nuclear domain, 
presents vexing challenges to reliable 
command and control.
There are several similarities between 
nuclear attacks and cyber attacks, in-
cluding speed, surprise, and special-
ization. Together, these characteris-
tics could make some level of cyber 
predelegation inevitable. However, 
there are also important differences 
between nuclear and cyber, includ-
ing impact and attribution, which USCYBERCOM must con-
sider before granting any level of cyber predelegation.
Unlike a nuclear holocaust, cyber attacks do not pose an 
apocalyptic threat to the United States, at least not yet. There-
fore, they do not pose the always-never dilemma, nor do they 
demand predelegation. Although attackers have a consider-
able tactical advantage on the cyber battlefield, it is not clear 





Risen, 1999).22 When the element of surprise is gone, and es-
pecially if positive attribution is made, traditional military and 
diplomatic might should determine the victor in a real-world 
conflict, and that fact already provides some degree of cyber 
attack deterrence.
The tactical advantages that hackers enjoy, however, must be 
addressed, and a national dialogue on cyber predelegation may 
be the right opportunity. The Internet is worth protecting—it 
offers a higher level of efficiency, transparency, accountability, 
and responsibility in government, civil society, and the mar-
ketplace. The public would likely support a national effort to 
give cyber defenders clear rules of engagement, and which also 
notifies malicious actors of red lines that they may not cross.
As with nuclear predelegation, a stronger case can be made for 
the use of defensive cyber weapons, especially if their impact 
is limited to U.S. networks. However, we now know that pre-
delegation during the Cold War extended beyond the use of 
nuclear weapons in a defensive role, so it is possible that this 
will happen with cyber weapons as well.
In the nuclear domain, civilian leaders have always demanded 
that they retain positive control over nuclear weapons. In cy-
berspace, it is likely that even the public will want to have 
a say, because civilians now live in this domain. President 
Eisenhower understood that any nuclear war might take place 
over allied territory; there is an easy analogy to cyber here: the 
cyber battles of the future will take place on the same terrain 
that everyone uses for banking, watching the news, and com-
municating with their friends and families.
Some aspects of nuclear predelegation and cyber predelegation 
are similar—how far down the chain of command to go, and 
how much latitude commanders should have for interpreta-
tion. But some characteristics of cyber conflict are unique. 
Information technology convergence (Dawson, 2003) now 
sends practically all communications through the same wires, 
so friendly fire and collateral damage during cyber conflicts 
may be difficult to avoid. If any cyber attack, even in self-de-
fense, leads to the disruption of Internet sites related to public 
health and safety, war crimes charges could follow. Finally, 
information technology is evolving so rapidly that rules for 
cyber predelegation granted today may not be valid tomorrow.
In summary, political leaders may be forced to authorize some 
level of predelegation to the military so that it can defend 
U.S. national sovereignty in cyberspace, but they are also 
likely to be every bit as skittish about its associated risks. At 
a minimum, they will want to preserve most of the form and 
substance of political control. i
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NOTES
1 “Instructions for the Expenditure of Nuclear Weapons in Accordance 
with the Presidential Authorization Dated May 22, 1957,”declassified on 
April 4, 2001, accessible at the National Security Archive, http://www.
gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB45 
2 This section is adapted from Peter Feaver (1992), pp. 38–66.
3 This authority is spelled out in sec. 301 of title 3, United States Code.
4 The first tranche of 16 documents was declassified and published 
in 1998 and is summarized here: http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/
news/19980319.htm The original declassified documents are available 
here: http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/news/predelegation/predel.htm. 
See also: http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nukevault/ebb332/index.
htm For a good summary of more recently declassified documents, 
see Burr (2012). Available here: http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/
nukevault/ebb406/ See also: “An interview with Carl Kaysen,” by Marc 
Trachtenberg, David Rosenberg and Stephen Van Evera, MIT Security 
Studies Program, available here: http://web.mit.edu/SSP/publications/
working_papers/Kaysen%20working%20paper.pdf. 
5 Notes of the President’s Meeting, October 14, 1968. Available 
here: http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nukevault/ebb406/docs/Doc%20
5A%20Furtherance%20document%20Oct%201968.pdf
6 As a 1978 Defense Science Board study put it, if the attack came while 
the President was in Washington, D.C. “it would be possible … for the 
President either to command the forces until the attack hit Washington 
and he was killed or to try to escape and survive, but not both.” Quoted 
in “Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Secretariat, Historical Division, Joint 
Chiefs of Staff Special Historical Study, A Historical Study of Strategic 
Connectivity, 1950-1981 July 1982.” Available here: http://www.
gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nukevault/ebb403/docs/Doc%201%20-%20
connectivity%20study%201982.pdf 
7 A Permissive Action Link (PAL) is a security device for nuclear weapons, 
whose purpose is to prevent unauthorized arming or detonation of the 
nuclear weapon.
8 Lieber (2007) argues that the new historiography on World War I casts 
doubt on the “automaticity” of the mobilization plans. On the Soviet 
Dead Hand system, which provided for a nuclear response if the system 
detected a physical signs of a nuclear strike, see Hoffman (2010).
9 The British resolved this public/private question with a “Letter of Last 
Resort,” a hand-written note from the Prime Minister to a submarine 
commander, normally locked in a safe and presumably never read and 
then destroyed upon completion of a tour, that provides instructions for 
what to do in the event of an actual nuclear war.
10 “Memorandum of Conference with the President, June 27, 1958,” dated 
June 30, 1958. Declassified on April 4, 2001, accessible at the National 
Security Archive, http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB45 
11 After the Dow Jones surprisingly plunged almost 1,000 points, White 
House adviser John Brennan stated that officials had considered but 
found no evidence of a malicious cyber attack.
12 In 2007, California government officials held a hearing on the security 
of its touch-screen voting machines, in which a Red Team leader testified 
that the voting system was vulnerable to attack.
13 In 2006, the Sandia National Laboratories Red Team conducted a 
network vulnerability assessment of U.S. water distribution plants.
14 Department of Homeland Security (DHS) officials briefed CNN that 
Idaho National Laboratory (INL) researchers had hacked into a replica 
of a power plant’s control system and changed the operating cycle of a 
generator, causing it to self-destruct.
15 Author interview with Mikko Hyppönen, Chief Research Officer for 





16 For example, there are myriad types of SQL injection, which are 
impossible to predict individually and are best defended conceptually.
17 Persuasive skeptics include Cambridge University Professor Ross 
Anderson, Wired “Threat Level” Editor and former hacker Kevin 
Poulsen, Foreign Policy editor Evgeny Morozov, cryptographer Bruce 
Schneier, and even the man who wrote “Cyber War is Coming” in 1993, 
Naval Postgraduate School Professor John Arquilla.
18 This was the case in Estonia in 2007, for example, when even chocolate 
shipments to Russia were cancelled.
19 This does not mean that the U.S. organization is ultimately responsible 
for the attack; rather, a hacker may be using a compromised computer 
on the organization’s network from which to launch the attack.
20 This is an attempt to make a computer or network resource unavailable 
to its intended users, usually by sending it so much bogus traffic that it 
cannot respond to legitimate requests.
21 For many networks, this can be done easily enough with a 
configuration change at an organization’s external router, 
disposing of the unwanted network traffic.
22 Persistent cyber espionage may be an exception to this rule—
by 1999, the U.S. Energy Department had determined that 
cyber attacks from abroad, particularly from China, posed 
an “acute” intelligence threat to U.S. nuclear weapons 
laboratories. As stated earlier, all things nuclear may 
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Comparing Airpower and Cyberpower
Dr. Gregory Rattray
SUMMARY 
This paper examines the similarities and differences between cyberpower in the modern era and airpower from 1914 to 1945, so 
that military planners may learn useful historical lessons and gain illustrative insight regarding strategic cyber warfare. It details how 
the dawning awareness of a new form of strategic warfare has been accompanied by bold assertions about its significance and how 
the United States should respond. Yet we have only begun to comprehend the underlying considerations that will shape the nature 
of strategic cyber warfare. Given the rapid pace of technological change and organizational complexity posed by this environment, 
actors who sustain their capacity to learn and adapt will be the best equipped to address cyber warfare.
OVERVIEW 
Applying the Airpower Narrative to Cyber
Although it is a uniquely manmade warfighting domain, 
cyberspace lends itself to numerous comparisons to other 
domains, defense developments, and major events and peri-
ods in military history. This paper examines the similarities 
and differences between cyberpower and airpower, so that 
military planners may learn useful historical lessons and gain 
illustrative insight regarding strategic cyber warfare. Airpower, 
defined as the ability to project power from the air and space 
to influence the behavior of people or the 
course of events, is illustrative when used 
to understand strategic characteristics of 
the cyber environment. During the period 
between World Wars I and II, particularly, 
airpower was characterized by emerging 
technologies and credited with a capacity 
for enabling quick military victory. As is 
now the case with cyberspace, airpower allowed significant 
freedom of movement for military forces and was viewed as an 
offense-dominant mode of conflict. 
Given these observations, the air-cyber comparison can show 
how preexisting assumptions impact military doctrine, policy, 
and strategy. For air warfare, early doctrinal assumptions 
about aircraft technology and offense dominance led to an 
emphasis on strategic bombing, at the expense of recognizing 
other important developments that would impact airpower’s 
use in future conflicts. For example, prior to World War II, 
existing doctrine led the U.S. to overlook lessons from exer-
cise outcomes and others’ conflicts which showed bombing 
forces would not always reach and destroy their intended 
target. Technological advances which improved the speed 
of pursuit aircraft and radar detection were not sufficiently 
addressed, causing setbacks for U.S. bombing campaigns in 
World War II.
While characteristics unique to cyberspace 
may allow the U.S. to avoid similar prob-
lems in preparing for future conflict, the 
air-cyber comparison highlights the poten-
tial adverse consequences of such doctrinal 
“lock-in,” and the importance of flexibility 
in strategic thinking.
To illustrate these points, this paper does not solely focus on 
lessons from the interwar period. This paper will supplement 
its analysis by referencing environments and examining the 
lessons from military engagements beyond the interwar pe-
riod. It will build on the author’s previous works, Strategic 
Warfare in Cyberspace, and “An Environmental Approach to 
Understanding Cyberpower” [Rattray 2001], a chapter in the 
National Defense University’s 2010 Cyberpower and National 
Security [Rattray 2010].
air-cyber comparison 
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WHAT ASPECTS OF THE CYBER 
ENVIRONMENT DOES THE AIR 
ENVIRONMENT HIGHLIGHT? 
General Characteristics of the Cyber 
Environment; Comparison to Air 
Environment
Cyberspace comprises both the physical and logical systems 
and infrastructures that are governed by the laws of physics 
and the logic of computer code. The principle physical laws 
governing cyberspace are those related to electromagnetism 
and light. The speed at which waves propagate and at which 
electrons move creates both advantages and challenges: global 
communications across cyberspace can happen nearly instan-
taneously, and vast amounts of data can rapidly transit great 
distances, often unimpeded by physical barriers and political 
boundaries. Cyberspace’s speed and freedom of movement 
create both challenges and advantages for individuals, orga-
nizations, and states, but at the same time, create weaknesses 
that could be exploited by adversaries. 
In prior analysis, the author has compared elements of this 
environment to the land, sea, air, and space domains, based 
on the following four characteristics: technological advances, 
speed and scope of operations, control of key features, and 
national mobilization [Rattray 2010]. In the air environment, 
technological advances eventually allowed attacking forces 
to strike at centers of gravity directly. For cyber, technology 
creates new strategic vulnerabilities, and empowers non-state 
actors. With high speed and broad scope of operations in the 
air environment, conflicts can end quickly, while cyber is even 
faster, with the automation of command and control. In the 
air, the control of key features makes first strikes against ad-
versary airfields crucial, while in cyber, key features are under 
human control in a highly malleable environment. Given the 
integral role of changing dual-use technology in both the air 
and cyber environments, it is important that a government 
maintain a cadre of professionals and engage with the private 
sector for the purpose of national mobilization [Rattray 2010]. 
National security organizations thus cannot simply defend the 
cyber environment by increasing the size of their military cyber 
forces. If the attacker has a high probability of rapid success, 
simply pursuing current cyber defense approaches with more 
vigor is unpromising. Most attention in the national security 
community has focused on risks from cyber espionage or a 
single, time-limited strategic blow from a major adversary. 
Counterstrategies to deal with state or terrorist non-state ac-
tors conducting an economic guerrilla campaign in cyberspace 
are still not fully developed. A robust, defensible infrastructure 
will depend on shaping the technologies employed, the obliga-
tions of operators of key networks and infrastructures, and the 
ability to coordinate government-private sector investment 
and responses to attacks. Distinct from the air environment, 
key features in the cyber environment require collaborative ef-
forts between the public and private sectors. 
Offense Dominance as an Important 
Characteristic in Air and Cyberspace
Like the air environment, offense dominance is characteristic 
of cyberspace. However, this has very different implications 
in cyberspace. Both the weaknesses in the security features of 
the technological foundations and the economic incentives 
for openness between networks and systems have made much 
of cyberspace vulnerable to exploitation, manipulation, and 
disruption by digital attack, especially networks operated by 
commercial enterprises,. Non-state actors derive advantages 
from the ability to leverage expertise, and make decisions rap-
idly. Generally, offense is easy, defense is difficult. 
Concerns over which actor might strike first in a conflict play 
out differently in cyberspace than with air forces or the use of 
ballistic missiles. The ease of stealthy deployment of attacking 
forces and difficulty in attributing the source and intent of 
attackers mean that damage limitation through preemptive 
first strikes or retaliatory strikes is largely irrelevant: an actor 
would have little confidence in trying to attack preemptively to 
remove the cyber attack forces of an even moderately sophisti-
cated adversary. Similarly, trying to use cyber counterattack to 
thwart attacks in progress is complicated by issues of identify-
ing and discretely targeting a complex web of electronic points 
of origin of the attacker. The culpability of network owners 
and systems from which attacks appear to originate, and the 
fundamental fact that disrupting these points in cyberspace 
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Deterrence by retaliation is problematic, given the difficulty 
of attributing an attack to an identifiable perpetrator. 
Aspects of the Mission: Learning from the 
Battle of Saint-Mihiel
The Battle of Saint-Mihiel was the first mass operation of 
airpower during wartime, when in 1918 then-Colonel Wil-
liam Mitchell assembled U.S. aircraft to support allied ground 
troops under General John Pershing against German forces. 
This particular use of airpower may illuminate aspects of cyber 
warfare when conducted in support of conventional forces. 
This analysis is based on previous work entitled “Categorizing 
and Understanding Offensive Cyber Capabilities and Their 
Use,” written jointly with Jason Healey and provided for the 
2010 National Research Council Workshop on Deterring Cy-
berattacks [Rattray/Healey 2010]. 
Though there have been information warfare organizations 
since the mid-1990s, known cases of cyber attacks in support 
of military operations are limited in number and 
not a part of large-scale operations. However, in 
the future, cyber conflict will result in numer-
ous instances where cyber forces engage heavily 
in support of traditional military operations. 
Cyber forces would be strongly integrated with 
kinetic forces, and the scope of the effect of cy-
ber technology would be operational in nature. 
Unlike an overt force-on-force cyber conflict or cyber “Battle 
of Britain,” as described below, a cyber St. Mihiel would most 
likely occur in the context of an existing state of war. 
Analogizing from the air support efforts of St. Mihiel, a com-
parable cyber engagement would involve computer network 
defense of U.S. communications, as well as computer network 
attacks against the adversary’s systems. Computer network at-
tacks could also be used to destroy or delay the transmission 
of information from the opposing forces, while also targeting 
command and control. Computer network exploitation could 
provide intelligence on the adversary’s intent and potential 
movements. Kinetic and cyber attacks might ensure access to 
key information like troop movements, adversary command 
decisions and intent, combat assessment for kinetic and cyber 
strikes, and generate new information about enemy vulner-
abilities [Rattray/Healey 2010]. 
In a cyber St. Mihiel scenario, the adversary may have cyber 
capabilities to respond in the cyber domain, but at other times 
it may be that one side has superiority in cyberspace. Either 
way, deterrence in this environment will not only have failed, 
but it will be a secondary consideration compared to control-
ling the kinetic conflict. It may still have some role, however, 
if patriotic hackers and copycat attacks confuse each side’s 
national leaders and upset conflict resolution processes. 
Aspects of the Mission: Learning from the 
Battle of Britain
The Battle of Britain, the series of German aerial campaigns 
against the British in 1940, may aid understanding of what 
an interstate cyber-on-cyber conflict would look like. As with 
this paper’s discussion of the Battle of Saint-Mihiel, this com-
parison is based on the work written with Jason Healey for the 
2010 National Research Council’s Workshop on 
Deterring Cyberattacks [Rattray/Healey 2010]. 
During the first large-scale contest between air 
forces, the original German goal was to enable 
an invasion of Britain through attacks on ports 
and convoys. The Germans then changed focus 
to the Royal Air Force (RAF), and later directed 
attacks against key cities through terror bomb-
ing. In the end, these attacks meant to inflict strategic damage, 
either through destroying national morale or through direct 
economic damage from destroyed infrastructure. The British 
used defensive engagements combined with their own limited 
offensive strikes. Because defense was the primary objective of 
the RAF, its limited offensive strikes targeted barges to thwart 
invasion, but involved some strategic attacks against Berlin as 
well [Rattray/Healey 2010]. 
A cyber equivalent of the Battle of Britain would be fought 
completely within cyberspace, involving attackers and de-
fenders on both sides. One key difference in this cyberspace 
scenario is that both sides would use a significant number of 
private sector attackers and defenders, raising new concerns 
related to combatant status in cyberspace. While both sides 
cyber forces will 
engage heavily 







may continue to escalate violence in cyberspace, this does not 
necessarily guarantee that escalation will result in a resort to 
traditional kinetic warfare, given concerns about international 
reaction and the potential for significantly greater casualties 
[Rattray/Healey 2010]. 
As in an extended aerial campaign, success in a cyber Battle of 
Britain would go to the side with the more flexible employ-
ment of tactical and operational forces, especially if that side 
had a doctrine that most closely matched the conditions of 
the future battle. The British held a decisive advantage with 
their “Dowding System”1 to detect incoming attack forma-
tions and respond quickly and effectively. To detect attacks 
the British developed and employed both high-tech (radar) 
and low-tech (searchlights and observer corps) systems. The 
heart of this system was an information control center to 
gain comprehensive situational awareness based on all the 
incoming feeds, allowing quick assess-
ments about incoming attacks. This 
knowledge improved defensive deci-
sions which were passed to operational 
commanders who then conducted 
their own interceptions. 
A defender in a cyber Battle of Britain, 
would have directly analogous needs, 
from equivalent radar (technology 
like deep-packet inspection at Tier 1 
telecommunication providers to sense incoming attacks) to 
an observer corps (concerned users or companies reporting 
incidents to the government or information sharing centers). 
This information would have to pass to a command center 
empowered to see all the data and with sufficient authority 
to issue orders. A cyber command center, for a cyber Battle 
of Britain, would present several tremendous disadvantages 
compared to the RAF’s Fighter Command Headquarters. In a 
cyber conflict, attacks may target the private sector which may 
be outside of the military commander’s authority. To address 
this challenge, Tier 1 telecommunications providers, financial 
institutions, power companies and other private sector targets 
would need to have a way of sharing situational awareness and 
coordinating with the military. While the RAF’s commands 
were able to issue orders to subordinate commands, most 
Western nations lack any ability to issue authoritative orders 
to critical infrastructure sectors that would be targeted by cy-
ber attacks. 
Aspects of the Mission: The Need for 
Trained and Ready Forces in Both Domains
Technology’s integral role in air warfare and cyber warfare is 
clear, but its usefulness is significantly diminished if it is not 
operated by well-trained and available personnel. Without pre-
pared, experienced personnel, a military does not have the or-
ganizational capability for strategic warfare in air or cyberspace. 
The initial U.S. strategic bombing campaigns in World War II 
illustrated the challenges presented by the lack of trained and 
ready personnel necessary to conduct effective operations. The 
development of technological knowledge within the Army 
Air Arm leading up to this point clearly 
followed the impetus created by doc-
trine and organizational leadership. A 
crucial problem was the underdevelop-
ment of human expertise. A principle 
reason for this underdevelopment was 
the challenge of training large numbers 
of personnel to perform a whole range 
of necessary functions. Even prior to 
the expansion of the late 1930s, Army 
Air Arm leadership lamented the lack 
of enough experienced personnel.2 Recruiting and teaching 
enough pilots to fly the tens of thousands of planes envisioned 
in the mobilization plans required the revamping of training 
procedures and curricula. The Army Air Arm relied heavily 
on civilian schools for this purpose, and had difficulty acquir-
ing instructors with the right expertise.3 Establishing training 
programs for bombardiers, navigators, radio operators, gun-
ners, and ground crews was even more difficult [GHQ Air 
Force 1938; Walters 1947]. The specifically military tasks in 
which these personnel engaged lacked any basis in the civilian 
sector and far fewer qualified personnel to conduct the neces-
sary training existed within the prewar Air Corps. Throughout 
the mobilization period and during the war, the U.S. suffered 
from a lack of qualified instructors for bombardiers and navi-
gators and had to rely on RAF schools and observers to provide 
Tier 1 telecommunications 
providers, financial 
institutions, power companies 
and other private sector 
targets would need to have 
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lessons based on combat experience. Maintaining the skill base 
of instructors for teaching aircraft repair and maintenance also 
proved difficult because these personnel were pulled toward 
better paying jobs in depots and factories.
Numbers of personnel aside, an innovative spirit within the 
nation’s cyber workforce will also be a crucial resource in the 
cyber environment, which rewards pioneers. Risks in cyber-
space are less physical than they were for previous explorers, 
so the premium is on brainpower, creativity, and ability to 
manage complexity. Historical U.S. strengths—advanced 
education, systems integration, and intellectual property 
development and management—should offer advantages in 
cyberspace competition. In an earlier era, commander of GHQ 
Air Force Frank Andrews implicitly addressed many of these 
factors in his advocacy for greater U.S. airpower: 
The tactical and strategical employment of Air Forces 
and the status of development of aeronautical science 
exercise a profound influence, each upon the other. The 
needs of employment spur designers and manufacturers 
to produce equipment that can meet those needs, and 
likewise, the equipment on hand, or definitely foreseen, 
limits and extends the sphere of influence of Air Power 
[Memorandum to the Assistant Secretary of War 1937]. 
In light of the relationship between technological change and 
strategic characteristics of the cyber environment, limitations 
on capability for strategic cyber warfare are not as much a 
matter of doctrine as they are a matter of organizational tech-
nological capability. The demands of the cyber environment 
have outpaced U.S. organizational change and currently con-
tinue to expand beyond U.S. Cyber Command’s (CYBERCOM) 
capacity and manpower. Even though CYBERCOM’s five-fold 
increase in staffing will be a step in the right direction [Na-
kashima 2013], further capacity-building efforts must seek a 
workforce with basic technological skill sets for cybersecurity 
and cyber warfare. Additionally the U.S. must address broader 
concerns over declining scientific and technological skills 
among the population. Increased public support for science, 
technology, engineering, and math (STEM) education can 
build entry-level skills necessary for a well-prepared cyber-
security workforce [Corrin 2013]. While CYBERCOM now 
strives to substantially increase its military and civilian staff, 
and military leaders debate its possible elevation to a unified 
combatant command, engagement and further development 
of these efforts is crucial. 
As an additional point in discussing developing organizational 
capabilities in cyberspace, the lack of requirements for major 
resource investments, and the ease of leveraging global access 
to networks, provides more advantages to non-state and lesser 
state competitors in developing significant capabilities than in 
other environments. Knowledge of the vital characteristics of 
critical infrastructures, economic flows, military dependen-
cies, operating systems, and disruptive code can be rapidly 
stored, duplicated, transferred, and acted upon. Such knowl-
edge and network access permit action in cyberspace on a level 
far greater than that of the air environment, and allows for 
faster development of appropriate human capital. This distinct 
characteristic of the cyber environment makes it all the more 
important that U.S. efforts achieve nimble and well-staffed 
cyber warfare capabilities. 
SIMILARITIES AND DIFFERENCES 
BETWEEN THE AIR AND CYBER 
DOMAINS
Similarities
Doctrinal Advocacy for New Technology’s Military 
Potential Appears in Both Periods 
The legacy of World War I influenced the airpower theorists of 
the early and mid-20th century, in particular Giulio Douhet 
of Italy, William Mitchell of the United States, and Hugh 
Trenchard of Great Britain. All three were participants in the 
rapid development of airpower in the Great War, and they 
drew similar conclusions about its future role in warfare. As 
the technology of the airplane rapidly improved, it would en-
hance the capacity of airpower to strike directly at an enemy 
homeland, “smashing the material and moral resources of a 
people,” said Douhet, “until the final collapse of all social or-
ganization” [Douhet 1942]. Trenchard asserted that “the ratio 
of morale to material effect was 20:1” [Trenchard 1919]. The 





unstoppable by defenses. “Viewed in its true light, aerial war-
fare admits no defense, only offense,” argued Douhet, failing 
to anticipate defensive technology such as radar and advanced 
interceptors. Future wars, argued these three theorists, would 
be short and dominated by those with sufficient airpower. 
Large land or sea forces, or extensive mobilization, would be 
unneeded. Surprise and preemptive airstrikes would constitute 
the strategic imperative for all advanced nations. According to 
Mitchell, 
The advent of air power, which can go straight to the 
vital centers and neutralize or destroy them, has put a 
completely new complexion on the old system of mak-
ing war. It is now realized that the hostile main army in 
the field is a false objective [Mitchell 1930].
The airpower theorists were not 
particularly concerned with broader 
issues of grand strategy and national 
power, although Mitchell stressed 
the need to make airpower a national 
priority to ensure the ability to keep 
up with rapid technological change.4 
Mitchell argued that airpower could 
provide a cheap source of security 
and avoid the large expenditures, 
conscription, and taxes required to 
maintain standing armies. 
Now, as with early stages of air-
power, the evolution of cyberspace is 
enabling new approaches and forms 
of warfare. The U.S. Department of 
Defense (DoD) has pushed aggressively over the last two de-
cades toward net-centric operations based on digital commu-
nications and ease of access to information at all levels, down 
to the individual soldier on the battlefield. Special forces units 
mounted on horseback operating against Taliban positions in 
Afghanistan called down GPS-guided precision airstrikes from 
B-52s they could not see [Rumsfeld 2002]. New U.S. fighter 
aircraft such as the F-22 and F-35 carry sensor systems that 
allow them to share data in real-time about activity in the 
electromagnetic spectrum, both with higher headquarters and 
with other units conducting tactical operations. As early as the 
1990s, military experts also viewed cyber attacks as a strate-
gic weapon for direct strikes against an adversary’s centers of 
gravity, based on the potential for such attacks to degrade and 
disable communications, electric power supply, and finance 
[Swett 1995; Schmitt 1999]. 
The nature of this new and open environment to facilitate sud-
den, at-will attack bears much similarity to the air environment 
of Douhet and Mitchell, as does the belief that cyber warfare is 
primarily offensive in nature [Garamone 2010; Benitez 2012; 
Gompert 2011]. Some leading thinkers and policymakers, 
including former Deputy Secretary of Defense William Lynn, 
have specifically cited the openness and fluidity of the Internet 
as factors which favor offense dominance [Lynn 2010]. More 
recently, the current Director of the 
National Security Agency and Com-
mander of CYBERCOM, General 
Keith Alexander has made a similar 
point, when in 2011 he stressed the 
need for offensive military cyber ca-
pabilities [Talbot 2011]. 
However, we know from airpower, 
the dangers of untested doctrine. 
Because such developing beliefs have 
not yet been tested in a sustained 
strategic cyber conflict, and because 
this form of conflict itself is difficult 
to define, policy makers must exer-
cise care in developing, establishing, 
and implementing related doctrine. 
Periods of Rapidly Advancing Technological Per-
formance, Short Technology Life Cycles
As with cyberpower today, airpower has experienced periods of 
rapidly advancing technology and short technology life cycles 
which in turn rendered doctrinal assumptions about strategic 
air warfare less useful. The airpower theorists thought that the 
rise of unstoppable strategic bombers would mean that direct 
strikes at the enemy centers of gravity would decide future 
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pursuit aircraft and radar, however, undermined the decisive 
impact of strategic bombers, placing new demands on airpow-
er strategy. Emphasis on the offensive detrimentally affected 
defensive considerations and the need to develop pursuit and 
escort aircraft. Leading up to World War  II, lessons learned 
by the air forces during World War I were gradually forgot-
ten at the Air Corps Tactical School (ACTS) [Greer 1985]. 
Although thinkers within the Air Corps continued to believe 
in the need for air superiority, operational concepts in the U.S. 
came to mirror the earlier thoughts of Douhet and Trenchard 
concerning the inability of pursuit aviation to intercept and 
destroy bomber aircraft. Later reflections by bomber advocates 
at ACTS and planners of the U.S. strategic bombing campaigns 
lamented the lapse in attention to 
pursuit aviation, but the offensive 
doctrine that would dominate the 
thinking of most Army Air Force 
leaders in World War II had formed 
well before the conflict. 
The space environment also provides 
similarities related to the impact of 
technological change, in that the 
ability of man to move into space 
has led theorists such as Colin Gray, 
Geoffrey Sloan, and Mark Harter to 
argue that sustained space presence 
will be an essential enabler of both 
military operations and control over 
the global information infrastructure 
[Gray 1999; Harter 2006]. In this envi-
ronment, the speed of technological change has been fueled by the 
increased availability of space-based assets, such as global position-
ing systems (GPS), satellites, and satellite imagery, to private en-
terprise. As early as the late 1980s, and leading into the 1990s, 
this stirred fears that adversaries could use this more widely 
available technology to detect classified facilities or movements 
revealing military operations [Richelson 2012; Broad 1987]. 
This fear has led major players in the international community 
to reinvest in or build their own alternatives. The potential 
military applications of GPS helped convince the European 
Union to create a citizen-oriented system known as Galileo 
that would not be shut off in times of conflict, unlike the 
American, Chinese, or Russian equivalents [Higgins 2013]. 
Technological change in this environment, according to Har-
ter, provides linkages with cyberspace, allowing information 
to be carried globally, and network warfare operations to lever-
age space systems [Harter 2006]. Space forces will conduct 
separate, parallel strategic campaigns with a global reach, such 
as warning and defending against ballistic missile launches. 
At the level of grand strategy, in his view, space systems can 
provide a means to exercise other “instruments of national 
power (diplomatic, informational, military, and economic) to 
force an enemy to capitulate” [Harter 2006]. Furthermore, he 
related uses of space satellites and their orbital locations can 
also create chokepoints in the cyber 
world. As with the air environment, 
technological change in the space 
environment has created new de-
fensive and offensive opportunities 
which challenge pre-existing doctri-
nal assumptions about warfare.
The advent of the Internet, the 
opportunities for information ex-
change and social dialogue created 
by the World Wide Web, and the 
growing ubiquity of wireless and 
digital connectivity all have impli-
cations for the nature of political, 
economic, and military interactions. 
Today, social media, cloud comput-
ing, and mobile technology are all 
undergoing waves of significant change, providing a greater 
variety of access points to commercial and public services, 
while widening the attack surface area available to military and 
non-state actors. As these technologies grow in sophistication 
and become more intertwined with everyday social functions, 
it is expected that attacks exploiting these rapidly advancing 
technologies will increase rapidly as well [Corrin 2013]. 
The practice of hacking has also experienced its own waves 
of change. Hackers engaging in demonstrative but relatively 
apolitical acts such as web defacement were far more common 





politically motivated hackers are far more common, whether 
they operate in loose organizations such as Anonymous which 
target state and prominent commercial institutions, or are non-
state actors who act on behalf of states [Mills 2012]. In the 
latter case, hackers with such political motives have taken over 
websites and placed confrontational messages and other propa-
ganda, but have also engaged in far more disruptive activities. In 
the spring of 2007, dissidents with ethnic Russian sympathies 
organized a disruptive series of cyber attacks that affected the 
Estonian government, banking, and other sectors [Greenemeier 
2007]. More recently, distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) at-
tacks against major U.S. banks occurring in late 2012 through 
early 2013 have led experts and government officials to assert 
that the attacks are an Iranian retaliation against Western sanc-
tions and cyber attacks such as Stuxnet [Perlroth 2013].
As such technological change creates new strategic vulnerabili-
ties; it can also render moot strategic observations about cy-
berspace, and create the need for entirely new ways 
of thinking. The rise of new approaches to politi-
cally motivated hacking and the broader availabil-
ity of social media have facilitated a convergence 
between information technology and political 
protest, enabling events such as the Arab Spring 
[Waters 2012]. New military capabilities and busi-
ness enterprises require a conscious balancing of 
opportunity and risk; this demands an analytic discipline that 
has not yet developed. The U.S. must learn how to protect its 
cyberspace presence in a cost-effective fashion. This may in-
volve the development of large offensive forces that “roam the 
Net” protecting commerce; the orchestration of international 
accords and norms might be able to limit disruptive activity 
by states against other states and punish non-state actors; and 
perhaps a new “cyber Manhattan project” that can establish 
more secure technological foundations for cyberspace. 
The Technology in Both Areas Has Significant 
Dual-Use Applications 
Rapid technological change in the 21st century has created 
new opportunities and capabilities for militaries and commer-
cial entities alike. Airpower can be viewed in a similar light, as 
rapid advances in aircraft performance during WWI greatly ex-
cited airpower advocates in both military and civilian sectors. 
However, resources for developing new aircraft and support-
ing technologies were severely limited. The Air Service consol-
idated its research, development, and procurement activities 
during the period at Wright Field near Dayton, Ohio, but also 
pushed the development of a commercial aviation industry. 
Billy Mitchell recognized the need for a synergistic relation-
ship between civil and military activities related to the use of 
airpower. In Winged Defense, he stated that “[t]he substantial 
and continual development of airpower should be based on 
a sound commercial aviation” [Mitchell 2010]. In a lecture 
to the Army War College in November 1923, Mason Patrick 
also called attention to “the intimate relation between the 
commercial and military air fleets, the readiness with which 
commercial aircraft can be transformed into military aircraft” 
and stressed that “therefore, in measuring the air strength of 
a country due weight must be given to both of these compo-
nents” [Untitled 1923]. 
Cyber presents its own range of dual-use applica-
tions. The more we improve our capacity for en-
crypting data and traffic for civilian purposes, the 
easier it is for members of the armed forces, spies, 
and criminals to find information on the Internet 
and communicate anonymously. We use JavaScript 
for a variety of civilian purposes, such as creating 
client-side scripts that can interact with the user, 
but it can also be used to deliver military-grade malware via 
drive-by download attacks. Even a page of text can be used 
for guerrilla purposes; for instance, Tamerlan and Dzokhar 
Tsarnaev, the men responsible for the bombing of the 2013 
Boston Marathon, found instructions on how to make a pres-
sure cooker bomb from al Qaeda’s online magazine Inspire 
[Ordenez 2013] From a more technical perspective, tools such 
as pcAnywhere, which allows people to access their computers 
remotely [Symantec 2013], can also be used to add computers 
to botnets for the purposes of crime or espionage. Just as the 
advent of aircraft technology highlighted both military and 
civilian uses, a variety of actors are realizing cyber technology’s 
own dual-use applications.
Speed and Scope of Operations
Both airpower and cyberpower have seen significant shifts 
toward faster speed and broader scope of military operations. 
in the present 
day, politically 
motivated 
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For the air theorists, the speed of air operations meant that 
wars would be over quickly, giving dominant advantages to 
the party that struck first. As Douhet put it:
Wars will begin in the air, and…large-scale aerial actions 
will be carried out even before the declaration of war, be-
cause everyone will be trying to get the advantage of sur-
prise…for each side will realize the necessity…of ridding 
the air of aerial means to prevent any possible retaliation 
[Douhet 1942].
The situation worsened in the nuclear age, as the advent of 
ballistic missiles armed with nuclear warheads brought deci-
sion making timelines down to minutes, while broadening the 
scale of effects dramatically. 
Today, cyber threats can necessitate responses in seconds. 
Cyberspace can make information on new political develop-
ments across the globe available almost instantly. Commercial 
companies are tightening global supply chains by means of 
radio-frequency identification systems linked to point-of-sale 
electronic inventories, increasing efficiencies and lowering 
costs. Militarily, new forms of rapidly adaptive operations are 
made possible by use of these systems. Actionable intelligence 
can be rapidly pushed to cockpits of aircraft or other weapons 
systems, allowing engagement of high-value targets across very 
wide areas, as in the U.S. strikes that killed al Qaeda terrorist 
leader Abu Mus’ab al-Zarqawi in Iraq [Knickmeyer 2006]. 
More broadly, advanced militaries that can conduct network-
centric operations can tightly orchestrate combined arms 
campaigns, pursuing full-scale combat operations at any time 
of the day and in any weather, so they can dominate less so-
phisticated conventional militaries, as the United States did in 
Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom. However, 
global connectivity to achieve rapid strategic impact has be-
come a tool for non-state actors as well. Organized criminal 
activity, Internet posting of beheading videos, and malicious 
disruption on a global scale can all spread rapidly. Cyberspace 
provides opportunities for alliances between organized crime, 
hackers, and terrorists, multiplying the risk to governments, 
corporations, and other potential targets. The participation of 
such non-state entities also adds to the potential for confusion 
in targeting adversaries in cyberspace, as automated decision 
making processes, when combined with the risk of human er-
ror, may lead to inadvertent harm against innocent individuals 
or government entities. 
Given the speed and scope of operations in cyberspace, man-
agement and acquisition processes will need to support agility 
in the adoption of rules governing access to outside networks 
and mission partners that balance usability and security. The 
conduct of military and other operations will place a premium 
on trusting individuals to understand the changes they see in 
the cyber tactical environment and adjust the execution of 
their operations quickly. 
Differences 
Non-state Actors Can Leverage Cyber Warfare 
Tools More Easily
Unlike airpower, which is primarily the province of states, 
cyber warfare tools diffuse much more readily to lesser states 
and non-state actors. The rapidity of connections offered by 
modern communications, information systems, and developing 
cyber weapons technologies creates opportunities for industri-
alized states, but it can also enable lesser states and non-state 
actors [Wilson 2009; Lachow 2009]. In addition to organized 
criminal activity and Internet posting of terrorist propaganda, 
malicious disruption on a global scale can spread rapidly. Cy-
berspace provides opportunities for alliances between organized 
crime rings, hackers, and terrorists, multiplying the risk to gov-
ernments, corporations, and other potential targets. 
Cyber Warfare Offers Greater Opportunities for 
Asymmetric Strategies
Presence in cyberspace and ease of connectivity create new 
vulnerabilities to attack. Accessibility and anonymity have 
produced an environment in which smaller organizations and 
political actors, especially those who seek to avoid vulnerabili-
ties to retribution in other environments, can achieve a dispro-
portionate increase in capabilities to conduct their operations 
and disrupt those of adversaries. 
The increasing use of the Internet and other aspects of the 
cyber environment by advanced states to orchestrate the op-
erations of their energy, transportation, and other infrastruc-





economic, military, and social activities from sustained power 
outages or loss of confidence in transportation systems could 
be more severe, involving physical damage and even casual-
ties. Attacks against digital control systems are technologically 
feasible [Wilson 2007; ICS-CERT 2012]. Such vulnerabilities 
provide asymmetrical advantages to non-state actors that are 
less reliant on such control systems and infrastructures. Less 
developed states can also use this advantage, as exemplified by 
acts of industrial espionage [ONCIX 2011] and DDoS attacks 
against civilian infrastructure [Perlroth 2013]. 
Today, various non-state actors are already using the Internet 
in aid of their respective causes. A large number of terrorist 
groups, such as al Qaeda, the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucio-
narias de Colombia, and Jemaah 
Islamiyah already use the Internet to 
recruit, raise funds, educate people 
in how to perpetuate attacks, and 
coordinate. However, while the ex-
tent to which insurgents and terror-
ists have conducted cyber attacks is 
not yet fully clear, various hacktivist 
groups have carried out DDoS attacks 
and breaches as forms of protest. The 
Anonymous collective has shown 
that it is capable of paralyzing the 
websites, and thus the operations, of 
companies such as PayPal [Martin 
2013]. In 1998, Milw0rm, a hacker 
group comprised of a few teenagers, 
hacked into the Bhabha Atomic Re-
search Centre in Mumbai to protest 
the Indian government’s nuclear tests [Mehta 1998]. As new 
and more complex forms of cyber weapons become increas-
ingly available, these attacks may transcend online protests 
and disruptions, resulting in more significant infrastructure 
disruption and physical damage. 
Cyberspace is Not Controlled by Governments of 
Sovereign States
The number of actors who play a significant role in cyberspace 
is also a distinguishing feature. States do not, and cannot, con-
trol cyberspace to the same degree as they can control land, 
sea, and air, or even as they could control cyberspace in the 
past. For example, during both world wars, the U.S. govern-
ment took control of the operation of the Nation’s predomi-
nant telephone provider, American Telephone and Telegraph 
(AT&T) [Rattray 2001]. That was possible because, at that 
time, AT&T alone provided almost all of the network hardware 
and determined the communications rule sets that allowed 
the telephone system to work (although it did so under close 
regulation by the government). Now, however, in the U.S. and 
elsewhere, there are myriad providers of devices, connectivity, 
and services in loosely woven networks with open standards. 
Western governments have extreme difficulty in controlling 
the full spectrum of telecommunications and other activities 
in cyberspace. In more authoritarian regimes, such as China 
and Iran, national systems of control 
over content and Internet access are 
in place with an attendant ongoing 
cat-and-mouse game with citizens 
who seek to work around constraints 
imposed by the government. 
Establishing sovereignty, or deciding 
on rules to govern the global cyber 
commons, creates major challenges 
and growing national security con-
cerns for state actors. With telephone 
networks, governments had ways to 
control connectivity beyond their 
borders. However, over time, non-
state actors—corporations, non-
governmental organizations, public 
interest groups—have also become 
influential; it is not just states that set standards or determine 
the rules of the road. In many respects, governance in cyber-
space resembles the American “Wild West” of the 1870s and 
1880s, with limited governmental authority and engagement. 
Users, whether organizations or individuals, must typically 
provide for their own security. Theories and approaches for 
exercising state control, and for leveraging control for national 
power, have not yet been adequately developed. 
As evidenced by the proceedings of the 2012 World Confer-
ence on International Telecommunication, held in Dubai 
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Union (ITU), there are competing narratives for how cyber-
space should be governed [Kehl 2012]. Given the variety of 
stakeholder, national and civil society interests which govern 
the numerous functions of the global Internet, no single vision 
has taken hold to the exclusion of others. Numerous organiza-
tions responsible for Internet governance operate under the 
multi-stakeholder model, meaning that they incorporate the 
input of industry, governments, technical experts, and civil 
society in their decision making processes. By contrast, some 
nation states believe these organizations (and particularly 
ICANN) disproportionately favor U.S. national and commer-
cial interests, and that states or state-centered organizations 
like the ITU should exercise greater control over regulatory 
and security issues. While this alternative view assumes that 
multi-stakeholder institutions cannot adequately address such 
concerns, groups like ICANN are responding by working to 
address security matters and improved representation of the 
developing world [ICANN 2012]. The challenges of governing 
this environment thus transcend borders, allowing technical 
realities of the cyber environment to continue to pose ques-
tions about the appropriate role of government.
Identifying Centers of Gravity is More Difficult in 
Cyber Warfare
Because cyberspace is unique in that interactions are governed 
by manmade hardware and software, the “geography” of cy-
berspace is much more mutable than other environments, 
thus complicating the task of identifying an adversary’s centers 
of gravity. This is not the case in the air, which is a static physi-
cal environment. Portions of cyberspace can be turned on and 
off with the flick of a switch, and can be created or “moved” by 
insertion of new coded instructions in a router or switch, thus 
making it more challenging to identify centers of gravity in 
cyberspace. Many of the rules of code are subject to frequent 
change, creating new online environments, as exemplified 
by the emergence of Web 2.0, the continued proliferation of 
social media, and the use of cloud-based services. While the 
constant creation of new features in an online landscape com-
plicates targeting, it also creates a wider attack surface area for 
adversaries, showing that such online activity does not come 
without vulnerabilities and disadvantages. 
Government Cooperation with the Private Sector 
is Crucial to Effective Cyber Defense Strategy
The U.S. security community has recognized the significant 
threat posed by digital attacks to both traditional military 
operations and the nation’s well-being. Yet, until recently, 
national security doctrine has avoided addressing the fun-
damental role played by the private sector in how risk and 
vulnerability in the nation’s information infrastructures can 
be jointly managed and defended. Statements regarding the 
threat posed to the nation’s information infrastructures by 
cyber attacks lump together a very wide range of threats with-
out adequately distinguishing the relative likelihood and risks 
posed by different categories. Many assessments have con-
centrated on what U.S. adversaries could potentially disrupt, 
with very little attention devoted to understanding underlying 
political objectives of possible adversaries, the degree to which 
disruption would cause serious damage, or the management of 
response and recovery efforts after an initial attack. 
In order to better protect cyberspace, the United States should 
pursue redundancy and diversity in undersea cables, satellites, 
ground stations, and fiber optic routing in order to minimize 
vulnerable chokepoints. We can worry less about precise map-
ping of all known vulnerabilities (which have been a focus of 
many U.S. federal government efforts, given the constantly 
morphing cyberspace environment). Public and private sec-
tor actors who operate and use cyberspace for key national 
economic and security purposes should jointly conduct regu-
lar scenario analyses and exercises to focus investment and 
develop strategies to establish a robust cyber infrastructure. 
Because of the adverse national security impacts of widespread 
economic harm to the U.S. private sector, intellectual prop-
erty can serve as a center of gravity for adversaries to exploit 
through espionage. Joint public-private analyses and exercises 
should not only examine threats to critical infrastructure, but 
should also account for the adverse national security impact 
of intellectual property theft. Enabling private sector institu-
tions to exchange information with the government pertain-
ing to data breaches should be facilitated by assuaging fears 
of prosecution, civil liability, or regulatory action. Even the 
potential harm of attacks against critical infrastructure should 
not overshadow the harm that stems from the steadily growing 





LESSONS OF THE AIR-CYBER 
ANALOGY 
The Lessons of Doctrinal “Lock-In”
The adverse consequences of inflexible adherence to doctrine, 
in spite of technological change, is a key concern for waging 
strategic warfare. Unlike strategic air warfare, strategic cyber 
warfare appears less prone to the adverse impact of doctrinal 
“lock-in” in the U.S., given the fact that it has done more to 
acknowledge the important role of defensive measures in cy-
berspace [Fryer-Biggs 2012]. However, the U.S. experience 
with airpower sets forth important lessons that today’s mili-
tary cyber strategists should consider when shaping policy 
and strategy. 
The first of these lessons is the need to know when operat-
ing concepts should be modified or changed, based on more 
effective defensive measures and detection technology. For 
airpower in the early-to-mid-1930s, bombers were capable 
of flying higher and faster than fighters, and this distinction 
helped lend credence to the emphasis on strategic bombing 
and the relative disregard of defensive measures. However, 
technological advances changed this calculation with numer-
ous defensive innovations such as radar that improved warn-
ing, better radios for coordinating defensive responses, and 
the ability of high performance, heavily-armed interceptors to 
intercept and destroy larger aircraft. But the commitment to 
existing concepts of operations from the late 1930s through 
1943 blinded the Army Air Arm to significant evidence that 
bombers would not be able to operate effectively during unes-
corted daylight operations over Germany. Learning this lesson 
proved very costly for the aircrews of the Eighth Air Force, and 
impaired the U.S. strategic bombardment effort.  
Given the difficulties that the Army Air Force experienced in 
World War II, cyber forces should also be prepared to address 
the development of new defensive capabilities in cyberspace. 
In light of cybersecurity experts’ desire to improve attribution 
technology and thus solve the challenges of identifying ma-
licious actors in cyberspace, significant advances in this area 
may necessitate a shift in offensive thinking. Current gradual 
advances in attribution technology do not provide complete 
certainty as to the identity of an attacker, but strategy should 
not remain grounded in assumptions that further change will 
not occur [Lemos 2013]. Changes in attribution technology 
will make offensive execution a more complex task, in that 
forces may need to deceive or disrupt defensive mechanisms 
more completely than today, before pursuing other intended 
targets. Failure to address an improved detection capability 
could lead to setbacks for offensive cyber forces similar to 
those experienced by the Eighth Air Force during its early 
bombing campaigns against Germany. 
Importance of the Role of Public-Private 
Partnerships
Cyber technology from the private sector has aided the de-
velopment of strategic warfare capabilities, as was the case 
for airpower during the interwar period. Around this time, 
the Air Service placed substantial emphasis on improving the 
performance of all types of aircraft. Increasing speed and range 
were primary concerns. According to an active participant 
in the interwar technological development of the Army air 
arm, James Doolittle, the involvement of the Air Services in 
air races and competitions “was for two purposes: one was 
research and development and the other was to bring avia-
tion to the American public” [Neufeld 1993]. In announcing 
U.S. military participation in the air races in 1922, a public 
release by the Secretaries of War and Navy stated that “[t]he 
encouragement of an aeronautical industry and of aeronauti-
cal activity outside the military forces is considered by every 
nation developing aeronautics the most economical method 
for developing air power” [Memorandum 1922]. The flight of 
Army MB-2 bombers around the world in 1924 and Charles 
Lindbergh’s Atlantic crossing in 1927, as well as experiments 
with refueling, explored the possibilities for improving the 
range of aircraft.
With its July 2011 Strategy for Operating in Cyberspace 
(DSOC), the Pentagon expressly linked itself with private in-
dustry. Of the five initiatives in the DSOC, Strategic Initiative 3 
advocated partnering with other U.S. federal agencies, as well 
as the private sector, so as to mitigate cyber risks stemming 
from reliance on private Internet Service Providers (ISPs) and 
the global supply chain [DoD 2011]. The initiative identified 
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Assurance (DIB CS/IA) program as one such effort that it would 
seek to strengthen through the build-up of related public-pri-
vate pilot programs. This led to the 2011 creation of the DIB 
Cyber Pilot program, which leveraged threat data provided 
by the government to protect the networks of private sector 
defense contractors [DoD 2012]. The recent White House 
Executive Order, issued 12 February 2013, offers similar sup-
port by seeking to expand the Enhanced Cybersecurity Ser-
vices program under the Departments of Homeland Security 
and Defense [The White House 2013]. While sharing threat 
indicators between public and private entities is one example 
of collaboration activity for improving cyberpower, this activ-
ity exemplifies the need for the government to improve and 
further work with the defense industrial base in this and other 
cooperative cyberpower efforts. 
ADVANTAGES OF THE COMPARISON
Given its similarities in terms of speed and scope of opera-
tions, airpower aids the understanding of the pace of opera-
tions in cyberspace. Strategic air warfare requires well-trained 
personnel to fully utilize technology, and helps illustrate how 
the same training and experience are of great importance in 
strategic cyber warfare. While identifying centers of gravity is 
difficult in both domains, in cyberspace it is distinctly more 
difficult. The U.S. strategic bombing campaigns in Germany 
during World War  II helped illustrate potential obstacles to 
effective targeting. Finally, because of the influence of doc-
trine and the change of technology in air warfare, the air-cyber 
comparison makes it easier to understand the risks of ignoring 
the impact of technology on the relationship between offense 
and defense. 
Airpower Aids Understanding of the Pace 
of Operations in Cyberspace
The development of airpower in the first half of the 20th cen-
tury meant that attacks could be launched against strategic 
centers of gravity in hours. Given the capacity for airpower 
to project force quickly and directly at an adversary’s centers 
of gravity, the airpower-cyberpower comparison illustrates 
the strategic importance of quick decision making and rapid 
response. In cyberspace, key events and disruptive threats can 
necessitate responses in seconds. National leaders are thus 
faced with tighter timelines for decisions even as it becomes 
increasingly imperative to orchestrate action across wider 
distances more quickly. In light of the need for such rapid 
decision making in strategic cyber warfare, it is necessary to 
discuss the appropriate balance between automation and hu-
man input for analytical purposes. While automation may 
prove extremely valuable in saving time, the lack of human 
involvement in certain decisions may present the risk of im-
properly attacking the innocent. 
Comparison Emphasizes the Need for 
Constant Training and Experienced 
Personnel 
Even as both environments require implementation of highly 
advanced technology, the U.S. experience with airpower il-
lustrates how technology cannot provide a strategic advantage 
without a strong cadre of well-trained personnel. This impor-
tant lesson is yet another function of cyberspace’s trend of 
rapid technological advancement. 
U.S. Army Air Forces entered World War II with an under-
developed organizational technological capacity for strategic 
warfare, both in terms of numbers of weapons and personnel 
and in terms of the breadth of technologies, skills, organiza-
tions, and training. U.S. airmen were inattentive to develop-
ments that changed how strategic bombardment forces could 
be used more effectively; even if this had been avoided in 
doctrinal assumptions and planning, sufficient training for 
U.S. airmen would have been crucial in implementing such 
strategic foresight. Instead, strategic bombing campaigns were 
hampered by an insufficient number of skilled bombardiers, 
navigators, and maintenance personnel. 
After World War II, U.S. pilots were successful against Chi-
nese and Korean forces in the air, even if U.S. airpower overall 
was not effective against enemy centers of gravity. In Viet-
nam, as with efforts against the Germans in World War  II, 
strategic attacks proved extremely difficult. After Vietnam, the 
U.S. stood up advanced training facilities at Nellis Air Force 
Base in Nevada, which placed significant emphasis on realis-





Force pilots could be adequately trained even in peacetime. 
Applying these lessons to training for strategic cyber warfare 
is crucial. 
The centrality of human expertise requires the U.S., like other 
major actors, to compete globally to create, attract, and retain 
the human capital needed to construct, utilize, and engage in 
cyber operations. These personnel must be capable of analyz-
ing the ever-changing opportunities and risks present in the 
environment, operating and protecting the large enterprises 
and infrastructures that sustain cyberspace, and performing 
other tasks ranging from forming new modes of sharing infor-
mation to developing the capacity for preventing or deterring 
disruptive attacks. For the U.S. military, the challenge is to 
nurture a strong cadre of cyber experts, similar to the naval, 
air, and space expertise that has enabled success in other envi-
ronments. This requires the vision and will to divert resources 
from traditional military missions to invest in the core capa-
bilities for cyber operations. Today, given the speed 
at which technologies for cyber warfare develop, 
education and training are even more crucial, and 
may have even more of an impact on organiza-
tional technological capacity than flexibility in 
doctrine. Efforts such as the National Initiative for 
Cybersecurity Education (NICE) under the National Institute 
of Standards and Technology (NIST), and the Pentagon’s cyber 
workforce development efforts demonstrate that the U.S. is 
beginning to develop at least some of the skill sets for suf-
ficient cyber organizational technological capacity. 
Inability to Identify and Target Centers of 
Gravity and Assess Damage 
Although identifying centers of gravity and targeting them 
are more difficult in cyber warfare, the U.S. experience with 
strategic bombing in World War II highlights such challenges 
as well as ways they can be mastered. In World War  II, the 
unanticipated ability of the Germans to limit their vulnerabil-
ity to strategic bombing posed problems for U.S. planners in 
identifying and attacking the most significant targets. Ameri-
can planners had expected to “find a taut industrial fabric, 
striving to sustain a large Nazi war effort” [Hansell 1972]. Yet 
the fact that the Germans had not conducted a full wartime 
mobilization until 1942 was not evident to either the Brit-
ish or United States. Similarly, the ability of the Germans to 
redesign systems to minimize use of items like ball bearings 
and disperse production in the aircraft industry did not figure 
into targeting schemes. 
The Strategic Bombing Survey would later conclude that 
“[t]he recuperative powers of Germany were immense; the 
speed and ingenuity with which they rebuilt and maintained 
essential war industries in operation clearly surpassed Allied 
expectations” [USSBC 1976]. In particular, the U.S. effort to 
identify critical nodes for production of finished war ma-
terials, to minimize the number of required targets, proved 
flawed. Attacking underlying systems would have provided 
higher payoff. As stated by the Strategic Bombing Survey, 
“[t]he importance of careful selection of targets for air attacks 
is emphasized by the German experience. The Germans were 
far more concerned over attacks on one or more of their ba-
sic industries and services … than they were over 
attacks on their armaments industry or the city 
areas. The most serious attacks were those which 
destroyed the industry or service which most in-
dispensably served other industries” [USSBC 1976]. 
Similar challenges will face those who wage strategic cyber 
warfare. The complexity of modern information infrastruc-
tures will make the effects of large-scale attacks difficult to 
estimate. The ability of the adversary to recuperate must be 
analyzed. Strategic cyber planners must evaluate which sectors 
or systems within an infrastructure constitute centers of grav-
ity with the greatest leverage. 
The ability of the U.S. strategic bombing campaign to attack 
the German vulnerabilities identified in war plans was also 
constrained by the continuing tug of war regarding available 
heavy bomber assets. This led to a piecemeal commitment of 
assets to strategic attacks that had very limited effect and may 
well have allowed the Germans to respond effectively to the 
threat of heavily armed but unescorted bomber attacks. The 
continual shift between target systems—from submarines 
to aircraft and ball-bearings, to supporting the Normandy 
invasion, to the eventual concentration on oil and trans-
portation—allowed the Germans considerable latitude for 
the challenge 
is to nurture a 
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reconstitution and recovery until the final phase of the con-
flict. In the context of cyber warfare, available assets capable 
of conducting cyber attacks may well be able to support both 
battlefield operations and strategic attacks. If the U.S. engages 
in a conflict with a significant conventional dimension, plans 
for waging strategic cyber campaigns should similarly expect 
a competition for resources and possible diversions of effort. 
The U.S. strategic bombing campaign in Germany also suf-
fered from an inability to assess the damage it was inflicting. 
The Army Air Force lacked an intelligence capacity for con-
ducting its own assessments. The assessments conducted by 
others, such as the Committee of Operations Analysts and 
the Joint Intelligence Committee, 
looked to identify future targets 
without adequately assessing the 
available information about the ef-
fects of attacks already conducted. 
Estimates measured bombing 
campaign progress in terms of the 
numbers and weight of the attacking 
force, not the effects on the targeted 
system. As a result, the combined 
U.S. and British intelligence esti-
mates on the effects of the streategic 
bombing campaign proved suscep-
tible to wide miscalculation and 
deception. Even if intelligence-gath-
ering efforts had been improved, the 
task of understanding the effects of 
bombing and the German efforts at 
recovery and substitution were immense. The U.S. Air Force 
study on intelligence and Army Air Force Operations in 
World War  II stresses the tendency to overestimate damage 
based on photoreconnaissance and the difficulties posed by 
the German program to disperse industrial production [Kreis 
2004]. Daniel Pape concludes that “[i]nformation was inad-
equate to produce reliable macroeconomic analysis, let alone 
comprehensive microeconomic analysis required for strategic 
interdiction by precision bombing” [Pape 1996]. Even when 
a thorough analysis such as the Strategic Bombing Survey for 
Germany was conducted, the assessments of the report were 
deemed inconclusive in terms of guiding the conduct of the 
strategic air campaign against Japan. Those responsible for 
waging strategic cyber campaigns should pay heed to the diffi-
culty of constructing capacity for damage assessment adequate 
to waging a new type of warfare. Intelligence organizations 
with the proper skills and analytic tools must exist if plan-
ners desire to adapt and improve their strategic cyber warfare 
targeting plans as a campaign progresses. 
In total, those contemplating waging a strategic cyber war-
fare campaign will confront at least as many challenges in 
establishing the enabling conditions for success as faced the 
planners and leaders of the U.S. strategic bombing effort 
against Germany in World War  II. Although achieving an 
offensive advantage may prove easier in cyberspace, meeting 
other conditions will present dif-
ficulties requiring attention if such 
campaigns are to prove effective. The 
lessons of the past should be kept at 
the forefront of thinking about how 
to establish cyber warfare forces and 
wage strategic warfare. 
Comparison Aids Better 
Understanding of the 
Fluidity Between Offense 
and Defense
Consistent with the challenges of 
identifying and targeting centers of 
gravity, the technological changes 
which create such concerns also pose 
the probability of changes in the bal-
ance between offense and defense. 
When judged against the great certainty with which early air 
theorists regarded offense and the use of strategic bombing, 
interwar improvements in pursuit aircraft and development 
of radar technology illustrate the speed at which revolution-
ary technological change can occur. Today, cyber technology 
is changing at a far more rapid pace, illustrating the potential 
for present-day assumptions about the difficulty of attribution 
and other defensive activities to be upended by innovation. 
This has significant implications for a range of activities 
related to preparation for strategic cyber warfare, includ-





collaboration in crafting new technology, the education and 
training of forces, and the overall development of military 
strategy applicable to cyber conflict. As new cyber weapons are 
created at an increasingly fast pace, fueling the proliferation 
of threats targeting governments and commercial enterprises 
alike, it is not unreasonable to view cyberspace as a dispro-
portionately offensive environment. This may, in turn, lead 
military planners and other cybersecurity experts to make 
operational assumptions that emphasize their own offensive 
or active defensive capabilities, while overlooking the need for 
innovation and adaptation on the defensive side. Again, given 
the U.S. Army Air Force experience in World War II, the air-
cyber comparison demonstrates the usefulness of a more bal-
anced approach to strategic cyber warfare. 
DISADVANTAGES OF THE 
COMPARISON
There are aspects of strategic cyber warfare that cannot be 
easily understood through the lens of air-cyber comparison. 
Given the comparative ease of access with which non-state 
and lesser state actors can enter cyberspace and develop cyber 
warfare capabilities, cyberpower is within easy reach of smaller 
parties. Because cyberspace is comparatively more challenging 
for identifying centers of gravity, is a more malleable environ-
ment, and is more open to a variety of actors, it is harder to 
assess belligerents’ use of cyber attacks through detection sys-
tems, unlike the case of airpower. 
Only States Can Effectively Operate 
Sophisticated Airpower, the Same Is Not 
True for Cyberpower
While airpower is a tool that can only be wielded successfully 
by governments, the tools of cyberpower are very different. 
For lesser states and non-state adversaries, developing and 
wielding airpower comes at a far greater expense, and requires 
far more organizational capacity. Projecting cyberpower does 
not place the same demands on those who seek it. In com-
parison to airpower technology, malicious software and other 
cyber tools can be developed and distributed fairly cheaply, 
strategically enabling entities that would not have the size or 
organizational sophistication to succeed in other domains. 
Given this important distinction from airpower, U.S. experi-
ences with strategic air warfare and interstate conflict in other 
domains do little to illustrate lessons on how to deter and 
respond to non-state adversaries in cyberspace. Military strate-
gists must account for this distinction, and observe lessons on 
asymmetric warfare from other domains as appropriate. The 
airpower-cyberpower comparison serves as a caution against 
rigid over-reliance on doctrinal assumptions, and emphasizes 
the strategic offensive and defensive implications of vulner-
abilities to vital centers. But lessons on asymmetric warfare 
drawn from U.S. approaches to counterinsurgency and coun-
terterrorism may prove illuminating in efforts to understand 
the greater variety of potential adversaries in cyberspace. 
Easier to Assess Belligerents’ Use of 
Airpower through Detection Systems; 
Cyberpower More Difficult
The air-cyber comparison generally helps efforts to understand 
the pace of operations in cyber warfare, but the risk of mis-
identifying targets in cyberspace is great. The Department of 
Defense net-centric warfare concepts, fusing improved sensor 
and communications systems, enables engagement of targets 
for air attack that emerge rapidly but offer very limited time 
periods in which to take action. Balancing the need for speed 
with the risks of automated responses in military and other op-
erations will prove a growing challenge. Rules of engagement 
will often call for high-confidence identification of potential 
targets, but a commander may not fully trust automated sys-
tems to make the call regarding weapons employment. The 
U.S. Navy shoot-down of an Iranian airliner in 1988 by the 
Aegis air defense system provides a cautionary tale, yet excessive 
caution may also lead to a slowed defensive response in the 
cyber environment [Miklaszewski 2006]. Cyberspace presents 
chances to hide or mislead regarding the source of malicious 
activity. Automated systems can be subverted and turned 
against their operators or used against third parties. 
For non-state actors to exploit this unique aspect of cyber-
space, a challenge is to take advantage of rapid, global opera-
tions without creating a recognizable signature in cyberspace 
that would render them vulnerable to retaliation, and thus to 
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medium where guerrilla campaigns, orchestrated dispersal, 
and surreptitious disruption make large land, sea, and air 
forces fighting decisive battles irrelevant.
CONCLUSION
In this century, the United States has entered an environment 
filled with opportunity and fraught with challenges. Dawn-
ing awareness of a new form of strategic warfare has been ac-
companied by bold assertions about its significance and how 
the United States should respond. Yet we have only begun to 
comprehend the underlying considerations that will shape the 
nature of strategic cyber warfare. 
Development of strategic cyber warfare capabilities requires 
efforts to identify issues and evaluate uncertainties, not react 
to individual events and accept simple answers. The analysis of 
strategic cyber warfare requires a deeper understanding of the 
linkage between applying force and intended political effects. 
Past efforts to wage strategic warfare have often failed because 
of inadequate understanding of the ways that applying force 
related to the political objectives sought rather than because 
of the shortcomings of technological tools for inflicting pain. 
Those contemplating strategic cyber warfare must also address 
the fundamentally new challenges of a manmade cyber envi-
ronment largely developed and operated outside the control of 
national governments. Given the rapid pace of technological 
change and organizational complexity posed by this environ-
ment, actors who sustain their capacity to learn and adapt will 
be best equipped to address cyber warfare.  i
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In the domain of cyber defense, the concept of active defense is often taken to mean aggressive actions against the source of an 
attack. It is given such names as “attack back” and “hack back” and equated with offensive cyber strikes. It is considered dangerous 
and potentially harmful, in part because the apparent source of an attack may be an innocent party whose computer has been 
compromised and exploited by the attacker.
Our purpose in writing this paper is to show that active 
cyber defense is a much richer concept that, when properly 
understood, is neither offensive nor necessarily dangerous. 
Our approach is to draw on concepts and examples from air 
defense to define and analyze cyber defenses. We show that 
many common cyber defenses, such as intrusion prevention, 
have active elements, and we examine two case studies that 
employed active defenses effectively and without harming in-
nocent parties. We examine the ethics of active cyber defenses 
along four dimensions: scope of effects, degree of coopera-
tion, types of effects, and degree of automation. Throughout, 
we use analogies from air defense to shed light on the nature 
of cyber defense and demonstrate that active cyber defense is 
properly understood as a legitimate form of defense that can 
be executed according to well-established ethical principles.
We are by no means the first authors to address the ethics 
of active defense. Dittrich and Himma (2005), for example, 
contributed substantially to initial thinking in this area. Our 
work differs from theirs and other work in this area through 
its application of air defense principles. We believe that the 
analogy of air defense helps shed light on active cyber defense 
and the moral issues it raises.
DEFINING ACTIVE AND PASSIVE 
CYBER DEFENSE
Because our definitions of active and passive cyber defense are 
derived from those for air defense, we begin by reviewing active 
and passive air and missile defense.
Active and Passive Air and Missile Defense
Joint Publication 3-01, Countering Air and Missile Threats, de-
fines active air and missile defense (AMD) as: “direct defensive 
action taken to destroy, nullify, or reduce the effectiveness of 
air and missile threats against friendly forces and assets.” The 
definition goes on to say that active AMD “includes the use of 
aircraft, AD [air defense] weapons, missile defense weapons, 
electronic warfare (EW), multiple sensors, and other available 
weapons/capabilities.” (JP 3-01 2012) Active AMD describes 
such actions as shooting down or diverting incoming missiles 
and jamming hostile radar or communications. 
An example of an active air and missile defense system is the 
Patriot surface-to-air missile system, which uses an advanced 
aerial interceptor missile and high performance radar system 
to detect and shoot down hostile aircraft and tactical ballistic 
missiles (Patriot 2012). Patriots were first deployed in Op-
eration Desert Storm in 1991 to counter Iraqi Scud missiles. 
Israel’s Iron Dome anti-rocket interceptor system has a similar 
objective of defending against incoming air threats. Accord-
ing to reports, the system intercepted more than 300 rockets 
fired by Hamas from Gaza into Israel during the November 
2012 conflict, with a success rate of 80 to 90 percent (Ker-
shner 2012). At the time, Israel was also under cyber assault, 
and Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said that the coun-
try needed to develop a cyber defense system similar to Iron 
Dome (Ackerman and Ramadan 2012).
Another example of an active air defense system is the U.S.’s 
Operation Noble Eagle (Air Force 2012). Launched minutes 
after the first aircraft was hijacked the morning of Septem-





homeland air defense that includes combat air patrols, air 
cover support for special events, and sorties in response to 
possible air threats. Although Noble Eagle pilots can poten-
tially shoot down hostile aircraft, so far none have done so. 
However, they have intercepted and escorted numerous planes 
to airfields over the years.
In contrast to active defense, passive air and missile defense 
is defined as: “all measures, other than active AMD, taken to 
minimize the effectiveness of hostile air and missile threats 
against friendly forces and assets,” noting that “these measures 
include detection, warning, camouflage, concealment, decep-
tion, dispersion, and the use of protective construction. Pas-
sive AMD improves survivability by reducing the likelihood 
of detection and targeting of friendly 
assets and thereby minimizing the 
potential effects of adversary recon-
naissance, surveillance, and attack.” 
(JP 3-01 2012) Passive AMD includes 
such actions as concealing aircraft 
with stealth technology. It covers 
monitoring the airspace for adver-
sary aircraft and missiles, but not 
actions that destroy or divert them.
Active and Passive Cyber 
Defense
We adapt the definitions of active 
and passive air defense to the cyber 
domain by replacing the term “air 
and missile” with “cyber.” This gives 
us the basic definitions: active cyber 
defense is direct defensive action taken to destroy, nullify, or 
reduce the effectiveness of cyber threats against friendly forces 
and assets. Passive cyber defense is all measures, other than 
active cyber defense, taken to minimize the effectiveness of 
cyber threats against friendly forces and assets. Put another 
way, active defenses are direct actions taken against specific 
threats, while passive defenses focus more on protecting cyber 
assets from a variety of possible threats.
Using these definitions, we now examine various cyber de-
fenses to see whether they are active or passive. We begin with 
encryption, which is clearly a passive defense. It is designed to 
ensure that information is effectively inaccessible to adversar-
ies that intercept encrypted communications or download en-
crypted files, but takes no action to prevent such interceptions 
or downloads. Steganography is similarly passive. By hiding 
the very existence of information within a cover such as a 
photo, it serves as a form of camouflage in the cyber domain. 
Other passive defenses include security engineering, configu-
ration monitoring and management, vulnerability assessment 
and mitigation, application white listing, limiting adminis-
trator access, logging, backup and recovery of lost data, and 
education and training of users. None of these involve direct 
actions against a hostile threat.
User authentication mechanisms 
can be active or passive. For ex-
ample, consider a login mechanism 
based on usernames and passwords 
that denies access when either the 
username or password fails to match 
a registered user. We consider this 
passive if no further action is taken 
against an adversary attempting to 
gain access by this means. Indeed, 
the person might try again and again, 
perhaps eventually succeeding. Now 
suppose that the mechanism locks 
the account after three tries. Then 
it has an active element in that this 
particular adversary will be unable 
to gain entry through that account, 
at least temporarily. However, it does 
not stop the adversary from trying other accounts or trying to 
gain access through other means such as a malware attack. Nor 
does it prevent an attacker who stole an account and password 
from gaining access to the system. 
Now consider DARPA’s active authentication program, which 
seeks to validate users continuously using a wide range of 
physical and behavioral biometrics such as mouse and typ-
ing patterns and how messages and documents are crafted 
(DARPA 2012). If at any time a user’s actions are inconsistent 
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fingerprint”), access could be terminated. Such a mechanism 
would be more active than the password mechanism above, as 
it could keep the adversary from entering and then exploiting 
any legitimate account on the system. It might even thwart a 
malware attack, as the malware’s behavior would not match 
that of the account under which it is running.
Consider next a simple firewall access control list (ACL) that 
blocks all incoming packets to a particular port on the grounds 
that because the system does not support any services on that 
port, it would be an open door for attackers. 
We consider this passive, as it serves more to 
eliminate a vulnerability than to address a par-
ticular threat. However, the ACL would become 
an element of an active defense if an intrusion 
prevention system (IPS) detected hostile traffic 
and then revised the ACL to block the offend-
ing traffic. However, an intrusion detection 
system (IDS) alone is more passive, as it serves 
primarily as a means of detection and warning.
Anti-malware (aka anti-virus) tools have much in common 
with intrusion prevention systems. They detect malicious 
software, including viruses, worms, and Trojans, and then 
(optionally) block the code from entering or executing on a 
protected system. Typically these tools are regularly updated 
to include signatures for new forms and variants of malware 
that are detected across the Internet. In this sense, the active 
defenses are applied globally over the Internet. After new mal-
ware is discovered, security vendors create and distribute new 
signatures to the customers of their anti-malware products. 
Intrusion prevention can likewise be performed on a broader 
scale than a single network or even enterprise. For example, 
the IP addresses of machines that are spewing hostile packets 
can be shared widely through “blacklists” and then blocked 
by Internet service providers. Indeed, victims of massive 
denial-of-service (DoS) attacks frequently ask upstream ser-
vice providers to drop packets coming from the originating 
IP addresses. 
Anti-malware and intrusion prevention systems can be inte-
grated to form powerful active defenses. In many respects, the 
combined defenses would resemble an active air and missile 
defense system that detects hostile air threats and then takes 
such actions as shooting them down or jamming their com-
munication, only in cyberspace the defenses are applied to 
hostile cyber threats such as malicious packets and malware. 
Rather than targeting incoming ballistic missiles, cyber de-
fenses take their aim at packets that act like “cyber missiles.” 
Honeypots, which lure or deflect attackers into isolated sys-
tems where they can be monitored, are another form of ac-
tive defense. They are like the decoys used in 
air defense to deflect missiles away from their 
intended targets.
In addition to playing a role in network secu-
rity, active cyber defenses have been used to 
take down botnets (networks of compromised 
computers) and counter other cyber threats. 
The following two examples illustrate.
Coreflood Takedown
In April 2011, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), De-
partment of Justice, and the Internet Systems Consortium 
(ISC) deployed active defenses to take down the Coreflood 
botnet (Zetter 2011a, 2011b; Higgins 2011). At the time, the 
botnet comprised over 2 million infected computers, all under 
the control of a set of command and control (C2) servers. The 
bot malware installed on the machines was used to harvest 
usernames and passwords, as well as financial information, 
in order to steal funds. One C2 server alone held about 190 
gigabytes of data stolen from over 400,000 victims.
The active defense included several steps. First, the U.S. Dis-
trict Court of Connecticut issued a temporary restraining or-
der that allowed the non-profit Internet Systems Consortium 
(ISC) to swap out Coreflood’s C2 servers for its own servers. 
The order also allowed the government to take over domain 
names used by the botnet. With the infected machines now 
reaching out to the new C2 servers for instructions, the bots 
were commanded to “stop.” The malware reactivated following 
a reboot, but each time it contacted a C2 server, it was instructed 
to stop. The effect was to neutralize, but not eliminate, the mal-
ware installed on the compromised machines. To help victims 
active defenses are 
direct actions taken 
against specific 
threats, while passive 
defenses focus more 






remove the malware, the FBI provided the IP addresses of in-
fected machines to ISPs so they could notify their customers. In 
addition, Microsoft issued an update to its Malicious Software 
Removal Tool, so that victims could get rid of the code. 
Using the air defense analogy, the Coreflood takedown can be 
likened to an active defense against hijacked aircraft, where 
the hijackers were acting on instructions transmitted from a 
C2 center. In this situation, the air defense might jam the signals 
sent from the center and replace them with signals that com-
mand the hijackers to land at specified airports. The airports 
would also be given information to identify the hijacked planes 
so that when they landed, the hijack-
ers could be removed.
This approach of neutralizing the 
damaging effects of botnets by com-
mandeering their C2 servers has 
been used in several other cases. 
Microsoft, for example, received a 
court order in November 2012 to 
continue its control of the C2 serv-
ers for two Zeus botnets. Because 
Zeus had been widely used to raid 
bank accounts, the operation has no 
doubt prevented considerable harm 
(Lemos 2012).
Georgian Outing of Russia-
Based Hacker
In October 2012, Network World reported that the Georgian 
government had posted photos of a Russian-based hacker who 
had waged a persistent, months-long campaign to steal con-
fidential information from Georgian government ministries, 
parliament, banks, and non-government organization (Kirk 
2012). The photos, taken by the hacker’s own webcam, came 
after a lengthy investigation that began in March 2011 when 
a file on a government computer was flagged by an anti-virus 
program. After looking into the incident, government officials 
determined that 300 to 400 computers in key government 
agencies had been infected with the malware, and that they 
had acquired it by visiting Georgian news sites that had been 
infected themselves, in particular, on pages with headlines 
such as “NATO delegation visit in Georgia” and “U.S.-Geor-
gian agreements and meetings.” Once installed, the malware 
searched for documents using keywords such as USA, Russia, 
NATO, and CIA, and then transmitted the documents to a 
drop server where they could be retrieved by the spy.
Georgia’s initial response included blocking connections to the 
drop server and removing the malware from the infected web-
sites and personal computers. However, the spy did not give up 
and began sending the malware out as a PDF file attachment in 
a deceptive email allegedly from admin@president.gov.ge. 
The Georgian government then let 
the hacker infect one of their com-
puters on purpose. On that comput-
er, they hid their own spying program 
in a ZIP archive entitled “Georgian-
NATO Agreement.” The hacker took 
the bait, downloaded the archive, 
and unwittingly launched the gov-
ernment’s code. The spyware turned 
on the hacker’s webcam and began 
sending images back to the govern-
ment. It also mined the hacker’s 
computers for documents, finding 
one that contained instructions, in 
Russian, from the hacker’s handler 
about who to target and how, as well 
as circumstantial evidence suggest-
ing Russian government involvement.
Again using the air defense analogy, the steps taken to block 
the exfiltration of files from compromised computers to the 
drop servers could be likened to jamming the transmission of 
sensitive data acquired with a stolen reconnaissance plane to 
the thieves’ drop center. The steps taken to bait the hacker into 
unwittingly stealing and installing spyware might be likened 
to a command intentionally permitting the theft of a rigged 
reconnaissance plane with hidden surveillance equipment that 
sends data it collects about the thieves back to the command. 67
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CHARACTERISTICS AND ETHICAL ISSUES 
IN ACTIVE CYBER DEFENSE
In this section, we offer a set of distinctions for characterizing 
the different types of active defense described in the preceding 
section and discuss some of the ethical issues raised by each. 
Scope of Effects
The first set of distinctions pertains to the scope of effects of 
an active defense. An active defense is said to be internal if the 
effects are limited to an organization’s own internal network. 
If it affects outside networks, it is said to be external.
Drawing on the air defense analogy, an internal cyber de-
fense is like an air defense system that takes actions against 
an incoming missile or hostile aircraft after it has entered a 
country’s airspace, while an external cyber defense is like an 
air defense system that operates in someone else’s airspace or 
attacks the base in a foreign country where the missile is being 
launched or the hostile aircraft taking off.
We consider defenses that involve sharing threat information 
with outside parties to be external. An example is the Defense 
Industrial Base (DIB) Cybersecurity Information Assurance 
(CS/IA) program operated by the Department of Defense. Un-
der the program, DoD provides DIB companies with unclassi-
fied indicators (signatures) of cyber threats. An optional part 
of the program, called DIB Enhanced Cybersecurity Services 
(DECS) and run jointly with DHS, allows DoD also to share 
classified threat information (DoD 2012a).
Most of the effects in the Coreflood takedown were external. 
In particular, the ISC-operated C2 servers instructed bots in 
outside networks to stop. In contrast, most of the effects in the 
Georgian case were internal. Connections to the drop server 
were blocked on internal networks and internal machines 
were cleaned of the malware. However, there were also exter-
nal effects, namely, infection of the hacker’s own computer 
with spyware.
Ethical Issues
In general, most of the ethical issues regarding active defenses 
concern external active defenses. These will be discussed in 
the next section when we distinguish cooperative external 
defenses from non-cooperative ones. However, even internal 
defenses can raise ethical issues. For example, inside users 
might complain that their rights to free speech were violated if 
internal defenses blocked their communications with outside 
parties. In addition, internal defenses do nothing to mitigate 
threats across cyberspace. By not even sharing threat informa-
tion with outsiders, external networks are exposed to contin-
ued harm that might be avoided if the defenses were applied 
to them as well. Arguably, at least in terms of national cyber 
defense, a better moral choice would be to help mitigate cyber 
threats more broadly, as DoD has done with its DIB CS/IA and 
DECS programs. Returning to the air defense analogy, a missile 
defense system that only shot down missiles headed to mili-
tary bases would not be as “just” as one that also shot down 
missiles headed to civilian targets such as cities and malls. On 
the other hand, it would be unreasonable to expect that missile 
defense system to protect the air space of other countries, at 
least absent an agreement to do so.
Degree of Cooperation
The second set of distinctions pertains to the degree of coop-
eration in an active defense. If all effects against a particular 
network are performed with the knowledge and consent of 
the network owner, they are said to be cooperative. Otherwise, 
they are classified as non-cooperative. For the purpose of dis-
cussion here, we assume that network owners are authorized 
to conduct most defensive operations on their own networks, 
at least as long as they do not violate any laws or contractual 
agreements with their customers or users. Thus, the distinc-
tion applies mainly to active defenses with external effects. 
Using the air defense analogy, a cooperative cyber defense is 
like an air defense system that shoots down missiles or hostile 
aircraft in the airspace of an ally that has requested help, while 
a non-cooperative cyber defense is like an air defense system 
that shoots them down in the adversary’s own airspace. 
Anti-viral tools are cooperative defenses. Security vendors dis-
tribute new signatures to their customers, but the signatures 
are only installed with customer permission. Similarly, sharing 
blacklists of hostile IP addresses is cooperative. In general, any 
active defense that does nothing more than share threat infor-





Defenses become non-cooperative when they involve actions 
taken against external computers without permission of the 
user or network owner. In the case of Coreflood, the actions 
taken against the individual bots were non-cooperative. 
Neither the users of those machines nor the owners of the 
networks on which they resided agreed to have the bot code 
stopped. On the other hand, neither had they agreed to the 
initial malware infection and subsequent theft of their data. 
Arguably, any user would prefer that the malware be stopped 
rather than be allowed to continue its harmful actions. Fur-
ther, even though the action was non-cooperative, it was de-
ployed under legal authorities, enabled in part by the tempo-
rary restraining order. Moreover, the actual elimination of the 
malware from the infected machines 
was to be a cooperative action involv-
ing the machine owners.
Non-cooperative defenses include 
what is sometimes called “attack 
back,” “hack back,” or “counter-
strike” where the defense uses hack-
ing or exploit tools directly against 
the source of an attack or gets the 
attacker to unwittingly install soft-
ware, say by planting it in a decoy 
file on a computer the attacker has 
compromised. The goal might be to 
collect information about the source 
of the attack, block attack packets, 
or neutralize the source. Non-coop-
erative defenses also include court-
ordered seizures of computers.
Although the Coreflood takedown did not include any sort 
of hack back, the Georgian case did. In particular, the actions 
taken to plant spyware on the hacker’s computer constituted a 
non-cooperative counterstrike. However, one could argue that 
the hacker would never have acquired the spyware had he not 
knowingly and willfully first infected the computer hosting it 
and second downloaded the ZIP archive containing it. Thus, 
he was at least complicit in his own infection and ultimate 
outing. 
Ethical Issues
As a rule, non-cooperative defenses, particularly those involv-
ing some sort of hack back, raise more ethical and legal is-
sues than cooperative ones. In part, this is because most cyber 
attacks are launched through machines that themselves have 
been attacked, making it hard to know whether the immedi-
ate source of an attack is itself a victim rather than the actual 
source of malice. They may be hacked servers or bots on a 
botnet. Thus, any actions taken against the computers could 
harm parties who are not directly responsible for the attacks. 
In addition, cyber attacks in general violate computer crime 
statutes, at least when conducted by private sector entities. 
While the argument can be made that some hack backs would 
be permissible under the law, not ev-
eryone agrees, and the topic has been 
hotly debated (Denning 2008, Step-
toe 2012, Messmer 2012). However, 
government entities, in particular 
the military and law enforcement 
and intelligence agencies, have or 
can acquire the authorities needed to 
perform actions that might be char-
acterized as hacking under certain 
prescribed conditions. 
If we assume that non-cooperative 
defenses are conducted by or jointly 
with government entities with the 
necessary legal authorities, then the 
primary concern is that innocent 
parties may be harmed. Then we can draw on the long tra-
dition of just war theory to determine the conditions under 
which active cyber defenses that pose risks to noncombatants 
can be ethically justified.
Most just war theorists hold that noncombatant immunity is 
a key linchpin to all our moral thinking in war (Walzer 1977, 
Nagel 1972, Rodin 2003, Orend 2006). As such, noncom-
batants are never to be intentionally targeted for harm as any 
part of a justified military action. Traditional just war theory 
does hold, however, that some actions that will foreseeably but 
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long as that harm is truly unintentional, is proportionate to 
the good goal achieved by the act, and is not the means itself 
to achieve the good goal. Grouped together, these principles 
are known as the doctrine of double effect. The doctrine has 
come under heavy scholarly debate, with many critics doubt-
ing that its principles can hold true for all cases (Davis 1984, 
Kamm 2004, McIntyre 2001, Steinhoff 2007), while others 
have argued that some revised or narrowed version of the 
doctrine can still be defended and applied to war (McMahan 
1994, Quinn 1989, Nelkin and Rickless 2012). We cannot 
here engage this larger debate, but assume that at least some 
narrow version of the doctrine of double effect is true and, as 
such, it is critical for our moral conclusions regarding harm 
to noncombatants from active cy-
ber defense.
Whether noncombatants’ property 
can be targeted is another matter. 
Generally, noncombatant property 
is similarly considered immune from 
direct and intentional harm since 
harming one’s property harms that 
person. However, as with physical 
harm, unintended harm of noncom-
batant property can be permissible 
in some instances. Moreover, tradi-
tional just war theory and the laws 
of armed conflict can allow for some 
level of intentional harm to civilian 
property if it is necessary to block 
a particularly severe enemy military 
action and the civilians in question are later compensated. That 
is, generally, the ethical restrictions on harm to civilian prop-
erty are far less strict than for physical harm to civilian persons. 
This is true for unintentional harms of both kinds, and can 
even allow for some intentional harm to property when neces-
sary, the stakes are high enough, and recompense can be made. 
In the case of active air defense, systems like Iron Dome are 
not without risk to civilians. If someone happens to be under 
an incoming rocket’s flight path at the time it is hit, they could 
be harmed from fallout from the explosion. However, Israel 
has limited their counterstrikes primarily to rockets aimed at 
densely populated urban areas. In that situation, any fallout 
is likely to be substantially less harmful than the effects pro-
duced by the rockets themselves if allowed to strike. We argue 
that such a risk imposition can be morally warranted. Note, 
however, that if Iron Dome created large amounts of danger-
ous and lethal fallout disproportionate to the lives saved, then 
its use would not be permissible.
In general, if an air defense system distributes some small level 
of risk of harm to civilians under an incoming missile’s flight 
path in order to protect a much larger number of civilians 
from much greater harm, then the conditions are present for 
such defense to be morally permissible. This is precisely what 
we find in the case of real-world air defense systems such as 
Iron Dome. Further, it is irrelevant 
whether the risk of harm is imposed 
on noncombatants from one’s own 
state or another state. The reason 
is that what matters are the moral 
rights of all noncombatants, includ-
ing, of course, noncombatants on 
either side of a given conflict. The 
point is to minimize collateral harm 
to all noncombatants.
The same principles should apply to 
active cyber defense; that is, it should 
be morally permissible for a state to 
take an action against a cyber threat 
if the unjust harm prevented exceeds 
and is proportionate to any foreseen 
harm imposed on noncombatants. 
Indeed, in the cyber domain it will 
often be easy to meet this demand because it is often possible 
to shoot down the cyber missiles without causing any fallout 
whatsoever. Instead, packets are simply deleted or diverted to 
a log file. Nobody is harmed.
In some cases, however, an active defense could have a nega-
tive impact on innocent parties. To illustrate, suppose that 
an action to shut down the source of an attack has the effect 
of shutting down an innocent person’s computer that had 
been compromised and used to facilitate the attack. In this 
case, the action might still be morally permissible. There are 





nature, affecting the computer, but only for a short time un-
til the attack is contained. Second, the harm itself might be 
relatively minor, affecting only noncombatants’ property, not 
their persons. It is possible that such effects could further im-
pede other rights of the noncombatants, such as their ability 
to communicate or engage in activity vital to their livelihoods. 
But all of these further harms would be temporary in nature 
and could even be compensated for, if appropriate, after the 
fact. This is not to disregard the rights of noncombatants and 
their property and its use for the furtherance of other rights 
in our moral calculus, but is rather a simple recognition that 
different kinds and severities of harm result in different moral 
permissions and restrictions.
The fact that the harm itself is likely to be 
non-physical is quite significant in our moral 
reasoning in favor of active cyber defense. If it 
is permissible in some cases to impose the risk 
of physical harm on noncombatants as part of 
a necessary and proportionate defensive action 
against an incoming missile (as we argued above that it could 
be in the air defense case), then surely there will be cases where 
it can be permissible to impose the risk of temporary harm to 
the property of noncombatants in order to defend against an 
unjust cyber attack. The point here with active cyber defense 
is that the kind of harms that would be potentially imposed 
on noncombatants, in general, are the kinds of reduced harms 
that should make such defensive actions permissible.
A caveat, however, is in order. Computers today are used for 
life-critical functions, for example, to control life support sys-
tems in hospitals and operate critical infrastructure such as 
power grids. In a worst-case, an active cyber defense that af-
fects such a system might lead to death or significant suffering. 
These risks need to be taken into account when weighing the 
ethics of any non-cooperative action that could affect non-
combatants. In general, defensive actions that do not disrupt 
legitimate functions are morally preferable over those that do. 
If the scope of possible effects cannot be reasonable estimated 
or foreseen, then the action may not be permissible.
In the case of Coreflood, the takedown affected many non-
combatant computers. However, the effect was simply to stop 
the bot code from running. No other functions were affected, 
and the infected computer continued to operate normally. 
Thus, there was virtually no risk of causing any harm what-
soever, let alone serious harm. In the Georgian case, the only 
harm was to the attacker’s own computer—and he brought 
this on himself by downloading the bait files, thus making 
himself liable to intentional defensive harm. 
Although the discussion here has focused on non-cooperative 
defenses, it is worth noting that while cooperative defenses 
generally raise fewer issues, they are not beyond reproach. 
For example, suppose that a consortium of network owners 
agrees to block traffic from an IP address that 
is the source of legitimate traffic as well as the 
hostile traffic they wish to stop. Depending on 
circumstances, a better moral choice might be 
to block only the hostile traffic or work with 
the owner of the offending IP address to take 
remedial action.
Types of Effects
The third set of distinctions pertains to the effects produced. 
An active defense is called sharing if the effects are to distrib-
ute threat information such as hostile IP addresses or domain 
names, or signatures for malicious packets or software, to other 
parties. Sharing took place in the Coreflood takedown when 
the FBI provided the IP addresses of compromised machines 
within the United States to their U.S. ISPs and to foreign law 
enforcement agencies when the machines were located outside 
the U.S.. Another example of sharing is DoD’s DIB program, 
described earlier.
An active defense is called collecting if it takes actions to 
acquire more information about the threat, for example, by 
activating or deploying additional sensors or by serving a court 
order or subpoena against the source or an ISP likely to have 
relevant information. In the Coreflood takedown, the replaced 
C2 servers were set up to collect the IP addresses of the bots so 
that eventually their owners could be notified. The servers did 
not, however, acquire the contents of victim computers. In 
the Georgian case, spyware was used to activate a webcam and 
collect information from the attacker’s computer.
While cooperative 
defenses generally 
raise fewer issues, 
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An active defense is called blocking if the effects are to deny 
activity deemed hostile, for example, traffic from a particular 
IP address or execution of a particular program. The Coreflood 
takedown had the effect of breaking the communication chan-
nel from the persons who had been operating the botnet to 
the C2 servers controlling it. As a result, they could no longer 
send commands to the bots or download stolen data from the 
servers. In the Georgian case, connections to the drop servers 
were blocked in order to prevent further exfiltration of sensi-
tive data. 
Finally, an active defense is pre-emptive if the effects are to 
neutralize or eliminate a source used in the attacks, for ex-
ample, by seizing the computer of a 
person initiating attacks or by taking 
down the command and control 
servers for a botnet. In the Coreflood 
takedown, the hostile C2 servers 
were put out of commission and the 
bots neutralized. With further action 
on the part of victims, the malware 
could also be removed.
Using the air defense analogy, the cy-
ber defense of sharing is like a missile 
defense system that reports new mis-
sile threats to allies so that they can 
shoot them down. The cyber defense 
of collecting is like a missile defense 
system that activates additional ra-
dars or other sensors in response to 
an increased threat level, or that sends out sorties to investigate 
suspicious aircraft. The cyber defense of blocking is akin to 
a missile defense system that shoots down incoming missiles 
or jams their radars and seekers. Finally, the cyber defense of 
pre-emption is like launching an offensive strike against the air 
or ground platform launching the missiles.
Some authors regard retaliation or retribution as a form of 
active defense. However, we consider these operations to be 
offensive in nature, as they serve primarily to harm the source 
of a past attack rather than mitigate, stop, or pre-empt a cur-
rent one.
Ethical Issues
All four types of cyber operations raise ethical issues. The act of 
sharing raises issues of privacy and security, particularly if any 
sensitive information is shared. The act of collecting also raises 
issues about privacy and security, but in this case relating to 
the new information acquired rather than the dissemination 
of existing information. The act of blocking raises issues relat-
ing to free speech and over-blocking. In a worst case, traffic 
might be blocked that is important for the operation of a life-
support system or critical infrastructure such as power genera-
tion and distribution. Likewise, the act of pre-emption raises 
ethical issues relating to disabling software or systems. Again, a 
worst-case scenario could cause serious harm, for example, by 
shutting down a life-support system. 
These possible harms would need to 
be considered in the application of 
any non-cooperative cyber defense, 
as discussed in the previous section, 
and argue for defenses that limit 
their effects, say, by disabling only 
traffic and software involved in an 
attack rather than shutting down all 
traffic and complete systems.
In the Coreflood takedown, it is im-
portant to note that the government 
did not attempt to remove the bot 
code from infected machines. They 
only neutralized it by issuing the 
stop command. Part of the reason 
for not removing the code was a 
concern for unanticipated side effects that might damage an 
infected computer.
Because active cyber defense is a form of defense that should 
not be misconstrued as offense, it is worth explaining why 
the distinction between offensive retaliation versus legitimate 
defensive action is so crucial in the ethical dimensions of kill-
ing and war. Defensive harm has the lowest ethical barrier to 
overcome from amongst all possible justifiable harms. That is, 
if one is being wrongly attacked, then the moral restrictions 
against using force of some kind in order to block that wrong-





right not to be harmed unjustly. If one is attempting to harm 
someone unjustly, then she has made herself morally liable 
to suffer defensive harm as part of an act taken to thwart her 
attempted unjust harm. The person being wrongly attacked 
may permissibly harm his attacker in an effort to block or 
thwart the attack against him, so long as the defensive harm 
meets two criteria. First, it must be necessary to inflict the de-
fensive harm to block the unjust attack. If the defensive harm 
in question does nothing to block the liable party’s unjust at-
tack, then it is retributive punishment, or something else, but 
not properly an act of defense. Second, the defensive harm 
must be proportionate to the unjust harm to be blocked. If 
a foreign plane was found conducting reconnaissance over a 
state’s territory without permission 
during peacetime, then the foreign 
state may have made itself liable 
to some form of defensive action 
such as being escorted to an airfield. 
However, it would be dispropor-
tionate and wrongful to shoot the 
plane down or, even worse, shoot 
down commercial planes flying 
under the foreign state’s flag. In gen-
eral, there must be some reasonable 
correlation and proper “fit” between 
the extent of defensive response and 
the degree of liability of the party 
defended against (McMahan 2005, 
Quong 2012). In the case of an ac-
tive cyber defense, if the act is truly 
a defensive effort to block an unjust 
attack, then so long as it is necessary and proportionate, it 
will usually be ethically permissible. In the Georgian case, 
the government responded to the cyber espionage operation 
against it with its own espionage operation against the hacker. 
It did not destroy software and data on the hacker’s computer. 
Degree of Automation
The final set of distinctions pertains to the degree of human 
involvement. An active defense is said to be automatic if no 
human intervention is required and manual if key steps re-
quire the affirmative action of humans. 
Most anti-malware and intrusion prevention systems have 
both manual and automated components. Humans determine 
what goes into the signature database, and they install and 
configure the security software. However, the processes of sig-
nature distribution, malicious code and packet detection, and 
initial response are automated.
In the Coreflood takedown, the execution of the stop com-
mands was fully automated through the C2 servers. However, 
humans played an important role in planning and decision 
making, analyzing the botnet code and the effects of issuing 
a stop command, acquisition of the restraining order, and 
swapping out of the C2 servers. Thus, the entire operation had 
both manual and automatic aspects. 
In the Georgian case, much of the 
investigation involved manual work, 
including analyzing the code, deter-
mining what the hacker was looking 
for, and setting up the bait with the 
spyware. But the key element in the 
outing, namely the operation of the 
spyware, was automated. Once the 
hacker downloaded the ZIP archive, 
it did the rest.
Applying the air defense analogy 
once again, an automatic cyber de-
fense is like a missile defense system 
that automatically shoots down any-
thing meeting the preset criteria for 
being a hostile aircraft or incoming 
missile, whereas a manual cyber de-
fense is more like Operation Noble Eagle where humans play a 
critical role, both in recognizing and responding to suspicious 
activity in U.S. airspace.
Ethical Issues
In general, manual actions give humans a greater opportunity 
to contextualize their ethical decisions. Rather than configuring 
a system to respond always in a certain way, humans can take 
into account the source or likely source of a perceived threat, 
its nature, and the likely consequences of taking certain actions 
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turn out to be non-hostile and lives are at stake. On the other 
hand, manual actions take longer to execute than automated 
ones, potentially allowing greater damage to be incurred before 
the threat is mitigated. In the cyber domain, where actions can 
take place in an instant, automated defenses become critical. 
That is, the speed of some actions in the cyber domain are such 
that a cyber defense must be automated in order to have any 
effect at all against the attack. It is perhaps for this reason that 
some cyber actions have been given an exemption from the 
recent “man in the loop” legal requirements for automated 
weapon systems put out by the DoD (DoD 2012b, Gallagher 
2012). If a hostile actor has launched an attack to cause a power 
generator to explode, then an automated response that success-
fully blocks the attack without causing unnecessary harm is 
morally superior to a manual one that comes too late. 
However, this does not mean that all cyber defenses should 
be automated. To be clear: we are not arguing that all cyber 
actions should be exempt from the “man in the loop” require-
ment. The nature of a defense and its potential effects must 
be weighed in any decision to automate. The potential sever-
ity of foreseeable harms should govern whether it should be 
automated. It is true that the cyber case is unique in that the 
speed of many cyber attacks necessitates that many defenses be 
automated in order to be effective in any way. But if the effects 
of a given defense are such that their automation would lead 
to too great a risk of impermissible harm, then they should 
not be automated, even if this entirely nullifies their efficacy. 
Thankfully, given the reasons discussed above regarding the 
kinds of predictable effects that most forms of active cyber 
defense would result in, we find that in many cases their auto-
mation could be permissible. 
Conclusions
Using analogies from air defense, we have shown that active 
cyber defense is a rich concept that, when properly under-
stood and executed, is neither offensive nor necessarily harm-
ful and dangerous. Rather, it can be executed in accordance 
with the well-established ethical principles that govern all 
forms of defense, namely principles relating to harm, neces-
sity, and proportionality. In many cases, such as with most 
botnet takedowns, active defenses mitigate substantial harm 
while imposing little or none of their own.
While active defenses can be morally justified in many cases, 
we do not mean to imply that they always are. All plausible 
effects must be considered to determine what, if any, harms 
can follow. If harms cannot be estimated or are unnecessary or 
disproportionate to benefits gained, an active defense cannot 
be morally justified.
In considering active defenses, we have assumed that they 
would be executed under appropriate legal authorities. In 
particular, they would be conducted by authorized govern-
ment entities or by private companies operating under ju-
dicial orders or otherwise within the law. We leave open the 
question of how far companies can go in areas where the law 
is unclear or untested. While such active defenses as sharing 
attack signatures and hostile IP addresses and domain names 
have raised few legal questions, an active defense that deleted 
code or data on the attacker’s machine would raise more. No 
doubt, this area will likely continue to inspire lively discussion 
and debate. i
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The Strategy of Economic Warfare: A Historical Case Study and 
Possible Analogy to Contemporary Cyber Warfare
Nicholas A. Lambert1 
The international economy today bears an uncanny resemblance to that of a century ago. The stability of the modern international 
economy rests upon the free movement around the globe of goods, money and above all information (broadly defined). Within 
this globalized trading system, there exist numerous parallels to the 1914 setting: ever-increasing velocity of transactions and pace 
of economic activity flowing through financial systems; dependency upon accurate and instantaneous information; vulnerability 
of merchants to a collapse of the insurance and reinsurance industry; and the buying and selling of ever more sophisticated and 
intangible financial instruments. In all these respects, the world of 2014 resembles that of 1914.
The historical analogy between British economic warfare in 
the First World War and the prospect of cyberwar in the 21st 
century is attractive for several reasons. Most obviously, the 
British sought to wage the war by controlling and carefully 
disrupting the information systems at the heart of the global 
economic system, just as cyber warfare today would seek to 
target information systems at the heart of the global economy. 
More generally, the analogy’s appeal stems from a widespread 
perception of similarities in the overarching geo-political-
economic landscape of the two eras. A century ago, like today, 
policy planners quite justifiably perceived themselves to be 
confronted with a very new, almost alien, strategic environ-
ment. The development of instantaneous global communica-
tions thanks to the spread of the cable (and wireless) telegraph 
network changed the structure of the world economy in ways 
that presented multiple challenges and opportunities to those 
nations that were economically, politically and militarily 
powerful. No less importantly, yet sometimes overlooked, the 
effects of this transformation in the world economic system 
extended beyond states and their militaries and included the 
lives of individual users. Globalization modified the day-to-
day behavior of the average business and consumer, which in 
turn helped transform the strategic environment. 
The analogy also serves as a reminder of how serious the stakes 
can be when warfare—cyber or otherwise—disrupts the global 
trading system and thereby causes significant economic dislo-
cation on a scale capable of producing major social upheaval. 
Throughout the First World War, the stakes were no less than 
the prospect of social revolution. Within the British govern-
ment, this fear was acute at the outset, and although within 
months concern subsided, it never went away, quickly return-
ing to the forefront at times of domestic crisis (such is in early 
1915). In 1917, after the Russian revolution, it gained new 
impetus. British corporations apparently took the prospect of 
social upheaval so seriously that they gradually came to accept 
more state regulation in the name of national security as an 
alternative to the prospect of total confiscation of property in 
the name of a radicalized society. Their accommodation raised 
fundamental questions about the relationship between state 
and society which remain largely unanswered. 
Before plunging into the historical analogy between cyber 
warfare and Britain’s plan for and conduct of economic war-
fare, I should like to make a few disclaimers by way of framing 
the discussion.
First, until we have developed a 21st-century doctrine of cy-
berwar, we can only have a rudimentary understanding of the 
contemporary end of our analogy between past and present. 
Second, to the extent that it works, the analogy serves as more 
of a cautionary tale than a model for emulation. The British 
government’s experiment was beset with unintended conse-
quences and unfulfilled expectations, and fell far short of the 
goals that planners had established. 
Third, economic warfare represented the cornerstone of Brit-
ish grand strategy in 1914; it was not a subsidiary, disruptive 
or auxiliary strategy. To work, the analogy presupposes that, as 
in 1914, cyber warfare occurs as the central strategy in peer-to-





The point here is not to present the economic warfare analogy 
as rigid or narrow, but rather to emphasize that the discussion 
of cyber warfare below is broad and worst-case, covering only 
an attack that threatens national social and economic survival. 
Complete national collapse—not a mere diversion of the Ger-
man military or government—is what the British strategy of 
economic warfare aimed at very explicitly in 1914, albeit for 
just a couple of weeks.
Fourth, economic warfare as the British conceived of it was 
more than a matter of targeting a specific industry or element 
of national critical infrastructure. We are not talking about 
bombing ball-bearing plants or oil refineries (with precision 
or otherwise), as in World War Two. While waging economic 
warfare could produce knock-on systemic consequences—
creating bottlenecks and chokepoints in terms of stocks and 
flows—the aim was not to throttle military 
industry. The aim was far higher, to score a 
knock-down blow that obviated the need for 
less intense but more prolonged types of war. 
Put another way, economic warfare transcended 
specific systems—it was not intended to be 
systems specific, but society specific. Indeed, 
Britain’s plan for economic warfare may well 
have been the first in history to seek victory by deliberately 
targeting the enemy society rather than the enemy state. 
Finally, I do not mean to suggest that there exist direct paral-
lels with the British (or German, or American) experience of 
World War One down to every last detail. Nor do I mean to 
suggest that the technologies are similar, for in fact they are 
quite different. Rather, the points that I want to emphasize—
the questions I am going to raise—pertain to the economic, 
political, and legal implications of waging warfare within a 
globalized trading system, and the difficulties and dangers of 
trying to weaponize any of the underpinning infrastructure. 
As the British discovered in 1914, it was easier said than done.
There are 4 basic parts to the story: 
First, why would one choose to “weaponize” the international 
trading system in the first place? We must understand how 
Britain came up with the strategy of economic warfare and 
why some British planners thought it would work and others 
thought the concept too dangerous. This question pertains to 
the strategic environment created by globalization, and must 
consume a great part of the analogy. 
Second, how did British strategists go about implementing 
their strategy? Clearly the technologies will be different from 
those of today, but if we bear in mind that “cyberspace” in-
cludes beliefs and psychology, and not just electronic systems, 
then we can begin to see how the British conceptualized their 
offensive and think about some functional requirements or 
opportunities. 
Third, we must look at the consequences, however unexpected 
or underestimated. What happened? How long did the strat-
egy last? How did it evolve? 
Which leads us to our final basic question: Can 
one prepare to defend as well as to attack? What 
are some inherent risks and opportunities for 
defense against economic warfare, and how do 
they relate to an offensive strategy? How does 
a state prepare to “endure” economic warfare, 
as opposed to preparing to “wage” economic 
warfare? 
THE GLOBALIZED ECONOMIC SYSTEM
At the beginning of the twentieth century, there existed 
widespread recognition that the world was experiencing an 
epochal transformation. Historians have written much about 
the changes of the nineteenth century: of agricultural and 
industrial revolutions, of transportation and communica-
tions revolutions, of accelerating urbanization, of the spread 
of market capitalism across the globe and growth in world 
trade, and of the political and societal revolutions—that is to 
say, fundamental changes in the relationship between society 
and state. But relatively few have considered the consequent 
transformation in the structure of the world economic system. 
Fewer still have followed these changes down to the nuts-
and-bolts level, to understand their impact upon the day-to-
day ‘economic’ lives of individual citizens or the cumulative 
consequences of those individual changes for social stability. 
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strategic implications of globalization as such, since no such 
category of analysis existed.
During the last quarter of the nineteenth century, techno-
logical innovation led to a series of sharp drops in the cost 
of transportation by land (railways) and by sea (steamships). 
Combined with other innovations in financial services (credit 
financing) and the creation of a communications network that 
permitted instantaneous communication between almost any 
two points on the globe (cable later supplemented by wire-
less), between 1870 and 1913, the 
volume of world trade doubled and 
redoubled. These three industries—
transportation, financial services and 
communications—were the central 
pillars supporting the global trading 
system: they represented the critical 
infrastructure for its operation. Dur-
ing this same period, all nations, es-
pecially the industrialized European 
powers, saw a steady rise in the ratio 
of foreign trade to national econom-
ic output. Transnational linkages 
and interdependencies multiplied 
and intensified to the point where 
one could legitimately talk about a 
global trading system, functioning 
on a worldwide basis. Commercial 
supply chains began to stretch around the world, and national 
economies became intertwined. 
These macro-economic changes were accompanied by aston-
ishingly rapid changes in micro-economic behavior, in other 
words the day-to-day methods by which international (over-
seas) commerce was conducted. The net effect of these changes 
was the creation of a new commercial environment. This may 
be attributed to a number of factors but unquestionably the 
most important of these, the one that more than any other 
defined the essential character of the new economic world 
system, was the creation during the 1870s of the global cable 
network. The speed with which commerce was negotiated and 
transacted, the velocity of transactions, accelerated beyond all 
experience. Railways and steamships enabled the delivery of 
goods faster and cheaper than ever before; this much is obvi-
ous. But the advent of a cheap and reliable means of real-time 
communication between buyers and vendors—instead of let-
ters sent by sailing ships—was fundamental. 
Even more remarkable and far reaching, however, was the ex-
tent to which the structure of commerce became reoriented to 
the cable. Within a remarkably short period, just twenty-five 
years or so, most international (and much domestic) com-
merce became reliant upon access 
to cable communications: to allow 
buyers and vendors to find each 
other in the first place; to negotiate 
contracts; to arrange credit financ-
ing (a bill of exchange drawn on a 
London bank), insurance and ship-
ping; to schedule payment and final 
delivery. It is tempting here to draw 
a parallel to the equally rapid spread 
and adoption of the Internet, and in 
some respects one may legitimately 
do so, but at the same time it is es-
sential always to consider “modern” 
developments in light of what existed 
before—to measure relative not ab-
solute change. Relative change in the 
earlier era was far greater than today. 
By the turn of the twentieth century, instantaneous com-
munications had transformed the day-to-day conduct of 
international trade. It was increasingly commonplace for mer-
chantmen to load with a bulk commodity (say wheat), clear 
port in the Americas and proceed east without an ultimate 
destination. Cargoes in transit could—and frequently did—
change ownership during the voyage. Only after crossing 
the Atlantic, a voyage that took approximately a fortnight, 
and touching at Falmouth (UK) to refuel might the mas-
ter receive instructions on where to discharge the cargo (be 
it London, Rotterdam, or Hamburg). With the advent of 
wireless telegraphy during the first decade of the twentieth 
century, merchantmen still at sea could be diverted in order 





While these developments increased commercial flexibility 
and efficiency and thus lowered economic costs, at the same 
time they created profound problems for traditional methods 
of waging maritime war. For instance, there were serious legal 
implications. The entire structure of international maritime 
law pertaining to war at sea, and specifically the law of block-
ade, was based on older trading practices. In particular, the 
law assumed that a belligerent—its navy and its prize courts—
could know the ultimate destination of a merchant vessel and 
ownership of its cargo. In the age of real-time communica-
tions, however, and subsequent changes in business norms, it 
was frequently impossible to obtain that knowledge, because 
even the master of the vessel in question often did not know 
his ultimate destination until late in the journeys and because 
ownership of cargoes often changed hands while vessels were 
at sea. Even at the point of unloading a cargo might not 
necessarily have a clear owner. In fact, no means or mecha-
nism, municipal or international, existed anywhere to verify 
the ownership or destination of merchant ship cargoes. The 
implications were staggering. In time of war, the 
immutable rights of neutrals under international 
law to maintain their legitimate trade had become 
fundamentally irreconcilable with the equally im-
mutable rights of belligerents to prevent illegitimate 
contraband from reaching their enemies.
Such changes in the day-to-day conduct of inter-
national trade also had enormous strategic implica-
tions, which require some grasp of classical economic theory to 
understand. In classical economics, conditions of near-perfect 
information in any market must be a pre-requisite for near-
perfect competition, which encourages prices to converge. Af-
ter about 1870, the global market began to mimic economic 
theory. In other words, only after 1870 did real-time global 
communications permit near-perfect “global” information, 
and only after 1880 did low-cost shipping make it possible 
for merchants to exploit that information both quickly and 
cheaply. As a result of the development of a global information 
network, therefore, the prices of staple commodities between 
different regional markets around the globe became increas-
ingly integrated, reflected in the convergence of prices. In 
1870, for instance, the price of wheat in Liverpool exceeded 
Chicago prices by 57.6%, in 1895 by 17.8%, and in 1913 by 
just 15.6%. Similar trends may be observed between other 
commodities and between other regional markets, such as 
Liverpool and Odessa. (Incidentally, these trends are equally 
evident within national markets: in 1870, the wheat price 
spread between New York City and Iowa was 69%; by 1910 it 
had fallen to just 19%.)
Of course, staples like wheat had been traded across oceans 
for centuries if not millennia; but the phenomenon of price 
convergence described above was something radically new; the 
necessary technological and information apparatus for allow-
ing staples to move fluidly between regional markets, and in 
such volume, simply did not exist before. 
Economic theory also calls for economic behavior to adjust 
to the convergence of prices (as indeed it calls for behavior 
to adjust to any change in prices). Again, reality mimicked 
theory, as economic actors around the globe, ranging from 
nation-states to individual households, began to plan their 
budgets and make investments (for instance to ex-
pand production) and purchases based on certain 
expectations derived from knowledge of a “global” 
price. One of the most significant indicators of 
these changes was the proliferation of “just-in-time” 
ordering—that is, not laying up reserves in advance 
(“buffer stocks”) and thereby incurring storage and 
other costs, due to uncertainty about prices and the 
inability to communicate in real time with sellers, 
but waiting to order goods until “just in time” on the expecta-
tion that their prices would remain stable and that it would 
be possible to communicate with sellers at the last minute. 
Already by the turn of the twentieth century, stocks of wheat 
in Britain were being measured in terms of weeks rather than 
months of supply.
The fact that economic activity, at all levels, had grown de-
pendent upon access to near-perfect information created enor-
mous new strategic opportunities and vulnerabilities. Of these, 
the most important was that it became possible for economic 
pressure, traditionally applied by navies rather than armies, to 
target whole societies and collapse them rapidly rather than 
merely to target state revenues and erode them slowly. The 
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in previous centuries vulnerable to naval pressure had been 
international trade (the other chief source was land, which 
was not vulnerable to naval pressure), and that the sources of 
state revenues were becoming more diversified (although they 
were). Rather, it was that the economic well-being of whole 
societies, not merely governments, depended upon a highly 
optimized economic system, itself dependent upon access to 
the infrastructure of global trade, reliant upon access to real-
time communications. 
The essential point here is that across the spectrum of eco-
nomic activity—national, business and individual—economic 
behavior had grown dependent upon the availability and flow 
of “perfect information”. Particularly in industrialized nation-
states with large urban populations, 
social and political stability had come 
to require high levels of economic pros-
perity, made possible by a steady supply 
(flow) of goods and staples through the 
global trading system. At the most basic 
bio-physical level also, urban popula-
tions needed a steady supply of food as 
they had no reserves of their own; cities 
contained no stockpiles beyond what 
was on the shelves, at most enough to 
last for a few weeks. Producers, mean-
while, depended on selling their pro-
duce in a constant stream of commerce. 
If it piled up on the wharves, they would 
be in deep trouble, as would the banks 
that had extended loans to them. To be clear, we are talking 
about two related but distinct types of fragility: both that of 
the economic system and that of politically-aware industrial 
societies. Of course, given time, businessmen could return to 
the old ways or otherwise adapt—but time was quite literally 
of the essence. The key question here, which pre-1914 states-
men across Europe pondered and worried about, was: how 
much time was needed for businesses and economies to adapt? 
And, of course, what would happen in the interim? 
Of course, information was not the only part of the global 
economic system on which whole societies increasingly de-
pended. Particularly in industrialized nation-states with large 
urban populations, social and political stability had come to 
require high levels of economic prosperity, made possible by a 
steady supply (flow) of goods and staples through the global 
trading system. At the most basic bio-physical level also, ur-
ban populations needed a steady supply of food as they had no 
reserves of their own; cities contained no stockpiles beyond 
what was on the shelves, at most enough to last for a few weeks. 
Producers meanwhile depended on selling their produce in a 
constant stream of commerce. If it piled up on the wharves, 
they would be in deep trouble, as would the banks that had 
extended loans to them. These conditions made possible a 
peculiar scenario: if supply were interrupted, then shortages 
could occur even in a year with a bumper crop; consequently, 
farmers could suffer a plunge in commodity prices while con-
sumers faced a surge in retail prices. In 
short, we are talking about two related 
but distinct types of fragility: both that 
of the economic system and that of 
politically-aware industrial societies. 
This new economic-commercial en-
vironment bore a resemblance to the 
present wave of globalization in that 
it constituted a dramatic accelera-
tion and intensification of the flow of 
information throughout commercial 
and financial networks. The efficient 
running of the global economy was 
based on the confidence in the effective 
working—and integrity—of the various 
institutions that comprised the system infrastructure (broadly 
defined as transportation, communications and financial ser-
vices). No less importantly, it depended also upon the smooth 
movement around the world of cargo, information, and capi-
tal. The Great Recession of 2008 appears broadly to confirm 
that, when confidence in information and institutions slips, 
the world economy is thrown into turmoil and the welfare 
of billions of people around the globe is affected. For what 
is money but confidence in data and in the proper comple-
tion of the transactions built upon it? And what is a panic, or 






The Idea of Economic Warfare
Toward the end of the nineteenth century, commentators with 
an interest in strategic affairs and political economy began to 
speculate that the ever-growing interdependencies and inter-
connections between the great industrial powers must reduce 
the likelihood of war between them. Such thoughts came less 
from idealism than from recognition of the implications that 
the newly created global economic system (and the infrastruc-
ture upon which it had been built) was remarkably fragile 
and sensitive to shock. This recognition produced widespread 
fear that a major war, even if confined to European powers, 
must dislocate the world economic system, destroying in its 
wake business confidence and thereby producing severe eco-
nomic, political and social consequences around the world. 
“The future of war”, Ivan Bloch wrote in his famous treatise 
on warfare, is “not fighting, but famine, not the slaying of 
men, but the bankruptcy of nations and the break-up of the 
whole social organization … In short, the economic results 
which must inevitably follow any great 
war in the present complex state of human 
civilization”.
The financial panic of 1907 and attendant 
economic depression reinforced and height-
ened such ideas. The “Banker’s Panic” in the 
United States precipitated an acute liquid-
ity crisis, producing general economic disruption and a wave 
of business bankruptcies. In Britain, the noted economist Sir 
Robert Giffen was alarmed by the severity of the global finan-
cial storm, which he believed had exposed serious weaknesses 
in the foundations of modern finance. More than anything 
else, the panic demonstrated the danger of interdependencies 
within the new world economic system: a shock in one part 
of the world was certain to be transmitted instantaneously 
everywhere—the point being that economic crises would not 
be localized. What is more, commentators appreciated that 
on what might be termed an “explosively index”, the 1907 
crisis ranked low: a major European War would rank much 
higher. Yet even the relatively “non-explosive” 1907 panic 
caused widespread economic turmoil which brought in its 
train severe unemployment. If therefore followed that a larger 
explosion might lead to unemployment on a scale to cause 
social unrest and even political instability. 
Recognition of the inherent fragility of the world financial 
system, combined with older ideas of dependency upon in-
ternational trade, encouraged the belief that the “next war” 
must of economic and social necessity be short in duration. In 
the extreme, some argued that the dislocation to global trade, 
and the world economic system, would be so catastrophic as 
to raise the specter of social collapse—theoretically precluding 
the possibility at all of major conflict, an idea popularized by 
the Nobel Laureate Norman Angell. Although military plan-
ners rejected this extremist viewpoint, they nevertheless seem 
to have admitted the plausibility of the central argument, and 
many accepted that the primary issue in any future war would 
be not the military outcome but the implications for the glo-
balized economy. Hence the remarkably widespread convic-
tion in 1914 that the troops would be home before the leaves 
fell, or that the war would be over by Christmas—if victory 
could not quickly be achieved then a prompt negotiated peace 
would be necessary.
Standing at the epicenter of the global trad-
ing system, at the hub of the global commu-
nications network, Great Britain appeared 
to have more to lose than most in the event 
of such a financial and economic catastro-
phe. Yet within the Admiralty the prospect 
of a meltdown in the global economy ap-
peared to offer Britain a unique strategic 
opportunity as well as a strategic danger. On the one hand, 
British naval planners, who naturally thought more about 
Britain’s role in the global commons than did army planners, 
accepted that Britain certainly had a great deal to lose. On the 
other hand, they realized, so did others, especially Germany. 
From about 1901, Admiralty planners began toying with the 
strategic possibilities of harnessing their naval supremacy to 
Britain’s effective monopoly control over the infrastructure 
of the international trading system in order to exacerbate 
economic derangement for the enemy while mitigating the 
impact upon their own economy. One might say, in effect, 
they contemplated “weaponizing” the global trading system.
Why did the Admiralty believe that Britain would suffer less 
from British efforts to derange the global economic system 
than would Germany? Basically because Britain’s dependence 
on the smooth functioning of the global economic system was 
the global economy was 
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matched by its control over the smooth functioning of the sys-
tem, whereas Germany had no such control. In effect, Britain 
was in a position to deny Germany access to the system while 
retaining access for itself, for the following reasons: 
 ¡ The Royal Navy was the most powerful navy in the 
world with an unrivalled capability to exert direct con-
trol over seaborne trade. 
 ¡ The Admiralty possessed by far the most sophisticated 
information-intelligence gathering network in the 
world, and an understanding of how to lever this rela-
tive advantage into global situational awareness. 
 ¡ Economically, Britain appeared better placed than any 
other nation to weather the financial and economic 
tsunami that was expected to strike at the outbreak of 
war—for instance bigger and better capitalized banks, 
a more flexible capital market, and above all credit-
worthiness. The state’s ability in wartime to borrow 
and spend freely cannot be overstated. Problems could 
be solved and time literally ‘bought’ by the lavish 
spending of money. 
 ¡ More importantly still, British companies dominated 
the physical and virtual infrastructure of the global 
trading system—the cable networks strung across the 
globe, the insurance and reinsurance industry centered 
in London, the banks financing international sales, the 
ships carrying commercial goods, etc. This conferred 
upon the British empire, or appeared to confer, the 
ability to wield a measure of control over the levers of 
international trade. 
 ¡ Since the early 1900s, when strategic planners first 
began toying with the strategic possibilities that envis-
aged harnessing naval supremacy to Britain’s effective 
monopoly control over the infrastructure of the in-
ternational trading system, the Admiralty had forged 
very close links with a number of key companies, most 
notably Lloyds of London (insurance), Harris and 
Dixon (freight forwarding), and the Eastern Telegraph 
Company (cables). In modern parlance, steps were 
taken to develop “private-public partnerships” in the 
sharing of information.
Above all else, however, was a conceptual breakthrough—the 
realization that the strategic environment in which navies 
must plan and operate is substantially defined by the structure 
and character of the world economic system. The significance 
of this breakthrough should not be minimized: there is a dif-
ference between reality and the perception of reality, and there 
was no guarantee that the latter would catch up to the former.
The changing perceptions of naval planners unsurprisingly 
provoked strong resistance. The immediate response by the 
army’s director of military operations, upon first learning of 
the navy’s proposed new strategy, was to tell his opposite num-
ber in the Admiralty that the navy and the army apparently 
had “a very grave divergence of opinion … not so much on 
the general question of strategy as upon the whole question 
of war policy, if not indeed upon the question of what war 
means.” This general did not exaggerate: the navy was indeed 
coming to a fundamentally different understanding of what 
war meant. He promptly illustrated the gap in understand-
ing by labeling economic warfare “an invertebrate means of 
offence”—a wonderful turn of phrase! What he apparently 
meant was that war is not proper war, and armed forces are 
spineless (“inverterbrate”), unless they “break stuff”. What 
the general missed was that the navy did, in fact, possess a 
spine—and, more to the point, possessed a much better sense 
of economic anatomy. 
In particular, the navy recognized that the nervous and circula-
tory system of the global economy increasingly depended on 
the sea, though in ways, perhaps, that were not entirely obvi-
ous. Whereas sea “communications”—traditionally the target of 
naval pressure—had once been limited to ships carrying goods 
and letters, by the early twentieth century they encompassed: 
 ¡ The communications grid—undersea cables and later 
wireless; 
 ¡ The British steam merchant marine (as ever watched 
over by the Royal Navy);
 ¡ The networked international “financial services indus-
try” centered in London—also the hub of the global 
communications grid—which allowed vendors to ship 
goods to purchasers on the guarantee that payment 





It can be easy to miss the novelty and strategic significance of 
these developments. Put most simply, the flow of goods over 
the sea depended upon a parallel yet separate flow of informa-
tion via cable. From the strategic perspective, furthermore, 
and of course employing an expanded definition of the term 
“communications”, an array of new vulnerabilities—and op-
portunities—now existed. What is more, very little of this new 
expanded strategic environment was governed or regulated by 
internationally agreed rules and laws. Whereas there were plenty 
of precedents governing the interdiction of ships and goods in 
war-time, there were almost none governing the interdiction of 
electronic information. Yet seaborne trade could be interdicted 
just as well through non-naval as well as naval means. 
The essence of the navy’s proposed economic warfare strategy 
was for Britain to disrupt these “communications”, through 
naval and non-naval means, so as to exploit the natural eco-
nomic forces set in motion by the outbreak 
of war that were expected to cascade though 
the economies of all nations, leaving in their 
wake widespread financial and economic 
chaos. The idea was that Britain would take 
certain measures calculated to exacerbate and 
accelerate the derangement of the German 
economy with the aim of quickly collapsing 
Germany’s underpinning systems and thereby provoking so-
cial upheaval. The aim of the strategy was not merely to inter-
rupt enemy military operations but rather to dislocate civilian 
systems with the object of creating economic chaos and panic. 
The means were not to pressure choke points through simply 
restricting an enemy’s maritime trade, nor precise attacks on 
specific individual industrial or military targets, but a wide 
range of actions designed to threaten confidence in the com-
mercial access and financial systems underpinning Germany’s 
economy. In other words, British actions were calculated to 
target both the physical and psychological. Weaponizing the 
infrastructure of global trade would translate into a shock—
not attrition— attack upon an enemy society. The means and 
ends of this plan thus differed fundamentally from traditional 
blockade, which pre-dated the globalized economy, was predi-
cated on outdated assumptions about the day-to-day conduct 
of international trade, and could work only slowly.
Of course, however impressive these connections between 
“communications” and economic shock sounded in theory, 
theory was not reality. As they struggled to turn theory into a 
workable strategy, naval planners made and acted upon three 
key conceptual breakthroughs. First, they realized that they 
needed advice from the people who conducted and studied 
international trade if they wanted to understand the global 
economy in the necessary detail. As a result, they began speak-
ing to leading economists, bankers, shippers, etc. Second, they 
realized that there would be very significant legal implications 
to British interference with global communications. As a re-
sult, Admiralty officials conducted what would now be called 
“lawfare,” doing their best to ensure that British negotiators 
at international legal conferences such as the Hague Confer-
ence of 1907 favorably shaped the international maritime legal 
environment (though it must be said, with limited success, 
because the British plenipotentiaries would not cooperate). 
Third, they realized that interfering with com-
munications was not an operational problem 
but a grand strategic problem, affecting the 
interests of multiple stakeholders, foreign and 
domestic, and requiring the highest political 
approval. As a result, they encouraged and 
participated energetically in inter-departmen-
tal discussions. 
Victory in these inter-departmental discussions was far from 
assured. From the perspective of the political executive, the 
Admiralty’s plan for economic warfare required revolutionary 
innovations in the strategic policy process and the assumption 
of enormous political risk. Both of these requirements derived 
from the extraordinary array of stakeholders whose interests 
would be affected by a campaign of economic warfare. They 
included British consumers, British businesses (especially in 
the shipping, communications, and financial services indus-
tries), and foreign neutrals. Within the British government, 
these stakeholders were represented chiefly by the Board of 
Trade, the Treasury, and the Foreign Office. Incidentally, the 
mere act of including the Board of Trade in strategic defense 
discussions was, by the standards of the day, revolutionary; 
traditionally, strategy had been a matter for the Admiralty, 
the War Office, and perhaps the Foreign Office. By the same 
token, the mere act of trying to enlist the support of British 
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business interests for the strategy—to say nothing of actually 
adopting or implementing the strategy—required substantial 
expenditures of political capital. The British government in 
the years before World War I was Liberal, which at that time 
meant an ideological commitment to free markets and free 
trade. Quite simply, seeking business support for wartime 
government control over the three pillars of global communi-
cations—telegraphs, merchant ships, and financial services—
risked alienating the government’s core constituency.
From February 1911 to May 1912, a group of senior govern-
ment officials known as the Desart Committee met to as-
sess the relative risks of economic warfare. Its establishment 
reflected the political executive’s 
recognition that economic warfare 
was “too important a matter” to be 
left to the admirals: it was grand 
strategic rather than operational and 
that deciding upon it required input 
from multiple governmental and 
non-governmental stakeholders, not 
just from the Admiralty. The Desart 
Committee’s investigation, which 
included testimony from leading 
bankers, shippers, and insurers, made 
clear that there would be power-
ful resistance from British business 
to economic warfare. The Board of 
Trade and the Foreign Office voiced 
their concerns about the domestic 
and foreign costs of the strategy very 
clearly. They argued, quite rightly, that economic warfare would 
entail large-scale state intervention in the workings of both 
the domestic and international economy, starkly challenging 
traditional ideas about the role of government. In so doing, 
moreover, it would far exceed established boundaries of what 
constituted grand strategy and indeed the very nature of war. 
The domestic and diplomatic fallout, they rightly predicted, 
was certain to be massive.
Though daunted, the political executive discounted these 
warnings. Impressed by the Desart Committee’s assessments 
of the potentiality of economic warfare, the political executive 
(represented by the Prime Minister and eight other senior 
Cabinet ministers acting in conjunction with the Committee 
of Imperial Defence) gave the defense establishment permis-
sion to forge ahead with preparations for offensive warfare. 
The government resolved that in the event of war they would 
assert their right to intervene in the economy. In secret, the 
government drafted a set of regulations and penalties to gov-
ern the activities of British companies in wartime, so as to 
prevent their “trading with the enemy” or on the enemy’s be-
half. These were articulated in a series of Royal Proclamations, 
drafted pre-war, which forbade British merchants, financiers 
and shippers—indeed, any British subject throughout the 
empire—to trade or conduct business with the enemy. The 
naval and military authorities were 
further granted “pre-delegated au-
thority” (another truly remarkable 
innovation in defense arrangements 
with huge constitutional implica-
tions) to implement immediately 
upon declaration of war stringent 
controls over a wide range of com-
mercial enterprises connected with 
international trade. 
By comparison with preparations to 
wage offensive economic warfare, 
defensive planning to survive war-
time economic dislocation—some 
of which would be caused by Brit-
ain’s own offensive measures—was 
minimal. Granted, as early as 1880 
the British government began sponsoring the laying of “stra-
tegic” cables intended to build greater redundancy into the 
communications grid. In addition, the British government 
subsidized the shipping industry through awarding lucrative 
contracts to deliver the mail to distant parts of the world, and 
insisting that vessels used to carry the mail be new-built and 
exceptionally fast and thus be of use in time of war as auxiliary 
cruisers. During the 1900s, however, this approach was aban-
doned. Too much money had seemingly been wasted: further 
technological changes had rendered much of what had been 
built or done already obsolescent. Moreover, the British gov-





Efforts at defensive planning undertaken by the Desart Com-
mittee also faltered. A series of interviews with the leading 
bankers and insurers of the day left committee members in 
no doubt that the City of London regarded any government 
intervention (unless it was a backhanded subsidy) as an un-
warranted and dangerous intrusion beyond the government’s 
competence. The commercial interests refused to contemplate 
or discuss with the state any form of government economic 
intervention; they insisted that in time of war they would 
take any necessary defensive measures. And such alarms were 
amplified by the Treasury and Board of Trade. Consequently, 
intimidated by howls of protest at the high financial costs 
mooted, deterred by the intrinsic complexity of both the 
technology and dazzling intercon-
nections within the system, and 
especially fearful of the high an-
ticipated political costs entailed, the 
political executive declined to press 
the matter. 
In retrospect, the actions—or inac-
tions—of the political executive 
may seem foolish. If it dropped its 
defensive plans when confronted 
with resistance from the private 
sector, why did it adopt economic 
warfare, which required cooperation 
from the private sector? The likeli-
est answer is that they could see no 
better option. As the Desart Com-
mittee’s investigation made clear, the 
Admiralty’s plan for economic warfare was likely to cause huge 
collateral damage while it lasted—but it was not likely to last 
long. Many observers expected that any war would be short 
due to economic dislocation even without a deliberate cam-
paign to worsen the dislocation. By contrast, the War Office’s 
plan for the continental commitment offered far less credible 
hope for quick victory—and a prolonged war arguably carried 
even greater political risk than a short one, however brutal the 
short one might be. While it is reasonable to wonder why the 
political executive did not do more, it is more vital to under-
stand the significance of what it did do. Even if the strategy 
of economic warfare was never implemented—after all, war 
in 1914 was not inevitable—actions taken in its formulation, 
adoption, and preparation would and did require the political 
executive to undertake revolutionary innovations in the policy 
process and to assume substantial political risk. 
Implementation and Abandonment: 
August—October 1914
Britain declared war on Germany on 4th August 1914. Already 
the optimized global economic system had demonstrated itself 
to be highly sensitive to shock. The mere expectation of war 
during the last week of July had caused a virtual cessation of 
world trade, an impact even more dramatic than the most pes-
simistic commentator had imagined. 
Commodity exchanges around the 
world shut their doors. In the finan-
cial world the panic was even worse 
than expected—on a scale greater 
even than occurred in 1929/31. 
By 31st July, every stock exchange 
around the world (including Wall 
Street) had shut its doors. There was 
a global liquidity crisis. Banks re-
called their loans. Foreign exchange 
was simply unavailable—though 
on the grey markets in New York, 
sterling was selling for $6 (up from 
$4.86). In London, meanwhile, the 
City was technically bankrupt; the 
accepting houses that funded inter-
national trade were unable to meet 
their obligations. The British government was compelled to 
step in, underwriting the entire stock of outstanding bills of 
exchange (in the world) and in so doing increasing the na-
tional debt obligation overnight by approximately 75%. The 
British then compounded this chaos by implementing their 
economic warfare measures—albeit only briefly. Although it is 
practically impossible to unravel the relative impact of the one 
or the other, it is clear that British implementation worsened 
the chaos—as had been intended. 
Then, as also foreseen, a backlash arrived—but far more swift-
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devastation wrought became increasingly apparent, domestic 
interest groups became ever more vocal in clamoring for relief 
and lobbying for special exceptions, and neutrals howled in 
outrage at collateral damage to their interests. Within the gov-
ernment, their protests received a sympathetic hearing from 
officials at the Treasury, Board of Trade, and Foreign Office, 
who had never fully approved of economic warfare in the first 
place. Inadequate economic data clouded understanding and 
spawned uncertainty leading to hesitation; political commit-
ment to the strategy began to crumble; and more and more 
exceptions to the published rules were granted, undermining 
the effectiveness of economic warfare. Implementation stalled. 
In October 1914, aware of evasions and growing outright defi-
ance by domestic interests, combined with mounting pressure 
from powerful neutrals (like the Woodrow Wilson administra-
tion), the economic warfare strategy was aborted. As a result, 
the British were compelled to wage war in ways they had 
previously agreed were undesirable, unthinkable, unworkable 
and even fatal. The reasons bear consideration by any nation 
contemplating similar warfare. 
What Went Wrong?
The war exposed the limits of prewar planning—and of the 
political will to engage in prewar planning—in several ways. 
One showed the potential of relatively narrow technical details 
in economic warfare to have large political consequences. For 
example, in 1914, in order to prevent trading with the enemy, 
the British cable censors required that all messages be trans-
mitted in plain English (i.e. no shorthand or abbreviations or 
code) and that each telegram include the recipient’s full name 
and address of recipient (i.e. no internationally registered 
abbreviations such as LAMP32—akin to a dot com address 
like shoes.com. In so doing, however, they either forgot or 
did not appreciate the finite limitation in cable capacity—or 
“bandwidth”, to use the modern term. The effect of the new 
regulations on telegram content doubled or even tripled the 
length of each message. The result was a communications log-
jam and commercial paralysis. Overruling objections from the 
military censor, the government quickly relented, dialed down 
the regulations, and agreed to share communications resources 
with corporations (both nominally British and foreign).
Another way in which the war exposed the limits of prewar 
planning concerned the behavior of British businesses. Before 
the war, faced with abundant evidence that they would re-
sist government regulation but seeking to avoid a politically 
damaging confrontation, the government defaulted to blithe 
hopes about private-sector conduct. These included the ex-
pectation that moral suasion would translate into effective 
control, that businesses would cooperate with regulations, 
and that capitalists would forgo enormous opportunities to 
make profit on the black market out of patriotism. Such an 
assumption ignores the reality that capitalistic economies are 
built upon a ‘reward system’ that encourages firms (and in-
dividual businessmen) to deviate from the conventional and 
pioneer new methods: those who succeed earn disproportion-
ate rewards; those who fail risk bankruptcy. Put crudely, the 
instinctive and essentially rational behavior of businessmen is 
to make money through innovative means. It might be said 
that conforming to government expectations is antithetical to 
the business mentality. 
Aside from the political costs of confrontation, the structure 
of British business made measuring its compliance with 
regulations extremely difficult. Tracking large corporations 
was one thing; tracking small businesses, through whom an 
enormous amount of economic activity flowed, was another. 
Generally speaking, there exists an inherent conceptual bias 
when talking about the problem of envisioning the economy 
in terms of large corporations, big systems and big data. In re-
ality a vast (un-quantified) amount of economic activity flows 
through the enormous base of small business. In any case, the 
point here is that the pre-war British government never set up 
sufficient detection and enforcement mechanisms to ensure 
compliance with the announced prohibitions on trade. 
As a result, certainly within six months, perhaps within three, 
British banks were financing most of the contraband trade 
from Americans to Germany via neutrals, deals with Germany 
were being transacted over British cables, and the goods carried 
to the enemy in British ships. Although these violations were 
apparent to some degree, the military authorities responsible 
for waging economic warfare found themselves powerless to 
prevent these absurdities. Early attempts to improvise a better 





(whose assistance was needed), while political leaders turned 
a blind eye. In the meantime British trade with previously 
unknown corporate entities located in countries contigu-
ous to Germany grew exponentially. For more than a year 
the British government remained unaware of the scale of the 
problem, lacking the means to gauge it, and not wanting to 
believe the worst. 
The government’s ability to impose effective control over the 
economy developed only gradually, and not because British 
businessmen suddenly discovered a hidden reservoir of pa-
triotism. By 1916, many in the private sector were sufficiently 
worried by the prospect of a social revolution that they were 
willing, it would seem, to tolerate relatively moderate state in-
terference as a preferable alternative to arbitrary confiscation 
of private property by a radicalized “Socialistic” society. The 
government and businesses had different understandings of 
what constituted a security emergency: for the government, 
the national security emergency was the prospect of military 
defeat; while for businesses, the corporate security emergency 
was the prospect of social revolution. In other words, when 
businesses finally began to cooperate with the government, 
they did so not because the government’s prewar expectations 
about corporate patriotism were correct, but because they 
came to fear something more than government regulation. 
The government’s failure to anticipate the behavior of Brit-
ish businesses reflected an even more fundamental failure 
to reach consensus with key stakeholders about the proper 
relationship between state and society in wartime. While the 
authority of the state to conscript its citizens was well-enough 
established during the nineteenth century, cemented by Prus-
sia’s victory over France in 1870, the state’s right to conscript 
never extended to private property. Social cooperation with a 
strategy that affected property interests had to be voluntary; 
it could not be legally compelled (and still cannot?). For the 
government, voluntarism was necessary not only to avoid 
legal challenge but to acquire the information—in effect the 
“targeting data”— needed to prosecute the strategy of eco-
nomic warfare. National-security imperatives required society 
to reconceptualize its relationship to the state, but neither 
party realized the degree to which reconceptualization was 
necessary. 
The Commons Strike Back
In seeking to disrupt global communications, broadly defined, 
via economic warfare, Britain enjoyed a number of advantages:
1. A near monopoly over the “communications” infra-
structure of international trade, defined here as tele-
graphs, merchant shipping, and financial.
2. Naval officials with the imagination to understand 
that the character of the global economic system de-
fined the navy’s operating environment and to spot 
new strategic opportunities caused by changes in the 
global economic system.
3. Naval officials who acknowledged that they lacked 
expertise on the day-to-day conduct of international 
trade and were willing to seek assistance from econo-
mists, bankers, shippers, etc.
4. Naval and other officials who realized that any attempt 
to interfere with maritime communications posed se-
rious legal problems and attempted to shape the legal 
terrain accordingly.
5. The broad recognition that any attempt to interfere 
with maritime communications was a grand strate-
gic rather than an operational problem, requiring 
input from multiple stakeholders, inside and outside 
government.
6. A political executive willing to conduct strategic dis-
cussions with multiple stakeholders, even at the risk of 
alienating its core political constituency.
7. Strong prewar political commitment to the strategy of 
economic warfare, manifested concretely in the pre-
delegation of authority.
Even with all these advantages, Britain’s strategy of economic 
warfare still failed—indeed it was barely tried.
The planners of cyber warfare could use this story to assure 
themselves that they would not make the same mistakes today. 
Or they could use it as an opportunity to ask whether the 
United States is in the same situation as Britain, and to think 
through some of the obstacles they might face today.
One obstacle is simply to define cyberspace. Just as definitions 
of maritime “communications” were not self-evident before 
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How does one distinguish private cyberspace from public cy-
berspace, and American cyberspace from foreign cyberspace? 
Will it suffice to defend just U.S. military cyber systems and 
U.S. critical infrastructure? Surely the U.S. economy, which 
depends on access to cyberspace, must be regarded as a critical 
interest? Further, given that the health of the national econ-
omy depends so very greatly upon a healthy world economy, 
should not national security measures encompass this too? 
Where does one draw the line? 
Alternatively, it may be helpful to think through potential 
parallels between maritime space and cyberspace. The mari-
time space most readily identified as the global “commons” 
are the “high seas,” or oceans. But 
they are contiguous with progres-
sively smaller and more sovereign 
(i.e., non-common) waters—gulfs, 
bays, deltas, ports and harbors, riv-
ers, inland seas, lakes, etc.—some of 
which may be reachable by continu-
ous voyage, some of which may be 
more isolated. Determining exactly 
where a commons turns into a sover-
eign area is not easy. By analogy, the 
private/sovereign areas of cyberspace 
are the cyber equivalents of inland 
seas, ports and harbors, great lakes, 
etc., public/foreign access to which 
may require permission from, or the 
use of force against, a host. The idea 
of cyberspace as a commons co-exists 
uneasily with various private/sovereign claims. 
As if the challenge of defining interests in cyberspace is not 
enough, it also involves very difficult legal questions—just as 
the challenge of defining maritime “communications” posed 
very difficult legal questions. The fact is that U.S. firms domi-
nate cyberspace, and very large portions of global Internet 
traffic pass through the United States. Does it follow that the 
U.S. government can legitimately claim the right to com-
mandeer or withhold bandwidth by which one gains access 
to cyberspace—in other words, the radio frequencies used 
by the mobile communications systems through which users 
will increasingly interact with cyberspace, as mobile platforms 
and related “apps” proliferate? Similarly, the U.S. government, 
without necessarily “owning” cyberspace, presumes to control 
access to portions known as .gov and .mil—but that is be-
cause they have control over the servers and the content. Do 
they own the interaction space, the protocols and gateways by 
which people gain access to those servers and data? Does exer-
cising sovereignty amount to legal ownership? Does “owner-
ship”, per se, confer the right to control access? Does the U.S. 
government have a legal or moral right to defend, regulate or 
control access to cyberspace in ways that will very likely im-
pinge on others’ interests? In time of war these questions will 
push their way to the front of political awareness. The exact 
answers are less important here than 
the recognition that these questions 
must be asked. The British experi-
ence with economic warfare suggests 
that it would be very dangerous for 
the U.S. government to assume that 
it could readily translate national 
dominance of cyberspace—however 
defined—into legal or effective state 
control. 
If it does decide to wage cyber 
warfare, how will the United States 
insulate itself from the collateral 
damage caused by deranging the 
global commons? How will the 
U.S. government gain the coopera-
tion and monitor the compliance of 
American companies? How will it respond when American 
consumers complain about rising prices, and when American 
businesses protest heavy state regulation, unfair foreign com-
petition and falling profits? What will it do when allies and 
neutrals complain that actions targeted at belligerents might 
as well be targeted at them? The issue is not necessarily that 
the United States will be unable or unwilling to act unilater-
ally within cyberspace. Rather, it is that IF the United States 
acts unilaterally, THEN, for a variety of reasons—primarily 
economic but also political and diplomatic, not to mention le-
gal—it will impinge on the critical interests of others and face 





might take in cyberspace could hurt American and foreign 
interests so much that the U.S. might be compelled to call off 
its attack, just as the UK had to do in October 1914. 
If the British experience with economic warfare has a single 
lesson, it is that the infrastructure of a globalized economic 
system makes for a weapon of mass disruption rather than 
a precision weapon. Accordingly, weaponizing it is a grand 
strategic, pervasively political problem. It is not a problem for 
computer experts or the Pentagon alone. To have any hope of 
success, a strategy to weaponize critical economic infrastruc-
ture requires the recognition that multiple stakeholders—for-
eign and domestic, inside and outside the government—exist, 
and it requires efforts to gain their cooperation. Its formula-
tion demands direction from the highest political authority 
and the assumption of substantial political risk by elected of-
ficials even to seek cooperation from powerful constituencies, 
let alone to alienate them by actually implementing the strat-
egy. The more aggressive the weaponization of the global eco-
nomic infrastructure, the more severe the damage it will cause, 
not only to its intended target but to “collateral” stakeholders, 
including neutral nations, domestic business interests, and 
domestic consumers who vote. For the strategy to survive the 
likely backlash, or for the intensity of the backlash to be re-
duced, a case must be made to stakeholders before the strategy 
is implemented that the costs of an alternative strategy—or no 
strategy—would be even worse—say, a war that drags on for 
four years, costs millions of lives, and raises the specter of revo-
lution at home. It may be impossible to secure the cooperation 
of all interested parties, but it is certainly impossible to do so 
without realizing that their cooperation is necessary.
In the event of a future major conflict, waging economic war-
fare within the context of a very different global economic 
structure would, as it did a century ago, be quite different 
in its character than anything experienced before. It thus be-
hooves us, now, to devote serious and persistent thinking to 
the subject. i
NOTES
1 This paper began life as a report prepared for a U.S. CyberCom 
Project on Cyber Analogies. I have removed footnotes in the belief 
that doing so was appropriate for this forum, but interested readers 
can find my evidence and further historical explication in Planning 
Armageddon: British Economic Warfare and the First World War 
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Silicon Valley: Metaphor for Cybersecurity, Key to Understanding 
Innovation War
John Kao1 
Chairman, Institute for Large-Scale Innovation
Recent attention has focused on the value of metaphors for deepening our understanding of cybersecurity and defining useful 
pathways for action. Metaphors carry two types of value for such work. First, the utility of a metaphor lies in its ability to help us 
understand a complex phenomenon, to create a gestalt, or a narrative, that can expand the available space for creative thinking. 
That in turn shapes the second form of utility, namely enhancing our ability to frame useful responses, whether in the form of 
prototypes, experiments, initiatives or policies. Therefore my guiding questions in this paper are three: How does Silicon Valley as 
a metaphor increase our knowledge of cybersecurity?; What are the implications for action?; and How do these in turn contribute 
to our larger understanding of the phenomenon of innovation war?
Silicon Valley has received widespread attention, and if imita-
tion is the sincerest form of flattery, then one need look no 
further than the website http://tbtf.com/siliconia.html to see 
the proliferation of other geographies that emulate Silicon 
Valley’s example, at least in name. This website currently lists 
close to a hundred geographies with the word “silicon” in the 
title, hence Silicon Glen (Scotland), Silicon Wadi (Israel), Sili-
con Alley (New York), Silicon Plateau (Bangalore) and even 
Siliwood (Hollywood).
This level of homage is not accidental or arbitrary. Silicon 
Valley can rightfully claim today to be the world’s leading 
innovation epicenter, or “habitat”, as some of its denizens 
prefer to call it. Consider just one tentpole of the Silicon 
Valley phenomenon—Stanford University—which has been 
the birthplace for more than 6,000 new ventures. They read 
like a who’s who of the innovation economy. Companies said 
to have been developed during a student or researcher’s time 
at Stanford: Atheros Communications, Charles Schwab & 
Company, Cisco Systems, Cypress Semiconductor, Dolby 
Laboratories, eBay, e*Trade, Electronic Arts, Gap, Google, 
Hewlett-Packard, IDEO, Instagram, Intuit, Intuitive Surgical, 
Kiva, LinkedIn, Logitech, MathWorks, MIPS Technologies, 
Nanosolar Inc., Netflix, Nike, NVIDIA, Odwalla, Orbitz, 
Rambus, Silicon Graphics, Sun Microsystems, SunPower, 
Taiwan Semiconductor, Tensilica, Tesla Motors, Varian, VM-
ware, Yahoo!, and Zillow.2
Or consider venture capital, another essential ingredient of the 
Silicon Valley model. Fully 40% of U.S. venture capital—funds 
with current assets of some $11 billion—are located in Silicon 
Valley, many on a single street, the fabled Sand Hill Road.3
Other elements of Silicon Valley’s storied innovation ecosys-
tem include a past history of significant U.S. government 
funding, additional academic institutions such as UC Berke-
ley, a host of entrepreneurship savvy service providers—law 
firms, banks, accountants, human resources consultants etc.—
as well as high quality lifestyle and weather.
The result, in terms of wealth generation, is evident; as one 
marker, Bay Area median household income, including data 
from four counties not directly related to Silicon Valley, was 
41% higher than the U.S. national average and 37% higher 
than the rest of California.4
THE SILICON VALLEY SUCCESS 
MODEL—RISK-TAKING AND OUT-OF-
THE-BOX IDEAS
What are some key aspects of the Silicon Valley business 
model?
First, Silicon Valley has a culture of risk-taking that is unique 
worldwide. Investments can be made on the strength of a 





capitalists enter into deals knowing that the majority of them 
will fail. Angel investors deploy their capital based on “well-
honed intuition.”
Such an attitude toward risk mirrors American culture writ 
large. The American comfort with risk-taking and wild ideas 
remains our singular, absolute advantage in a world that is 
increasingly filled with the raw materials for innovation—tal-
ent, good ideas and the infrastructure to support them. It is 
still the case that countries that talk the talk of innovation, for 
the most part, fail to extend full support to the lonely risk-
taker who is light on success guarantees. Resources may be 
forthcoming, provided that failure does not rear its ugly head. 
Even in countries that are seemingly as innovation-friendly as 
Singapore and Finland, business failure is viewed with a dim 
eye. Likely as not, you will be ostracized from polite business 
society, refused business loans and other niceties.
In contrast, the Silicon Valley saying is “if you 
haven’t gone bankrupt at least once or twice, 
you’re not trying hard enough.” A favorite in-
vestor question to an entrepreneur in Silicon 
Valley is to “describe your biggest failure.” The 
correct answer is not to minimize your failures, 
but rather to come up with a major “crash and 
burn” story. A seasoned Silicon Valley venture 
capitalist will understand that failure is inextricably woven 
into the entrepreneurial process and is much more interested 
in how an entrepreneur dealt with failure than whether it 
occurred.
This accords with psychological explorations of risk-taking 
that involve the well known ring-toss exercise. Psycholo-
gists have studied entrepreneurs based on where they place 
themselves in relation to the ring-toss post. If the entrepreneur 
stands too close to maximize the likelihood of success, that is 
not an encouraging sign of a willingness to try new unproven 
things. Conversely if they stand too far away and lob the rings 
at the post, they are assuming an excessive amount of risk. So 
finding the “sweet spot” for risk becomes the order of the day.
Related to risk-taking is tolerance of off-the-wall ideas, what 
Howard Rheingold, noted social media expert, calls “wild ass 
ideas.” The evocative film, Something Ventured,5 portrays titans 
of the Silicon Valley venture capital community talking about 
Apple Computer. One after another, they admit that they 
missed the “next big thing,” perhaps put off by the eccentrici-
ties of Steve Jobs and Steve Wozniak, thereby losing a claim to 
turn an initial investment of $350,000 into a current market 
capitalization of some $200 billion. This highlights the inher-
ent unpredictability of the innovation process. While incum-
bents may be allergic to this level of uncertainty, the ability to 
see things that others do not, to follow hunches and to sense 
useful innovation from the edges is key to innovation success.
Genuine risk capital and the attitudes that come with it are 
fundamental to the Silicon Valley phenomenon. The classic 
model of Silicon Valley venture capital marries a visionary 
investor with a technology visionary to create a new industry, 
as has been the case over and over again with companies like 
Tandem Computers, Amgen, Apple, Intel, Google, and many 
others. Nowhere else in the world is it so possible 
to get started with a simple conversation and 
handshake.
Venture investors, to be clear, are not simply 
shoveling money randomly out the back of a 
truck, but rather are using disciplined intuition 
coupled with a sophisticated internal assessment 
of investment-grade entrepreneurs to guide their decisions. 
While capital is abundant in many other places in the world, 
it resembles banking money rather than genuine early-stage 
risk capital. There is an old adage: “You can’t get money from 
a bank until you don’t need it.” This certainly is the case with 
what passes for venture capital in many other parts of the 
world.
Silicon Valley is distinct in the extent to which it offers early-
stage money for ideas, and its tolerance for the iteration and 
experimentation that an unproven idea must go through to 
have proof of concept validated. This dynamic—now captured 
in the notion of the lean startup6—is intrinsic to the innova-
tion process. New ideas have to be tried out and field-tested. 
They cannot simply be asserted as revealed truth. Business ap-
proaches that emphasize planning and analytics for an early-
stage idea often produce a mismatch of expectations. There 
Venture 
capitalists enter 
into deals knowing 
that the majority 
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is really no way that a business plan can be valid in an early-
stage environment. Like the old adage of “no plan survives 
first contact with the enemy,” no business plan survives first 
contact with the market. The point here is that sophisticated 
strategic conversations are key to a startup, but five-year pro 
formas and business plans may be less relevant. It is therefore 
easy to understand why new ideas can become implemented 
in the Silicon Valley environment with tremendous speed and 
flexibility.
THE SILICON VALLEY SUCCESS 
MODEL—COMMUNITY
Less obvious but no less important to the Silicon Valley phe-
nomenon is the importance of community. I have compared 
Silicon Valley and its startups to the time-honored tradition of 
a barn-raising. In the pioneer days, if you were a newcomer to 
town, the community would gather and give you their collec-
tive effort to build a barn and at the end of the day you’d have 
one. Your obligation then reciprocally would be to offer a day’s 
worth of labor to the next new person who required it and 
so on. The rough and tumble of Silicon Valley competition, 
which perhaps had its origins in the California Gold Rush of 
the 19th century, is more than made up for by the extraordi-
nary efforts of those who have made their fortunes in Silicon 
Valley to give back to their community with their time and 
money to endow professorships, support community develop-
ment programs, and even fund a home-town museum, The 
Tech Museum of Innovation in San Jose.
This notion of barn-raising is very much part of the hid-
den DNA of Silicon Valley. There are few other communities 
lubricated with as much reciprocity and smooth networking. 
There is a kind of specialized emotional intelligence at work. 
People know what’s going on, who to make the proper in-
troduction to, who’s in the club, not in the club, who would 
make a good partner, ally, friend. As a result, the Silicon 
Valley dynamic is not typically a linear progression from 
idea to funding to execution, but rather the expression of a 
web of relationships, an ecosystem in which there are many 
pathways to yes, and in which the scarce knowledge of how 
to practice the innovation process is sprinkled across many 
different kinds of professionals, whether they are lawyers, 
venture capitalists, or even the waiter at Buck’s Restaurant, 
the famous gathering place in Silicon Valley, who may in fact 
have a good idea of his or her own.
This sense of community certainly lies at the heart of the 
university, business and entrepreneurial community nexus in 
Silicon Valley and the often cozy business-academic ties that 
result. It is well-known, for instance, that John Hennessy, 
president of Stanford, also gave Sergey Brin and Larry Page 
resources that helped with the launch of Google and subse-
quently received equity and a board seat in that company. This 
behavior might be viewed with skepticism by American col-
leagues and with suspicion by peers in other countries, despite 
the fact that communities as diverse as Helsinki’s Aalto Univer-
sity and Moscow’s Skolkovo Foundation are trying to emulate 
these kinds of town-gown relationships in growing their own 
versions of Silicon Valley.
THE NEW GEOGRAPHY OF 
INNOVATION AND THE RISE OF 
COMPETITION
As Silicon Valley has matured over the past half-century, much 
has been made of its growing pains. Concerns about the future 
of Silicon Valley have been expressed in such terms as the high 
cost of residential real estate that freezes out young creators, 
the fevered bidding wars for talent that increase the cost of 
starting up, the arrogance and complacency that comes from 
mold-breaking levels of success.
But the real issue for Silicon Valley is globalization and the 
proliferation of innovation capability worldwide. How can 
Silicon Valley maintain its preeminence in an “innovation 
world?”
It is worth reviewing some economic history. At the conclu-
sion of World War  II, the United States was really the only 
game in town when it came to innovation. And Silicon Valley 
in its early days was a singular phenomenon. America had eco-
nomic might, an intact homeland, universities that the world’s 
talent clamored to come to, an R&D base second to none, and 
so on. It is striking to recall that, post-World War II, the United 





was responsible for no less than 50 percent of global economic 
output. Clearly this was also a time in which America’s innova-
tion prowess was at an all-time high and driven by a host of 
absolute advantages.
But now, innovation capabilities have gone global and all of 
America’s advantages, save its culturally defined comfort with 
risk, mentioned above, have become relative. The world is 
striving to become competent at the kind of societal innova-
tion that is increasingly seen as driving economic growth and 
social development. I have elsewhere coined the term large-
scale innovation7 to refer to innovation at a societal as opposed 
to enterprise scale. Most of our knowledge about innovation 
comes from studying companies, while the study of innova-
tion in societies remains a great work to be done.
If one adopts a large-scale innova-
tion perspective, it is clear that there 
are at least 50 countries around the 
world with sophisticated national 
innovation agendas, strategies, and 
investment programs. China alone 
is putting $500 billion into its na-
tional innovation agenda, while the 
government of Sweden for example 
has Vinnova, an agency with 300 
professionals dedicated to pursu-
ing a national innovation strategy. 
Helsinki has created an Innovation 
University by merging the faculties 
of engineering, business, and design 
at their leading universities. And 
governments ranging from Russia to 
Singapore are investing in large-scale 
innovation platforms. Russia has the Skolkovo Foundation 
that explicitly intends to emulate the success of Silicon Val-
ley with the support of American multinationals such as Intel 
and Cisco. Singapore, a country with no natural resources 
save smart people, targeted life sciences as an area in which 
to achieve eminence and now boasts the Singapore Biopolis, a 
life sciences city within a city that is on track to having 6,000 
PhD scientists working on its premises.
In this “innovation world,” it is clear that new ideas can come 
from anywhere. And multinational corporations are playing 
their roles in enabling that. For example, Cisco has a Net-
work Academy education effort that counts a million students 
across the globe. The efforts of China to link access to domes-
tic markets with the establishment of multinational corporate 
laboratories in China is well known. In a speech at the Office 
of the Director of National Intelligence a few years ago, I com-
mented that the labs of today are the foxholes of tomorrow, 
and that this dissemination of innovation capability can be 
likened to a swarm of innovations and innovators that will 
inevitably lead to unexpected breakthroughs from unexpected 
quarters. Welcome to innovation world.
In military doctrine, the swarm references the power of the 
many and the small to fight the large and centralized. So, 
for example, ultra-fast gunboats 
loaded with explosives may go up 
against aircraft carriers. There is a 
similar phenomenon in innova-
tion. The centralized corporate labs 
of today and yesterday, the Bell 
Labs for example, are increasingly 
confronted by innovation coming 
from the margins, from a kind of 
“innovation swarm” made of up 
of venture-backed companies and 
“super-empowered” innovators for 
whom the cost structure of doing 
their innovation work may be a frac-
tion of what it used to be.
Disruptive innovation, the kind of 
innovation that changes the nature 
of the game, typically does not 
come from incumbents but rather from insurgents who are 
crowding in from the margins and may lack traditional cre-
dentials but whose ideas—perhaps outlandish at first—may 
wind up setting the new standards. It is often the odd idea 
that can create a new order of things. Who can forget how 
Xerox with its attachment to the mainframe model of copying 
(proprietarily called Xerography) fell victim to Canon with 
its expertise in miniaturization and optics that capitalized on 
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self-employed, and community organizations? Xerox was very 
happy serving its current market while Canon perceived a 
new one, and the rest is history, as Xerox suffered a near-death 
experience. Consider, therefore, box cutters and passenger air-
planes or from a cybersecurity perspective the many thousands 
of military- or kleptocracy-grade hackers working to overturn 
the existing order of things in bunkers, basements and faceless 
office buildings around the world.
SO WHAT FOR CYBERSECURITY?
Innovation capability is now becoming abundant and global. 
The old adage of brainstorming is that quantity leads to 
quality. Inevitably, amassing innovation capability over time 
around the globe will lead to breakthroughs that may come 
from any point of the compass. In a way, the world itself is 
becoming more like Silicon Valley, with disruptive innovation 
able to originate from virtually everywhere. The cybersecurity 
community would therefore be well advised to understand the 
Silicon Valley model with an eye to enhancing its own innova-
tion capability and also perceiving clearly the new competitive 
landscape within which Silicon Valley is no longer a singular 
phenomenon.
Bringing Silicon Valley inside will be a challenge for military 
institutions that are used to hierarchy, elimination of uncer-
tainty, authority, centralization of resources and top-down 
mechanisms of control. Recall that early-stage initiatives typi-
cally cannot be validated by traditional methods of proof and 
documentation—business plans and financial models may 
not capture the essence of a new idea or validate it. Cutting 
off outlier ideas is not, however, a smart strategy, if there is 
any reasonable chance that they might show promise in the 
uncertain landscape that is innovation war. The insurgents 
meanwhile—our cyber warfare adversaries—are all about out-
lier ideas and asymmetric responses.
So the cybersecurity community would do well to ponder the 
ingredients of the Silicon Valley model if it wishes to go up 
against the “swarm” that sits on the other side of the battle-
lines in the kind of amorphous innovation war that we are 
now engaged in. This swarm is leaderless, crowd-sourced, 
crowd-funded, emergent, experimental and, like Silicon 
Valley, is able to reap the benefits of adopting a different kind 
of business culture from that of the mainstream.
So the cybersecurity community might usefully address some 
core questions inspired by the Silicon Valley example:
1. How can it build enduring capabilities analogous to 
leading universities to ensure the continuing develop-
ment of deep knowledge about salient agendas?
2. How can it practice a model of risk capital and invest-
ment that does not require the usual validation, but 
instead supports emergent possibilities in a manner 
similar to the early-stage venture capital community 
of Silicon Valley?
3. How can it create an attractive environment for talent 
to work in a fluid and collaborative way that is free 
from inhibiting influences of hierarchy and the day-
to-day, and that instead supports the kind of “white 
space” most conducive to the creative thought that 
leads to disruptive innovation?
4. How can it win the war for talent by offering attractive 
opportunities to do one’s best work? How will it create 
the kind of “strange attractors” to draw talent in by 
focusing on cool ideas, horizon opportunities, and the 
overall mission?
5. How will talent attraction in turn lead to talent mul-
tiplication in terms of achieving critical mass or “share 
of talent?”
6. How can it create the kind of trust, collaboration and 
community internally that creates salience, speed and 
support? Will the good guys be able to make an in-
novation model out of an ability to validate emergent 
ideas on the back of a napkin through a network of 
trust?
Overall, the cybersecurity community will have to learn how 
to build relationships across the hard skin of organizational 
boundaries, to be able to establish friendships, alliances, part-
nerships and collaborations that don’t fit the traditional model 
of defense contracting. In addition, security classification 
becomes an issue, because many of the kinds of people that 
one might most wish to learn from either are not eligible for 
clearance, do not want it, or would regard the notion of clas-





In conclusion, it is important to understand that to fight 
the swarm, we have to be the swarm; to fight the innovation 
swarm, we have to be the innovation swarm. The intelligence 
community needs not only to study and interact with Sili-
con Valley, but to figure out what it wants to apply from the 
Silicon Valley playbook. Keeping pace with the “long war” is 
actually the struggle to fight the innovation war, within which 
the building of innovation capabilities globally has created 
new instability as well as new collaborative opportunities. i
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Silicon Valley: A Metaphor for Cybersecurity
The Offense-Defense Balance and Cyber Warfare
Keir Lieber
Offense appears to trump defense in cyberspace. Cyber attacks are cheap, whereas cyber defense is expensive. Defenders must 
defend across an entire network, whereas attackers merely need to find individual points of vulnerability. Cyber attack is considered 
technically easier and can be carried out quickly, whereas cyber defense is complicated and time-consuming. Because of the difficul-
ties of attributing the source of a cyber attack, attackers can expect to hit and live to fight again another day. And because modern 
military command and control systems are so dependent on information technology, cyber attacks offer the tantalizing prospect of 
strategic decapitation. In contrast, strategic victory through pure cyber defense seems remote.1
This observation has led some analysts to predict a new era of 
international cyber instability and conflict. Specifically, schol-
ars and policymakers worry that cyber offensive advantage will 
provoke spirals of hostility, arms racing, and the outbreak of 
full-fledged cyberwars. 
This paper argues that such concerns are overblown. The 
conventional wisdom is wrong for two reasons: First, the 
offense-defense balance analogy itself is conceptually flawed 
and empirically unsupported. Second, regardless of any mer-
its, the offense-defense balance concept travels poorly to the 
realm of cyberspace. In particular, the inherent 
complexity and ambiguity surrounding cyberwar 
preparations and operations precludes generating 
the kind of state behavior predicted by offense-
defense theory. In short, potential U.S. adversar-
ies are unlikely to see greater incentives to launch 
cyber attacks to degrade U.S. military capabili-
ties than they otherwise would in the absence of 
perceptions of a cyber offensive advantage.
The paper is organized as follows. The first section presents 
the basic tenets and predictions of offense-defense theory, 
the body of academic work that underpins modern concerns 
about offense-dominance in cyberspace. The second section 
discusses why offense is thought to trump defense in cyber-
space, and why such a finding points to potentially troubling 
consequences for U.S. national security. Third, the paper ana-
lyzes how these problems are exacerbated when the offense-
defense balance analogy is applied to cyberspace. Finally, the 
paper concludes with policy recommendations.
OFFENSE-DEFENSE THEORY AND THE 
PROSPECTS FOR CONFLICT 
Contemporary concerns about the consequences of cyber of-
fense dominance rest on a body of academic work known as 
“offense-defense theory” (ODT). The core claim of the theory 
is that the nature of technology at any given time is an im-
portant cause of international conflict: leaders will be more 
tempted to launch wars when they believe new innovations 
favor attackers over defenders. 
ODT is perhaps best known from the passionate 
and intricate debates about nuclear first-strike 
capability and deterrence stability during the 
Cold War, as well as from the popular interpreta-
tion—made famous by historians Barbara Tuch-
man (The Guns of August) and A. J. P. Taylor (War 
by Time-Table and other works)—that World 
War I was triggered by erroneous perceptions of a 
new era of swift and decisive warfare.2 The theory 
remains a staple of international relations theo-
rizing, and it shapes modern policy debates on arms control, 
national security, and defense force structure and posture. 
Below I discuss the theory’s background, the core concept 
of the offense-defense balance, and how the offense-defence 
balance (ODB) analogy has been used to explain several key 
historical cases.
Background
Allusions to the relative strength of attack and defense, and 
the idea that offensive advantages foster conflict, whereas 
defensive advantages promote peace, can be traced back to 
many of the 
steps pursued 
by states to 
bolster their own 
security make 






the writings of Sun Tzu, Carl von Clausewitz, and Antoine-
Henri Jomini. For example, Clausewitz wrote that “the greater 
strength of the defensive [might] tame the elemental fury of 
war”; after all, he continued, “if the attack were the stronger 
form … no one would want to do anything but attack.”3 In 
the last century, basic offense-defense insights are found in 
the analytical work of B. H. Liddell Hart and J. F. C. Fuller 
in the 1930s; Marion William Boggs and Quincy Wright in 
the 1940s; and Malcolm Hoag and Thomas Schelling in the 
1960s.4
Specialized works focused on ODT, however, were produced 
in the 1970s and 1980s at a time when Cold War strategic 
nuclear issues loomed large. International relations scholars 
such as George Quester, Robert Jervis, Stephen Van Evera, 
and Charles Glaser believed that nuclear weapons gave de-
fenders a large military advantage, ensured strategic stability in 
the form of mutual deterrence, and should have allowed U.S. 
and Soviet leaders to feel tremendously secure and act more 
peacefully. The superpower nuclear arms race confounded 
these views, leading offense-defense proponents to conclude 
that U.S. and Soviet leaders misunderstood the nature of the 
nuclear revolution. And proponents of ODT feared that the 
unnecessary arms competition could spiral into an otherwise 
avoidable nuclear war.
In this context, the originators of ODT sought to identify how 
military technology in general might cause war or peace.5 The 
seminal work in this vein is Jervis’ 1978 article, “Cooperation 
under the Security Dilemma.” The security dilemma holds 
that many of the steps pursued by states to bolster their own 
security simultaneously make other states less secure.6 Even 
when such preparations are meant solely for self-defense, other 
states are compelled to interpret these military preparations as 
hostile and prepare accordingly, because international anarchy 
(the absence of a central authority to govern or protect states), 
pervasive uncertainty about present or future intentions, and 
the shifting balance of power make inaction or the attribution 
of benign intent inordinately risky. This triggers an action-
reaction spiral of reciprocal arms buildups, diplomatic tension, 
and hostility that can lead to war.
The severity of the security dilemma depends on whether of-
fense or defense has the advantage on the battlefield (i.e., ODB) 
and whether offensive and defensive capabilities can be dis-
tinguished.7 When the balance favors offense, the probability 
of competition and war is greater for several reasons. Striking 
first seems an attractive option for all states. If technology is 
such that states believe an initial attack will lead to a quick 
and decisive victory, then striking first will be tempting—both 
because of fear of attack under such conditions and the desire 
to make gains through conquest. Second, political crises are 
more likely to escalate into full-fledged military conflicts be-
cause states will be quicker to conclude they are threatened, 
more inclined to attack preemptively, and more prone to inad-
vertent wars.8 Third, arms races become more intense because 
even small advantages in armament levels can have decisive 
consequences in a short war. In sum, all types of war—e.g., 
expansionist, preemptive, preventive, accidental—are more 
likely when the balance favors offense. The opposite holds 
when defense has the advantage.
The Offense-Defense Balance
The ODB turns out to be a surprisingly complex concept to 
operationalize in practice. In order to apply the ODB to cyber-
space, it is necessary to first clarify some basic definitions and 
assumptions:
The ODB is typically defined as the relative ease of attack and 
defense, with “relative ease” denoting some measure of the 
relative costs and benefits of attack and defense. “Offense” 
and “defense” refer to the use of military force, not the politi-
cal motivations, intentions, or goals that may motivate such 
military action. Specifically, offense is identified as the use of 
force against another state in order to seize territory or destroy 
assets. Defense entails the use of force to block those attacking 
forces. The relative cost of attack and defense is understood 
as the amount of resources (money) an attacker must invest 
in offensive capability to offset the amount of resources a de-
fender invests in defensive forces.9
Offense and defense can be used to describe military action 
at three levels of warfare: strategy (pertaining to overall war 
plans and ultimate outcomes), operations (the conduct of 
specific campaigns in a war), and tactics (concerning actions 
and engagements taken within a campaign or battle). In order 
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outcomes, the strategic level would appear to be the most suit-
able frame for analysis. That is, because the theory ultimately 
aims to explain the politics of war and peace (i.e., decisions 
to initiate war), what matters most are leaders’ expectations 
of whether attackers can win wars quickly and decisively. 
After all, launching a war would not be appealing to leaders 
if the nature of the balance promised victory in the opening 
campaigns but defeat in the war. In practice, however, the 
operational level of warfare offers a suitable unit of analysis, 
especially for measuring the objective ODB. For one thing, 
the success or failure of specific campaigns will very often de-
termine whether the attacker or defender prevails in a given 
war. And, given the great uncertainty military and political 
leaders face in predicting the course of any war very far into 
the future, the prospect that initial campaigns can be won 
rapidly serves as a good functional equivalent for the prospect 
of strategic success. In sum, the logic of offense-defense theory 
implies that the strategic ODB is the key unit of analysis, but in 
practice the ODB at the level of operations is what should drive 
military and political outcomes.
The ODB should be distinguished independently of great dis-
parities in power and skill between adversaries. Battlefield out-
comes clearly depend on a host of factors other than the ODB, 
including the overall balance of military forces, resources, and 
skill. If a given state wins a quick and decisive victory, it could 
stem from the nature of the ODB, but it could also simply 
result from a gross disparity in military power (understood in 
quantitative or qualitative terms). To classify an ODB requires 
the assumption that states make reasonably intelligent deci-
sions about how to employ existing technologies and forces 
given prevailing knowledge at the time.
Finally, one needs to stipulate the criteria used to judge how 
technology favors offense or defense at any given time. Schol-
ars have struggled to identify objective and consistent criteria, 
but at least two hypotheses emerge: First, mobility-improving 
innovations are presumed to favor attackers because they 
contribute to quicker and more decisive warfare. Second, fire-
power-improving innovations seem to favor defenders because 
they result in longer, more indecisive warfare.
Historical Cases
Scholars have used offense-defense logic to explain the history 
of major wars, ethnic civil wars, arms races, alliance behavior, 
crisis behavior, military doctrines, and much more. Consider, 
for example, how the ODB analogy has been used to explain 
the origins of the Wars of German Unification, World War I, 
World War II, and the Cold War arms race: 
Wars of German Unification
The spread of railroads in the mid-1800s—the quintessential 
technological innovation of the industrial age—dramatically 
increased the strategic mobility of armies. The mobilization, 
deployment, and concentration of ever larger forces could 
now be achieved across vast distances at up to ten times the 
speed of marching troops. Offense-defense theory predicts 
that the greater mobility conferred by railroads made quick 
and decisive victories for the attacker more likely. Moreover, 
the prospect of quick victory offered by railroads (and the fear 
that an adversary would seize the same opportunity) should 
have made leaders more inclined to launch war. Prussia’s 
quick and decisive victories in the Wars of German Unifica-
tion—against Denmark (1864), Austria (1866), and France 
(1870–71)—appear to validate the theory’s predictions of 
railroad-based offensive advantage. Although the outcome of 
the Danish War was a foregone conclusion given across-the-
board power disparities, Prussia’s victories over Austria and, 
especially, France were surprising, given that both states ap-
peared to have greater overall military strength and fighting 
experience as well as extensive rail networks. What else could 
explain how upstart Prussia could invade and defeat in short 
order the two recognized great powers of the continent be-
sides the role that railroads played in benefiting the attacker? 
Moreover, according to the story, Prussian leaders recognized 
and opportunistically embraced the offensive advantage of 
railroads in order to pursue an expansionist foreign policy.
World War I 
The Great War is the paradigmatic case for the ODB analogy. 
Scholars contend that the dramatic increase in firepower cre-
ated by the revolution in small arms and artillery in the late 
19th and early 20th centuries gave an enormous advantage to 





Tragically, however, European statesmen and military leaders 
erroneously perceived great offensive-dominance in the suc-
cession of new firepower technologies. In turn, these massive 
misperceptions of the ODB—the “cult of the offensive” and 
“short-war illusion,” as they have been labeled—served as a 
master cause of World War I. As A. J. P. Taylor wrote, “When 
cut down to essentials, the sole cause for the outbreak of war 
in 1914 was the… belief in speed and the offensive.”10 As 
Robert Jervis describes it, “A version of spiral dynamics was… 
an immediate cause of the outbreak of war in 1914. Each of 
the continental powers believed that 
the side that struck first would gain 
a major military advantage. Since to 
wait for the other side to clarify its 
intentions could mean defeat, even a 
country that preferred the status quo 
to a war would feel great pressures 
to attack…11 Had the participants 
recognized the objective defensive 
advantages of the new weapons of 
war, Jervis writes elsewhere, “they 
would have rushed for their own 
trenches rather than for the enemy’s 
territory.”12 The “cult of the offen-
sive” dominated German planning 
in particular, because military and 
civilian leaders were mesmerized by 
“a highly exaggerated faith in the ef-
ficacy of offensive military strategies and tactics.”13 Stephen 
Van Evera writes, “ between 1890 and 1914 Europeans in-
creasingly believed that attackers would hold the advantage 
on the battlefield and that wars would be short and decisive. 
They largely overlooked the lessons of the American Civil 
War, the Russo-Turkish War of 1877–78, the Boer War, and 
the Russo-Japanese War, which had revealed the power of the 
new defensive technologies.”14 Van Evera concludes, “Euro-
peans embraced political and military myths that obscured 
the defender’s advantages… and primed Europeans to expect 
a quick, total victory for the stronger side in the next war.”15
World War II
The mechanization and motorization of armies—especially 
in the form of the tank—transformed land warfare between 
the world wars, greatly increasing operational mobility on the 
battlefield. Proponents of offense-defense theory believe that 
the incorporation of tanks into the European armed forces 
in the interwar period resulted in greater offense-dominance 
and provoked Adolf Hitler’s decision to attack his enemies. 
According to Stephen Van Evera, “During 1919–45 the power 
of the offense was restored by motorized armor and an of-
fensive doctrine—blitzkrieg—for its employment.”16 Robert 
Jervis notes, “the German invasion in World War II… indi-
cated the offensive superiority of highly mechanized armies in 
the field.”17 Sean Lynn-Jones writes, 
“The tank, for example, is useful for 
offensive and defensive purposes, but 
without tanks, blitzkrieg offensives 
would be virtually impossible. Tanks 
make it possible for states to launch 
offensives using large armored for-
mations. In other words, they make 
offensive strategies far less costly 
than they would have been without 
tanks.”18 And Adolf Hitler, because 
of his recognition that armored war-
fare gave offense a great advantage 
over defense, felt free to pursue his 
expansionist aims. To be sure, Hitler 
had very aggressive aims in any case; 
but the ODB analogy suggests that he 
was truly emboldened only when he 
grasped the offensive promise of armored blitzkrieg warfare.
Cold War Arms Race
The invention of nuclear weapons produced an unprecedent-
ed, exponential increase in firepower—and the equivalent of a 
revolution in defensive advantage. “After 1945 thermonuclear 
weapons restored the power of the defense, this time giving it 
an overwhelming advantage,” Van Evera writes. According to 
Glaser, “Nuclear weapons created a revolution for defense ad-
vantage.”19 Thus, according to scholars, the nuclear revolution 
rendered strategic nuclear competition between the United 
States and the Soviet Union irrelevant, irrational, and danger-
ous.20 Nuclear weapons should have essentially eliminated the 
security dilemma and much of the grounds for security com-
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to appreciate the true nature of the ODB, and undertook an 
intense and costly nuclear arms race—involving highly offen-
sive strategic forces—that threatened to precipitate World War 
III. In the end, and despite rampant misperception, the fact 
that the Cold War never turned hot is seen as a testament to 
the ultimate power of defense embodied in nuclear weapons 
technology.
In sum, the analytical power of the ODB analogy is that it 
conceivably explains why all kinds of states—aggressive or 
defensive, revisionist or status quo, greedy or insecure—might 
face incentives to attack based simply on the nature of the 
technology available at the time. World War  I was a tragic 
accident—a war that nobody really intended, but one that was 
unleashed by rampant misperceptions of the new industrial 
tools of warfare; World War  II was driven in large part by 
Hitler’s discovery of blitzkrieg warfare, which gave him the 
offensive firepower to pursue his boundless objec-
tives; and the Cold War nuclear arms race was an 
illogical product of leaders who failed to appreci-
ate the revolutionary defensive (or at least deter-
rent) character of the absolute weapon. Based on 
the ODT literature, it seems reasonable to worry 
that the current era of cyber offensive advantage 
could spell trouble.
But is offense-defense theory useful for understanding cyber 
threats to U.S. national security? Is the ODB analogy—the idea 
that conflict is more likely when offense dominates—appli-
cable to cyber warfare? In short, does the cyber ODB foretell a 
new era of instability and conflict?
THE OFFENSE-DEFENSE BALANCE IN 
CYBERSPACE
John Arquilla speculates that cyberwar could be “showing the 
world that outbreaks of conflict may be primarily driven by 
the state of play in technology.” “Today,” he continues, “this 
state of play is one that makes attacking seem easy and defend-
ing oneself hard. A world replete with cyberwars appears to 
loom ahead.”21 To evaluate this and related claims, one must 
first operationalize the ODB in the context of cyberspace. How can 
we understand the relationship between offense and defense in 
cyberspace? Why is offense thought to be dominant in cyberspace? 
What predictions flow from such a finding?
War is a political act—its purpose is to achieve political 
objectives. In an anarchical world fraught with uncertainty, 
states are compelled to care about one objective above all 
others: national security. Offense-defense theory purports to 
explain when states are more or less likely to resort to war 
to achieve national security goals. According to the theory, 
offensive advantage in military operations makes all kinds of 
wars more likely: expansionist wars driven by states seeking to 
expand their power over other states; preventive wars driven 
by states seeking to stop the rise of a potentially threatening 
rivals; preemptive wars driven by first-strike incentives and 
fears; and unintended wars sparked by spirals of arms racing 
and hostility.
If the ODB analogy is to shed any light on the 
dynamics of cyberspace, the analysis should be 
restricted to the realm of cyberwar. That is, the 
realm consisting of military operations conducted 
in cyberspace to destroy, damage, or degrade an 
enemy’s military capability in order to achieve 
political ends. 
To be sure, analysts and policymakers—including those at 
U.S. Cyber Command—are interested in a larger set of cyber 
threats. Broadly defined, cyber attacks also encompass non-
strategic attacks aimed at manipulating, stealing, disrupting, 
denying, degrading, or destroying critical systems, assets, in-
formation or functions. But if the ODB analogy is to have any 
analytical purchase in cyberspace, it cannot be conceptually 
stretched to account for all of these cases. Put simply, offense-
defense theory is all about explaining why and when technol-
ogy encourages states to attack each other. Even if the ODB 
analogy were not applicable to crime, terrorism, espionage, 
or any number of other cyber operations, its application to 
understanding strategic cyberwar among states would be an 
important and useful accomplishment.
Cyber Offense Dominance
Although it is widely agreed that offense has the advantage over 
defense in cyberspace, few studies have explicitly adopted the 









offense-defense framework to rigorously examine the claim. 
Nevertheless, both existing and new criteria point toward a 
clear offensive advantage in cyberspace.
Mobility
According to the traditional criteria discussed above, mobility 
favors offense because it multiplies an attacker’s advantage in 
surprise and initiative. That is, greater mobility increases an 
attacker’s ability to quickly outflank or overwhelm a surprised 
defender and reduces the time an attacker must take to assault 
defensive positions. Cyber offense is highly “mobile” in the 
sense that attacks can be carried out almost instantaneously. 
Cyber defenders may have little (if any) warning of a cyber 
attack, may not even detect an attack as it is underway and 
inflicting damage, and may be quickly outflanked or over-
whelmed. In short, for cyber attackers, achieving surprise 
is easy, targets can be assaulted immediately, and 
operations can be completed very quickly. Mobil-
ity in cyberspace appears to favor offense in spades.
Cost
Measures of the relative ease of attack and de-
fense typically rest on relative costs—the amount 
of resources an attacker must invest in offensive 
capability to offset the amount of resources a 
defender invests in defensive forces. Determining 
such an actual cost ratio in a real-world case is enormously 
difficult, if not impossible, but it seems safe to say that such 
a ratio in cyberspace favors the attacker. One analyst—using 
a heuristic model combining empirical data and case studies 
on the offensive and defensive costs of hardware, software, 
and personnel—estimates that the offense-defense ratio in 
cyberspace favors attackers over defenders by 132:1.22 An-
other analyst calculated that a high-end “cyber army” ca-
pable of defeating U.S. cyber defenses could be developed 
for roughly $100 million dollars, which pales in comparison 
to the annual U.S. cyber defense budget.23 In short, the cost 
of defending computer networks appears to be far more ex-
pensive than penetrating those networks.
Complexity
Much of the cost discrepancy between cyber offense and 
defense stems from the relative technical difficulty of these 
operations. In large part because defenders must defend across 
an entire network, whereas attackers merely need to find 
individual points of vulnerability, cyber attack is considered 
technically less demanding.24 Cyber attackers also appear to 
require fewer personnel and less computer science knowledge 
to prepare and launch attacks than defenders require to pre-
vent such attacks. According to the 2010 U.S. Quadrennial 
Defense Review, an offensive advantage “is growing as hacker 
tools become cheaper and easier to employ by adversaries 
whose skills are growing in sophistication.”25 As Deputy De-
fense Secretary William Lynn put it, “A couple dozen talented 
programmers wearing flip-flops and drinking Red Bull can do 
a lot of damage.”26
Other Attributes
Other attributes of cyberspace appear to favor the 
attacker even if there does not appear to be a clear 
corollary in traditional offense-defense theory. 
First, because of the difficulties of attributing the 
source of a cyber attack, attackers can expect to 
strike and live to fight again another day. Second, 
improved knowledge of defensive cyber opera-
tions, tools, and strategies can simultaneously be 
a huge boon to attackers. Finally, because modern 
military command and control systems are so dependent on 
information technology, cyber attacks offer the tantalizing 
prospect of strategic decapitation. In contrast, strategic victory 
through pure cyber defense seems remote.
Predictions Based on Cyber Offensive 
Advantage
Offense dominance in cyber space has led many to identify an 
emerging “cybersecurity dilemma” that will generate a world 
replete with cyber arms racing, spirals of hostility, and the 
outbreak of full-fledged cyberwars.27 The United States, in 
particular, might be dragged into a range of cyber conflicts. 
For example, committed adversaries—those that want to 
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seize the opportunity created by offensive advantage to launch 
significant cyber attacks against U.S. military assets. Poten-
tial adversaries—those that have conflicts of interest with the 
United States but are otherwise deterred from taking hostile 
actions—might be emboldened by offense dominance to pur-
sue revisionist goals through cyberspace, or launch attacks for 
fear of the U.S. striking first. Even the United States, as it 
continues to build up its offensive cyber capabilities, might 
be tempted to launch more preventive or preemptive cyber 
attacks in the name of national security.28
The ODB analogy strongly suggests that cyber offense domi-
nance would exacerbate the security dilemma and lead to more 
arms racing, and conflicts driven by preemptive, preventive, 
and aggressive incentives:
Arms Racing
As Lord and Sharp write, “Offensive dominance creates a 
great risk of cyber arms races. States… are likely to view the 
prevalence of offensive cyber threats as a legitimate rationale 
for bolstering their own capabilities, both defensive and of-
fensive, thus fueling an action-reaction dynamic of iterative 
arming. Experts believe that at least 20 nations are engaged in 
a cyber arms competition and possess the type of advanced ca-
pabilities needed to wage cyberwar against the United States. 
As Michael Nacht, Former Assistant Secretary of Defense for 
Global Strategic Affairs, told us, ‘An arms race is already going 
on in cyberspace and it is very intense.’29 Such arms races are 
predicted to result in the outbreak of war because they trig-
ger an escalating spiral of hostility and misunderstanding. As 
Lord and Sharp continue, “Conflict in cyberspace is uniquely 
predisposed to escalation given uncertainties about what 
constitutes an act of war and the growing number of state… 
actors seeking offensive capabilities. Actors are more likely to 
misperceive or miscalculate actions in cyberspace, where there 
is no widely understood strategic language for signaling in-
tent, capability and resolve. Uncertainty will encourage states 
to prepare for worst-case contingencies, a condition that could 
fuel escalation.”
Preemptive War
The ODB analogy also suggests that countries will face greater 
incentives for taking preemptive military action. If attack is 
relatively easy, the incentive to strike first is great, because a 
successful surprise attack provides larger rewards and averts 
looming dangers. If aggressors and potential adversaries are 
persistently vulnerable to cyber attack, there is little hope for 
the emergence of stability, predictability, and trust.30 Instead, 
states—facing few if any observable signs of imminent attack, 
the prospect of an attack being carried out instantaneously, 
and the danger of surprise strategic decapitation—will be 
sorely tempted to land their own decisive blow first. In short, 
as states build more and more offensive cyber capabilities, they 
will grow more trigger-happy (mouse-happy?)—launching 
preemptive cyber attacks to exploit the advantage of the initia-
tive and deny the same opportunity to the adversary.
Preventive War
Cyber offense might also encourage states to launch more 
preventive cyber attacks. From an ODT perspective, the devel-
opment and deployment of the Stuxnet worm to attack Iran’s 
nuclear enrichment facilities was a harbinger of preventive 
cyberwar—marking a dangerous turning point where states 
will be tempted to reach for new and increasingly disruptive 
offensive cyber weaponry to address or eliminate military 
threats before they fully materialize. The fact that diplomatic 
or international legal restrictions have not advanced in lock-
step with these capabilities means that there is little to check 
the strategic temptation to mount preventive attacks.
Wars of Aggression
Finally, according to the ODB analogy, cyber offense-domi-
nance creates a greater likelihood of direct attack by a bel-
ligerent adversary. In particular, analysts worry about the 
possibility of a surprise attack designed to strike at the heart 
of country’s military power. Just as the right combination of 
offensive technologies and tactics emboldened Adolf Hitler to 
launch quick and decisive blitzkrieg operations against France 
in 1940, adversaries might seize upon offensive cyber weapons 
to attack the United States without warning and with devas-
tating strategic consequences. Former U.S. Secretary of De-
fense Leon Panetta labeled this danger a “cyber-Pearl Harbor,” 
with cyber attacks being used in conjunction with physical 
military attacks to cripple infrastructure, and kill and trauma-






that, according to Andrew Krepinevich, “much of the military 
capability of the United States could prove to be the modern 
equivalent of the Maginot Line.” Other analysts echo Krepin-
evich’s fear of a terrible surprise attack that would neutralize 
U.S. military advantages.32
PROBLEMS WITH APPLYING OFFENSE-
DEFENSE THEORY TO CYBERSPACE
Despite its prominence in international relations scholarship, 
potential policy relevance, and intuitive appeal, offense-
defense theory is deeply flawed. The core ODB concept is al-
most impossible to define, operationalize, and measure in any 
meaningful way. And the purported behavioral consequences 
stemming from state perceptions of the ODB are empirically 
unsupported. These problems have been discussed at length 
elsewhere, and need not be repeated here.33 
Applying these concepts in the cyber realm is equally prob-
lematic. The most general reason to doubt the utility of the 
ODB analogy in cyberspace stems from enormous uncertainty 
about whether cyber attacks can inflict significant military 
damage on a victim. Such uncertainty undermines the ap-
plicability of ODT predictions—about arms spirals, oppor-
tunistic wars of aggression, preventive wars, and preemptive 
wars—to cyberspace. 
Offense-defense theory is based on the idea that offense-domi-
nance makes quick and decisive victory possible, which in turn 
makes initiating war more attractive under a range of circum-
stances. Just as German leaders allegedly based their strategies 
for quick and decisive victory in Europe on perceived offense-
dominance before World War  I and II (with the Schlieffen 
Plan and Blitzkrieg, respectively), so too might countries opt 
for cyber attacks to deliver quick victory in the future. But, as 
Thomas Mahnken notes, “Cyber advocates have failed to offer 
a theory of victory for cyberwar, a chain of causal logic linking 
the use of cyber means to the achievement of political ends.”34 
It is reasonable to question whether cyber attacks can deliver 
victory in future conflicts, even in a supporting role with cyber 
attacks being used to bolster traditional military operations. It 
is even harder to see states (especially U.S. adversaries) being 
tempted enough by the offensive possibilities of cyberwar to 
initiate conflict.
We have little evidence so far of cyber weapons being used to 
cause physical damage, and almost none to military hardware. 
Clearly, the most likely kinds of cyber attack in the military 
realm would target U.S. C3I and logistical networks. But these 
sorts of attacks do not inflict any direct lethal damage, and 
their ability to either significantly undermine kinetic military 
operations or do so in a way that would contribute to suc-
cessfully defeating or coercing an adversary is questionable. 
Russia deployed cyber attacks against Georgia in support of 
military operations in 2008, but it is hard to extrapolate from 
this example to future attacks by weaker powers against the 
United States. 
Again, the power of the ODB analogy is that it helps explain 
why and when states that would otherwise be content or 
forced to live with the status quo would decide to launch mili-
tary attacks. The key logic is the appeal of winning quick and 
decisive victory. Cyber attacks, at present, appear to lack the 
prospect of having such decisive military and political effects. 
Cyber attacks have a limited shelf-life and require follow-up 
kinetic attacks to have any hope of military impact. And, in 
any event, such attacks are unlikely to dramatically shift the 
overall conventional military balance between states.
Perhaps most importantly, attackers would face a great deal of 
uncertainty in predicting the strategic effectiveness of cyber 
attacks. Such uncertainty is inherent to the enterprise—not 
only because of the difficulty of predicting how one’s own cy-
ber attacks will develop and spread, but also because of great 
uncertainty about a target’s defensive capabilities, ability to 
identify the attack quickly, and the ability to respond to such 
attacks. Preparatory probes and preliminary attacks are more 
likely simply to reveal vulnerabilities to the defender, which 
can then address them, than help the attacker discover weak 
points for subsequent exploitation. In short, it is hard to see 
how cyber attacks could be launched with the kind of confi-
dence about effectiveness that underpins offense-defense logic. 
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Arms Racing/Spirals of Hostility
The ODB analogy about the increased danger of arms racing 
under offense-dominance seems ill suited to understanding 
the dynamics in cyberspace. To be sure, the United States 
is ramping up its cybersecurity forces in response to evolv-
ing threats. But most of our understanding of evolving cyber 
threats comes from evidence of actual attacks; i.e., from ongo-
ing offensive operations. The logic of the security dilemma, by 
contrast, is that states living in a world of offense-dominance 
are forced to respond to military preparations by another actor, 
even if those preparations are for defensive purposes only: State 
A builds arms. State B sees those steps and is compelled to 
build more of its own arms to restore the military balance. State 
A sees State B’s response, fears B’s intentions, and so builds yet 
more arms. This spiral of reciprocal arms buildups generates 
such hostility and suspicion that both States are tempted to 
launch an attack during a crisis. 
In cyberspace, however, one country would have difficulty 
detecting that another country is ramping up its cyber ca-
pabilities in the absence of actual ongoing cyber attacks. If 
State A is not launching cyber attacks against State B, then 
State B is unlikely to perceive that State A is undertaking 
preparations for cyber attack—and therefore unlikely to re-
spond nervously with preparations of its own, which then 
contribute to the outbreak of conflict. In other words, the 
kind of preparations and counter-preparations that drive 
otherwise security-seeking states into an unintended and 
unstable arms race seem absent in cyberspace. If one state 
is already engaged in cyber attacks against another, there is 
no security dilemma dynamic caused by offense dominance. 
There is simply one state pursuing aggressive aims against 
another. 
Preemptive War
Preemptive strike incentives are vastly reduced when actors are 
uncertain of the effects of military attack. According to the 
logic of ODT, it is the clarity of effects—the decisive advantage 
of the first mover—that can lead states to attack regardless 
of whether they have aggressive or defensive aims. But that 
kind of clarity about effects is absent in cyberspace. Would a 
future adversary have any high degree of confidence that its 
preemptive cyber attacks would succeed as planned? Would 
the adversary (especially a relatively weaker one) bank its en-
tire strategy of follow-up military operations on the ability to 
achieve decisive advantages through a cyber first-strike? 
Note that once a state is engaged in conventional combat, un-
certainty about military effects is much less of an obstacle to 
action. States simply try various methods and learn from trial 
and error. But even in the conventional world, history does 
not provide many examples of true preemptive strikes.35 And 
the main reason for this is a lack of confidence that a surprise 
first strike would give the attacker a decisive advantage—es-
pecially when weighed against the cost of starting a war. The 
crisis of confidence seems even worse in cyberspace.
Preventive War
Preventive attacks are launched for the purpose of stalling the 
growth of an adversary. The typical scenario is of a state trying 
to stem its decline in relative power by using force against a 
rising state while that state is still vulnerable—that is, stran-
gling the baby in the crib before it grows up to harm you. But 
preventive attack can also be more appealing for a rising state 
if offense is dominant and the rising state fears being strangled 
in the crib.36
How does this logic play out in cyberspace? If a rising China, 
for example, sought to undermine U.S. power before that 
power could be used to stifle China’s growth, it would be far 
more likely to employ other tools of statecraft. For example, 
China might resort to financial actions aimed at wrecking 
the U.S. economy. Moreover, China has already built—and 
continues to build—powerful asymmetric conventional mili-
tary options that it could use to undermine U.S. power if it 
felt threatened by U.S. behavior. China has not resorted to 
either of these courses of action because it is deterred. Or it 
has determined that such steps would be counterproductive or 
simply ineffective. Cyber capabilities seem unlikely to change 
this basic calculus because China would face great uncertainty 








The most promising case for applying the ODB analogy to 
cyberspace might lay in the argument that cyber offense-
dominance will embolden a belligerent adversary to launch 
a direct attack. An aggressive adversary might be tempted to 
launch a surprise attack if it thought it could strike decisively 
at the heart of its enemy’s military power. But the “cyber Pearl 
Harbor” scenario is far-fetched. Objective analysts have raised 
much skepticism about the ability to conduct truly decisive 
offensive cyber warfare, and states are unlikely to be more opti-
mistic than armchair analysts. The uncertainty behind Japan’s 
gamble in 1941 was less about its ability to inflict damage on 
the U.S. fleet at Pearl Harbor—and thus on the U.S. ability 
to project power in the Pacific—than about the will of U.S. 
leaders and the American people to sustain support for a long 
and bloody conflict. (It is also worth noting that few states in 
the future are likely to face such desperate circumstances as 
those faced by Japan in 1941.) By comparison, uncertainty 
about both the military effectiveness of a cyber bolt-from-the-
blue and the political impact of such an attack would seem to 
overwhelm any theory of decisive strategic victory. 
In short, the inherent uncertainty about the effects of offen-
sive operations in cyberspace undermines predictions derived 
from the ODB analogy. States that would otherwise accept 
the status quo are unlikely to be led by cyber offense down a 
spiral of hostility into arms racing and preemptive or preven-
tive attacks. And there is no compelling reason to believe that 
hostile U.S. adversaries will face greater incentives to launch 
cyber attacks than they otherwise might in the absence of any 
comprehension of a cyber offense advantage.
CONCLUSION
This paper examines what offense-dominance in cyberspace 
implies for U.S. Cyber Command’s understanding and articu-
lation of its role and mission in U.S. national security policy. 
On the surface, there seem good reasons for concern. Cyber 
attacks have clear advantages over cyber defense. According to 
offense-defense theory, offensive advantage in military opera-
tions exacerbates the security dilemma among states, leading 
to a greater likelihood of dangerous arms races and attacks 
driven by preemptive, preventive, and aggressive motives. To 
make matters worse, and in comparison with the conventional 
realm of operations, cyberspace entails rapid technological in-
novation and much uncertainty about the nature and source 
of attacks. All of this suggests great cause for worry.
However, the answer offered here is that although U.S. com-
manders should be concerned about many cyber threats, the 
prospect of greater conflict stemming from offense dominance 
is not one of them. In particular, instability and competition 
among states that would otherwise be willing to accept the 
status quo seems highly unlikely. To be sure, offense is rela-
tively easier than defense in cyberspace. But the inability to 
sufficiently predict and control the consequences of cyber 
attacks serves as a major check on the incentive to resort to 
such attacks. Neither fearful nor aggressive states will find an 
answer to their national security problems in the cyber realm. 
The equivalent of a “null” research finding might initially seem 
unsatisfying for policymakers and military planners seeking 
to make sense of the dynamics of cyberspace. But identify-
ing exaggerated security fears is a crucial step in formulating 
wise strategy. U.S. military planners need to devote cyber 
resources to deal with the threats that matter, not those that 
don’t. Moreover, U.S. policymakers need to marshal persua-
sive counterarguments to any claims that the growth of U.S. 
cyberpower—especially in the realm of active defenses and of-
fensive capabilities—is somehow dangerous and destabilizing. 
The United States should maintain and bolster its impressive 
cyber capabilities because doing so can only strengthen deter-
rence. Relatively weaker states are unlikely to be emboldened 
by the offense-dominant nature of cyber weapons. The pos-
sibility of reaping important military advantages, much less 
winning quick and decisive victories, by resorting to cyber 
attack is at present remote. U.S. adversaries that are sophisti-
cated enough to develop and deploy effective cyber capabilities 
are unlikely to be deceived by such a possibility, particularly if 
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The Offense-Defense Balance and Cyber Warfare
A Repertory of Cyber Analogies
Robert Axelrod 
Ford School of Public Policy, University of Michigan
This report provides a repertory of 35 analogies relevant to issues related to cyber conflict. Analogies such as these can serve several 
purposes: to motivate (by fear or inspiration), to demonstrate what is possible, to provide examples from the past of things to avoid, 
and to illuminate particular features of past events that might be worth thinking about in preparation for cyber conflict. The report 
provides the implications of each analogy. These implications can be thought of as lessons from the past that can be useful once 
again, despite important changes in technology, doctrine, organization and political context. The analogies are organized in sec-
tions covering historical analogies from before, during, and after World War II, and include a section on functional analogies such 
as those inspired by biology. The report includes an appendix on a tactic that has been used by the Chinese that is quite distinct 
from Western conceptions of deterrence, namely the denial of retaliatory intent. 
BEFORE WORLD WAR II 
1. David and Goliath
Asymmetric cyber warfare can topple a giant. The religious 
significance of the story is somewhat different, namely that 
overwhelming odds can be overcome if God is on one’s side. 
For many Muslims, the Soviet defeat in Afghanistan is a clear 
example of David and Goliath. 
2. “Remember the Maine”
Destruction of a military target can lead to jingoism and be 
used to justify war, even if the destruction could have been an 
accident. In 1898, the U.S.S. Maine exploded in Havana har-
bor, leading to the battle cry of “Remember the Maine, to Hell 
with Spain!” The exploitation of this event in the American 
press helped launch the Spanish-American War. The lesson for 
the cyber realm is that the meaning of an ambiguous event can 
be shaped by the media to appear to be a deliberately provoca-
tive act, resulting in a demand for an overwhelming response. 
In the case of China, the national media is controlled by the 
regime, but when the indignation of ultra-nationalist micro 
bloggers resonates with the broader public, the resulting pres-
sure on the government could be intense. (See also 16, “Gulf 
of Tonkin Incidents.”)
3. Demise of Piracy
Major powers working together can eliminate private attempts 
to do damage to the global economy, e.g. by holding companies 
hostage.  On the other hand, territories without proper gover-
nance (whether geographic or virtual) can be havens for piracy.
4. Privateering
Implication:   Some activities that look like piracy might be 
legally sponsored by a nation, as specified in the U.S. Consti-
tution. “Letters of marque and reprisal could be the latter-day 
equivalent to empower cyber-privateers in this way to go after 
certain targets … The possibility of cyber militias comes to 
mind as well (the Chinese are actually encouraging the forma-
tion of these).”1  
5. Unrestricted Submarine Warfare
A tactic that begins by being regarded as “sneaky” and dishon-
orable can become accepted, as unrestricted submarine war-
fare did during the course of World War I. Observing the re-
quirement to warn ships about to be attacked greatly reduced 
the value of the submarine, which is why giving warning was 
abandoned.2 Of course, on the way to becoming accepted, 
the dishonorable tactic can contribute to an overwhelm-






unrestricted submarine warfare contributed to the American 
decision to enter World War I. The lesson for cyber conflict is 
that new modes of attack are often seen as dishonorable, and 
therefore could elicit stronger responses than would otherwise 
be expected.
6. Unanticipated Information Requirements 
for British Economic Warfare in World War I
The implementation of a policy may require information in 
ways not anticipated in peacetime. At the outset of World 
War  I, when Britain tried to implement economic warfare 
against Germany, it found that the information collected in 
peacetime was not always what was needed for wartime. In ad-
dition, even when the information was collected, it was often 
distributed over many different parts of the government (and 
the private sector) in ways that made it impossible to aggre-
gate in a timely way.  The difficulties of aggregation included 
incompatibilities of definitions, periods covered, and formats 
in which the data is kept. There was the additional problem of 
withholding information for competitive reasons (either profit 
or bureaucratic power), as well as legal constraints on sharing.3 
7. Collateral Damage in British Economic 
Warfare in World War I
Collateral damage may require restrictions in the use of 
an otherwise successful form of warfare. Prior to World 
War  I, the British Admiralty had plans to exploit Britain’s 
dominant position in global trade and finance to strangle 
Germany and its allies at the outbreak of war. When war 
came, the policy was implemented, but it turned out to 
be impossible to strangle Germany without impinging on 
neutral rights in a manner highly provocative to the United 
States.4 U.S. cyber measures could hurt allies and neutrals in 
a conflict (e.g. Japan or EU) so much that the U.S. would 
have to call off its attack, just as the British had to.  An ex-
ample might be if a conflict that included cyber attacks left 
only limited bandwidth that was fully secure (say because it 
went through the latest generation of communications sat-
ellites). Then one could imagine that the Pentagon would 
want to commandeer virtually all of it, but our own private 
sector and our allies would demand some for themselves. 
DURING WORLD WAR II
8. Blitzkrieg
New doctrine is as important as new technology.  The French 
in 1940 had tanks, airplanes and radios, but only the Germans 
had the doctrine to take advantage of them.
9. Battle of Britain
A conflict can take place entirely within a single domain, such 
as air-to-air combat or cyberspace. The analogous conflict in 
cyberspace would be a standalone, overt cyber battle or war 
between nations, fought entirely within the domain of cyber-
space and fully engaging each side’s cyber attackers and de-
fenders (probably both in government and the private sector). 
Though tactical engagements might take place “at the speed 
of light” these would be mere dogfights in the context of the 
larger fight, with complete operations as part of offensive and 
defensive campaigns. A cyber Battle of Britain may develop 
slowly, through various phases (as did the original, 70 years 
ago) moving up from smaller, less-organized attacks before 
blossoming into a full force-on-force unleashing of violence. 
Each side may be deterred from making larger cyber attacks 
(as the Germans originally refraining from attacking cities) 
but continue to one-up the other nation in a progression of 
violence.5
10. Fort Eben Emael
When design criteria are specified too narrowly a supposedly 
well-designed defense can be easily overcome. On May 10, 
1940, seventy-seven Germans in gliders descended on Bel-
gium’s strongest fort, Eban Emael. Within a day, they had 
taken decisive steps to capture the garrison of 1,200. The fort 
was well “buttoned up” and protected by massive casements 
and embrasures, being optimized against heavy attack from a 
distance. To the Belgians, worried about such an attack, glid-
ers were an unknown unknown. Had the Belgians considered 
an attack from gliders directly onto the fort as even a very 
unlikely possibility, they could have easily taken measures to 
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11. Die Glückliche Zeit (Golden Time)
At the start of a major conflict one side might present numer-
ous easy targets until it adapts. Die Glückliche Zeit (Golden 
Time) is the German term for the period in the first summer 
of World War II when their submarines were able to sink 282 
Allied ships.7 The second Golden Time was the summer after 
the U.S. entered WWII when German subs were able to sink 
609 ships totaling more than three millions tons, roughly a 
quarter of the tonnage they sunk in the entire war.8 This is an 
example of
the ‘harbor lights’ phenomenon:   when the U.S. en-
tered WWII, it kept eastern seaboard cities’ lights on af-
ter dark, illuminating targets for U-boats.   The lights 
stayed on for fear of the economic consequences of 
blackout–—and blackout was only imposed when U-
boat depredations became too costly.  A bit like the cy-
bersecurity problem today.  The harbor lights are on all 
over cyberspace, but the hacker/U-boat captains haven’t 
done enough damage yet to cause more serious security 
measures to be taken.9 
12. Raid on Taranto
Vulnerabilities in one’s defenses can be revealed by observing 
how a similar defense was overcome in another setting. On 
November 11, 1940, British torpedo planes overcame the de-
fenses of the Italian battleships at Taranto by adapting their 
torpedoes to be effective in shallow waters.10 Nevertheless, the 
American Navy failed to learn from this surrogate experience, 
so the battleships at Pearl Harbor remained vulnerable to Japa-
nese torpedo plane attack.
13. Pearl Harbor
The trauma of Pearl Harbor means that the U.S. will always be 
alert to the possibility of a “bolt from the blue,” even though 
Pearl Harbor itself was hardly an example of one. In fact, an 
important lesson of Pearl Harbor (and many other surprise 
attacks) is that a country can be surprised by the nature of 
the attack, but is almost never attacked without days, if not 
weeks, of a serious political crisis that makes war a real possi-
bility in the near future.11 The implication for cyberwar is that 
even though a cyber attack can be launched without tactical 
warning, it is very likely that any major attack will only hap-
pen in the context of a serious political crisis. An important 
lesson is that a potential target of a major cyber attack should 
be prepared to take advantage of the time available in a cri-
sis to upgrade defensive capabilities in ways that may not be 
practical in ordinary times. Of course, there may be political 
constraints on taking any measures that could be seen by the 
other side as preparations for a preemptive attack.12
AFTER WORLD WAR II
14. China Crosses the Yalu
Sometimes attacks are made at the start of a conflict, and then 
quickly stop. The natural interpretation by the target is that 
the attack was halted when its initial efforts were thwarted 
by effective defenses. However, another possibility is that the 
attacker planned all along that the attack would be launched 
and then halted in order to send a warning. The attack might 
have been meant as a demonstration of willingness to resort to 
this type of attack, and the pause might be designed to give 
the other side a last chance to avoid a more serious conflict. 
In the autumn of 1950 as the United States forces were rout-
ing the North Korean Army and racing toward the Yalu River 
on the border with China, the Chinese tried to warn by both 
public and private messages that approaching the border 
would not be tolerated. The Chinese first sent troops over the 
Yalu to make contact with U.S. forces, and then deliberately 
broke contact. The U.S. did notice this but did not see it as 
a warning, despite other numerous diplomatic and public at-
tempts by the Chinese to warn the U.S. that it was about to 
intervene unless the U.S. backed off.13 
The Chinese did the same thing against India in 1962, and 
against Vietnam in 1979.14 In all three cases, the Chinese 
warned, then struck in a restrained manner, then paused, 
and—when their warnings were not heeded—they attacked in 
strength.15 I know of no other country that has used this tactic. 
The lesson is that when a cyber attack is halted, there are three 
possible interpretations: the attack failed, the attack was meant 






as a warning and was not a bluff. Especially if the attack comes 
from China, the third possibility needs to be taken seriously. 
[See also the Appendix.]
15. Vietnam and the Tet Offensive
A cyber attack could take the form of guerrilla warfare in-
volving a few large-scale incidents with large-scale effects, but 
also a continuing string of attritional attacks seeking to erode 
an adversary’s power, influence, and will. A typical tactic of 
guerrillas is to cause an overreaction from the other, more 
powerful, adversary as this can help push more people to 
support the guerrillas’ cause. Another is to ensure civilians 
are impacted directly or indirectly to force them to pressure 
their government to cease hostilities or influence the way the 
war is fought. In a true “cyber Vietnam” the attacking group 
would also have the backing of a national sponsor, aiding 
and encouraging its campaigns, though possibly unwilling 
to commit their own cyber or traditional military forces.16 
The massive Tet Offensive of 1968 was based on the premise 
that the urban population would rise up against the Saigon 
government if given the chance. The premise turned out to 
be wrong and the immediate result was the decimation of 
the Viet Cong. But the Tet Offensive had the unforeseen and 
possibly decisive effect of undermining the will of the Ameri-
can public to prosecute the war. The lesson for cyber attacks 
is that the effects may be important without being foreseen.
16. The Gulf of Tonkin Incidents
Seemingly solid information that an attack happened might 
have been subject to bureaucratic processes that filtered out 
contradictory information, leading to the same result as if the 
attack had happened. The first incident in the Gulf of Tonkin 
was an attack on a U.S. destroyer by ships from North Viet-
nam on August 2, 1964. Two days later another attack was 
reported, but that report was based on misinterpretation of 
radar imagery—an error that was quickly identified but not 
corrected until much later.17 In any case, only three days after 
the second “incident” Congress passed the Gulf of Tonkin 
Resolution that provided justification for presidential action 
for the rest of the Vietnam War. The lesson for the cyber realm 
is that evidence of an attack needs to be verified with care.
17. The Cold War
The lesson most Americans have derived from the Cold War is 
that a patient policy of containment was successful. The impli-
cation of invoking the Cold War is that rivalry can be limited 
and crises need not explode.18 
18. Mutual Assured Destruction
Deterrence of nuclear war, and even direct combat between 
the superpowers, was (apparently) effective for sixty years, 
making deterrence a highly salient concept for the prevention 
of cyber war.  Despite the attempts to adapt the concept of de-
terrence to the differences between kinetic and cyber conflict, 
it has been a stretch.  For example, the core concept of mutual 
assured destruction does not apply.   Likewise, the core con-
cept of deterrence that requires clarity of response in order to 
achieve credibility of commitment does not necessarily apply 
to cyber conflict, since ambiguity might be helpful to avoid 
retaliation, even if the ambiguity lessens deterrence. (For more 
on China’s use of ambiguity, see analogy 24, “Chinese Restric-
tion of Rare Earth Exports,” and the Appendix.)
19. Escalation Ladder
The clarity of the nuclear threshold has helped sustain the 
taboo against the use of nuclear weapons.  There are potential 
thresholds between cyber espionage and  cyberwar, but they 
are not yet widely understood or agreed upon.  Nor is there 
even convergence on how the terms should be defined. There 
is not even convergence on what kinetic actions in response 
to a given kind of cyber attack would constitute escalation or 
de-escalation. 
20. Control of Chemical Weapons
Even without effective verification, agreements on limiting 
cyber attacks (e.g. to military targets) could prove effective.
21. MIRV (multiple independently 
targetable re-entry vehicle) 
In a rivalry, the side with a technical advantage (such as the 
U.S. had in the 1970s with MIRVs) may miss an opportunity 
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detection was easy at the stage of testing, but almost impos-
sible once deployed. In retrospect, the U.S. would have been 
better off with an early arms control treaty banning the test-
ing of this destabilizing technology. At the time, however, the 
well-established principle prevailed that a military advantage 
should never be voluntarily surrendered, and there was little 
or no consideration of the destabilizing potential of that tech-
nology. The analogy will be apt when one side has a lead in a 
technology that would be destabilizing if deployed by both 
sides of a rivalry, when prohibition would be more reliably 
verifiable before deployment than afterwards. 
22. 9/11
There are terrorists who are plotting to inflict maximum dam-
age to the U.S. population.  Beside the obvious possibility of 
nuclear or biological weapons, there is also the potential dan-
ger of a cyber attack on a critical target such as a dam, hospital, 
power grid, or water purification system.
23. Wikileaks
When classified information is widely distributed to promote 
the “connection of the dots”, there is a corresponding risk of 
massive leakage.
24. Chinese Restriction of Rare Earth 
Exports
An act by one country that harms another is often ambiguous 
in its intent, even if the effect and the perpetrator are both 
clear. On September 7, 2010 the Japanese detained the captain 
of a ship in waters around a disputed island. The Chinese then 
cut their exports of rare earths by 72%. Since rare earths are 
essential for a variety of electronic and other industrial prod-
ucts, and China controlled 95% the global supply, the timing 
of the export restriction was seen by many in Japan and the 
West as retaliation, despite Chinese denials.19 For more on the 
Chinese tactic of denying retaliatory intent, see the Appendix.
25. Cyber Espionage
Espionage is done by everyone and is not an act of war.  Na-
tions maintain a “polite fiction” that they don’t do it, even if 
their rivals do. The burden is on the defense. Revealing es-
pionage often harms bilateral relations. The amount of harm 
done by cyber espionage, especially by China, is substantial 
but the U.S. public has not been aroused. 
26. Cyber Attack on Siberian Pipeline 
Cyber industrial sabotage by means of malware is nothing 
new. In 1982, the CIA introduced a logic bomb into exported 
pipeline software that was picked up by the KGB, leading to 
“the most monumental non-nuclear explosion and fire ever 
seen from space.”20
27. Cyber Attacks on the Iranian Nuclear 
Program
The use of cyber attacks by the U.S. and Israel against infra-
structure (as opposed to  cyber  espionage) now has a prec-
edent,21 making it easier for other nations to justify another 
such attack.   A potential “red line” still exists for attack on 
financial systems.
28. DigiNotar Certificate Authority Breach
Even the most trusted category of cyber authority could have 
“shocking ineptness” in its security system. DigiNotar was a 
supplier of trusted certificates to authenticate that a request 
on the Internet was being sent to the intended party. In 2011, 
over 500 false certificates for domains such as Google and 
Yahoo were issued through DigiNotar by an Iranian hacker. 
This hack resulted in 600,000 requests that were subject to a 
“man-in-the middle” attack. Over 95% of these requests came 
from Iran, suggesting that the purpose was to spy on Iranian 
Internet users. After the fact, an audit showed that DigiNotar’s 
servers ran out-of-date software. Its network was poorly 
segmented, so problems would not be contained if they 
arose. Passwords in play at the time of the hack might 
easily have been guessed via brute-force attack. In addi-
tion, there was no secure logging and server-side anti-
virus protection was absent.22 
In my opinion, some or all of these failures in elementary se-






tolerated by co-workers. The most important lesson is that 
cybersecurity indoctrination should include a version of West 
Point’s Honor Code such as “I will not violate cybersecurity 
procedures, or tolerate those who do.”23 
FUNCTIONAL ANALOGIES
29. Biodiversity vs. Weakest Link
The biodiversity metaphor suggests that diversity of cyber 
systems may result in resilience against attacks. On the other 
hand, if the problem is to protect information stored in vari-
ous systems, the “weakest link” metaphor suggests that diver-
sity of cyber systems makes the defense as weak as its weakest 
component.
30. Herd Immunity
If a sufficient proportion of the population is immune to a 
disease, the disease is unable to spread among the vulnerable 
parts of the population. 
31. Crime
A wide range of private (as opposed to state-sponsored)  cy-
ber activity can be suppressed by ordinary police work and the 
criminal justice system. 
32. Child Pornography
Some things are universally abhorred, and such things could 
be the basis of initial understandings and norms about activi-
ties in cyberspace.
33. Territorial Responsibility
The legal principle that a state is responsible for the prevention 
of illegal acts emanating from its territory can be extended 
to  cyberspace to hold nations responsible for  cyber activity 
launched from their own territories.  While the origin of a cy-
ber  activity is often impossible to trace, there may be times 
when its origin can be established. 
34. World Trade Organization
The principle of equivalent retaliation built into the treaty of 
the World Trade Organization makes enforcement of its rul-
ings quite effective.  If such a principle could be established for 
violations of norms in the cyber world, self-help enforcement 
could also be effective.
35. Insurance and Industry Standards
Individuals and companies purchase insurance to mitigate the 
effects of theft and other crimes.  In turn, insurance compa-
nies often set standards that require certain anti-theft mea-
sures to reduce their liability.  Insurance against cyber crime is 
not a well-established industry, largely because of the difficulty 
of assessing damage from a  cyber  crime in monetary terms.   
Nevertheless, there may be value is exploring whether the 
standards required by insurance companies could be adapted 
to prevent cyber crime.  For example, the computer security 
industry could set standards and issue the equivalent to a 
“Good Housekeeping Seal of Approval” for companies that 
meet those standards.
APPENDIX
Chinese Tactic of Denying Retaliation
The historical analogy Number 24, “Chinese Restriction 
of Rare Earths Exports” is worthy of elaboration because it 
involves an unusual tactic that China has used several times 
recently, and is readily adaptable to cyber conflict. 
In the last few years, China has employed a new pressure 
tactic against three countries with which it has a dispute: Ja-
pan, North Korea, and the Philippines. In each case, China 
suspended trade in specific commodities, while refusing to ac-
knowledge that the trade suspension had anything to do with 
the dispute. In two of the cases, China has apparently achieved 
its immediate goals, and the third case is still unfolding.
 ¡ After a Chinese ship captain was detained in Japan for 
sailing in waters near a disputed island on September 
7, 2010, China drastically curtailed its exports of rare 
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of many electronic products, and China controlled 
95% of the global supply.24 China denied it had a 
trade embargo with Japan, but after the captain was 
released, the trade returned to normal.25
 ¡ In January 2011, China suspended oil supplies to 
North Korea following the North’s shelling of Yeon-
pyeong Island. This was widely interpreted as an effort 
to prevent Pyongyang from carrying out its threats to 
retaliate against the South if the South went ahead 
with its live-fire exercises as planned.26 China has not 
publicly acknowledged its oil cut off, let alone pro-
vided a reason. Earlier suspensions without public 
acknowledgement have apparently occurred in 200327, 
200628, and 200829. For example, in March 2003, Chi-
na suspended oil shipments to North Korea for three 
days due to “technical difficulties” soon after Pyong-
yang test-fired a missile into waters between Korea and 
Japan. The move was widely interpreted as a successful 
effort to get North Korea to attend a trilateral meeting 
in Beijing the following month.
 ¡ On April 10, 2012, a Philippine naval ship tried to 
arrest Chinese fishermen near a disputed reef in the 
South China Sea. China then refused to allow 150 
containers of bananas to enter its market, saying that 
the bananas were “crawling with insects.” The Philip-
pines denied the charges and said that the insects the 
Chinese cited attack coconuts, not bananas.30 China 
never acknowledged that its interruption of trade with 
the Philippines was linked to the territorial dispute.
Four questions arise with respect to these cases: What’s new in 
the Chinese tactic? Why deny? Why China? and What’s next?
What’s New?
Countries have frequently resorted to economic pressure to 
get their way on some dispute. What is new in the Chinese 
tactic is the refusal to acknowledge that the pressure has any 
relationship to the issue at hand. I can think of no other coun-
try using a trade disruption to provide pressure on a security 
issue, where the timing of the disruption was publicly pre-
sented as totally coincidental. 
Of course, other countries have often used economic pressure 
to attain security goals. For example, in 1956 when Britain 
and France invaded Suez, the United States successfully used 
financial pressure to force them to withdraw. But the United 
States did not claim that its financial sanctions were merely 
coincidental. Nor has Pakistan claimed any pretext when it 
expressed its anger at U.S. actions by halting NATO supply 
trucks en route to Afghanistan in 2010 and again in 2011.31
There are also many cases in which a country took military 
action that it did not acknowledge, or sought “plausible deni-
ability.” The U.S. responsibility for the Bay of Pigs invasion is 
just one of many examples, some successful and some not.32 
But I can’t think of any incidents in which the actions in the 
economic domain were taken to apply pressure in the security 
domain, along with claims that the timing of the economic 
pressure was purely coincidental.
In fact, standard strategic doctrine—as understood in the 
West—emphasizes that threats and warnings should be ex-
plicit for two reasons: to achieve maximum credibility, and to 
make clear what must be done to end the pressure. This raises 
the questions of why one might deliberately deny that a trade 
disruption is related to the security issue at hand, and why 
China is the one using this new tactic. 
Why Deny?
Apparently the purpose of denying that the trade disruption 
is related to the security issue is to allow the other side to save 
face when backing down. Even if everyone knows that there is 
a linkage, the idea that there isn’t any linkage is something we 
might call “a polite fiction.”33 
Polite fictions are common in everyday discourse such as the 
polite fiction “All teachers at our school admire one another 
and the principal.” Everyone knows or suspects this is a fic-
tion, but the statement’s veracity is never pressed. It serves 
like the willing suspension of disbelief—allowing everyone to 
maintain the personae they have constructed for the purpose 
of social interaction.34 
In blunt strategic terms, the polite fiction of the Chinese tactic 






the cost to the other side of backing down—something of ob-
vious value to the Chinese.35 
Why China?
It is often said that East Asian cultures are more concerned 
with “saving face” than Western cultures are. Perhaps so, but 
there are plenty of examples in which Western countries have 
put great store in saving face.36 For example, in the Cuban 
Missile Crisis President Kennedy took care to call his action 
a “quarantine” rather than a “blockade” because a blockade 
was an act of war and he did not want the Soviets to have to 
acknowledge giving in to an act of war. Even more important, 
in the deal that resolved the crisis, the Americans insisted to 
the Soviets that the promised removal of American missiles 
from Turkey remain secret, so that neither the U.S. nor its 
Turkish ally would lose face when the missiles were actually 
removed a few months later.37 
So if other countries have also been concerned with saving 
face, why has China been the one to invent the tactic of claim-
ing that the timing of its economic pressure was only coinci-
dentally related to a security issue? One reason is that China is 
concerned to support its claim that it seeks a “peaceful rise”. For 
this reason it wants to avoid acknowledging that it uses undue 
pressure to resolve security issues. Another reason why China, 
rather than a Western power, is the one to invent this tactic is 
that (as described earlier), ambiguous threats and warnings are 
simply inconsistent with the dominant Western conception of 
how to achieve deterrence and compellance. One might want 
to be a bit vague about the consequences if things escalate, 
but one wouldn’t want to leave any unnecessary doubt in the 
target’s mind that a threat was being issued, and one would 
want to display as much commitment as possible that further 
action would be taken if the situation remained unsatisfactory. 
Or so says standard Western security doctrine. 
Indeed the Western approach to clarity draws not only on game 
theory, but also on major lessons from the outbreak of the two 
most traumatic events in the West, namely World War I and 
World War  II. At the outbreak of World War  I, Britain had 
not yet made clear that it would declare war on Germany if 
Germany violated the neutrality of Belgium. An important 
lesson was that clarity might have deterred Germany from in-
vading Belgium.38 Likewise, a major lesson from the failure to 
deter Germany from launching World War II is that the Allies 
should have decided much earlier and made it very clear that 
they would resist Hitler’s aggressive demands by force if neces-
sary. On the other hand, China’s experience—both before and 
after 1949—is that subtlety is often better than clarity.
What Next?
China’s use of its new tactic has clearly achieved its immediate 
goal when applied to both Japan and North Korea, but it is 
too early to tell if it achieved its immediate goal when applied 
to the Philippines. But it is plausible to assume that the tactic 
works well at a low enough cost to China and would be used 
again when the conditions are right. The conditions seem to 
be that China wishes to exert pressure in a given domain (such 
as a security issue), but wants to avoid the appearance of using 
pressure. The desire to avoid the appearance (or at least the 
acknowledgement) of pressure can be due to several factors, 
including China’s desire to maintain its posture of “peaceful 
rise,” its desire to avoid domestic reactions from its own public 
or the publics of the targeted country, and its desire to make 
it easier for the other side to give in to China. No doubt these 
conditions are likely to arise many times in the years to come, 
not only on issues related to sovereignty over disputed islands, 
but on other issues of deep concern to China in dealing with 
countries like North Korea, and perhaps Taiwan. 
China must, however, weigh the prospects of short-term suc-
cess against the possibility of incurring long-term costs with 
its new tactic. For example, China’s disruption of rare earth 
exports was quickly followed by Japan’s release of the Chinese 
sea captain it held, but it also led to a global awareness of 
China’s virtual monopoly of the supply of these valuable ma-
terials.39 The result has been a buildup of inventories of rare 
earths and a readiness to restore production elsewhere, two 
steps that will soon dramatically reduce the vulnerability of 
other countries to any future disruption of Chinese exports of 
rare earths. In retrospect, China may regret not having saved 
its one-time opportunity to exert this pressure in a dispute 
of greater importance to China.40 They may also come to re-
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of which may be greater U.S.-Philippines security coopera-
tion—albeit under the polite fiction that it has nothing to do 
with China.41 
In a future confrontation with the United States, a country 
might choose to use a cyber attack rather than an economic ac-
tion. A cyber attack could be designed both to show displeasure 
with the United States, and to imply the possibility of escala-
tion if it is not satisfied with the American response. A cyber 
attack has the advantage of not being as easily attributable as 
an economic action would be. To make it easier for the U.S. 
to give in, the instigator may once again assert that whatever 
harm occurred was not intended, and that the timing was 
purely coincidental.42  i
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